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THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO
CORPORATE EXPATRIATIONS: THE TENSION
BETWEEN SYMBOLS AND SUBSTANCE IN THE
TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
Michael S. Kirsch*
During the past few years, several high-profile U.S.-based
multinational corporations have changed their tax residence from the
United States to Bermuda or some other tax haven. They have
accomplished these expatriations, and the resulting millions of dollars
of annual tax savings, merely by changing the place of incorporation of
their corporate parent, without the need to make any substantive
changes to their business operations or their U.S.-based management
structure. Congress and the media have focused significant attention on
this phenomenon. Despite this attention, Congress initially enacted only
a non-tax provision targeting corporate expatriations - a purported
ban on expatriated companies entering into contracts with the
Department of Homeland Security. This article addresses this
alternative sanction, concluding that it is prototypical symbolic
legislation, with no instrumental effect. The article also discusses the
extent to which the initial Congressional debate over expatriations may
have had indirect instrumental effects by furthering the informal
enforcement of social norms. Ultimately, after almost three years of
debate, Congress enacted a tax provision intended to deny the desired
tax benefits to expatriating corporations. The article also addresses the
substantive tax policy implications of this response, concluding that it
illustrates the tenuous normative underpinnings of the place-of-
incorporation rule for determining corporate residence and the need for
Congress to reconsider what makes a corporation "American" in an
increasingly globalized world.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years,' several well-known U.S.-based
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B., Cornell
University, 1985; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1988; LL.M., New York University
School of Law, 1989. 1 would like to thank Matthew J. Barrett, Christopher H.
Hanna, Gregg D. Polsky, and Julian Velasco for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this article. I would also like to thank Sonja Redmond and Tracy Villecco for
their helpful research assistance.
1 Corporate inversions began as a relatively rare phenomenon. The first
modern inversion occurred in 1983, with the second inversion not occurring until
1994. See Willard B. Taylor, Corporate Expatriotions - Why Not?, 78 TAXES 146,
146-49 (2000); cf. Robert J. Peroni et al., Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of
U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 461 n.28, 473 n.78 (1999);
David R. Tillinghast, Recent Developments in International Mergers, Acquisitions and
Restructurings, 72 TAXES 1061, 1063-68 (1994) (discussing the 1983 McDermott
International corporate inversion and the 1994 Helen of Troy corporate inversion and
the Service's responses to each). However, in the past few years, a significant number
of high-profile corporate inversions have occurred. See OFFICE OF TAX POL'Y, DEP'T
OF TREASURY, CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1,
3 (2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/inversion.pdf
[hereinafter TREASURY INVERSION STUDY] (noting that "[s]ince the late 1990s, an
increasing number of U.S.-based multinational corporations have engaged in so-called
'corporate inversions"' and "[i]n recent months several high-profile U.S. companies
have announced plans to reincorporate outside the United States.").
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multinational corporations have engaged in restructurings known as
"expatriations" or inversions. Pursuant to an inversion, a
corporate group changes the parent corporation's place of
incorporation from a U.S. state, such as Delaware, to a foreign
country, such as Bermuda or the Cayman Islands.
It is important to distinguish these corporate expatriations from
related phenomena such as "runaway plants" and "outsourcing." The
runaway plant phenomenon involves corporations with U.S.
manufacturing operations shutting down those operations and shifting
production to a foreign location. Similarly, outsourcing involves a
corporation eliminating service positions in the United States and
instead hiring service workers in a foreign location. In contrast to
these phenomena, a corporate expatriation does not involve any
immediate change in the physical location of the corporate group's
management headquarters, manufacturing operations, services, or
other activities.' Instead, expatriation merely reflects a formal legal
The list of companies that have undergone inversions includes McDermott
International, Helen of Troy, Triton Energy, Tyco International, Fruit of the Loom,
Cooper Industries, and Ingersoll-Rand. Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr.,
Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate
Inversions, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 409, 418-20 (2002) (summarizing significant corporate
expatriations between 1983 and 2002). At the height of the inversion trend in 2002,
seven companies among the Standard & Poor's 500 had expatriated, or were in the
process of expatriating. Id. at 416; see also infra note 165. For a useful summary of
the history of corporate inversions, their transactional structures, and the possible
government responses thereto, see Hal Hicks, Overview of Inversion Transactions:
Selected Historical, Contemporary, and Transactional Perspectives, 30 TAX NOTES
INT'L 899 (June 2, 2003).
2 The term "expatriation" derives from the movement of the corporate parent's
place of incorporation from within the United States to a foreign country. The term
"inversion" refers to the flip in the corporate structure as a result of the transaction.
Prior to the transaction, a U.S.-incorporated parent serves as the holding company for
U.S.- and foreign-incorporated subsidiaries, whereas after the transaction a foreign-
incorporated parent serves as the holding company for U.S.- and foreign-incorporated
subsidiaries. This article uses the terms "inversion" and "expatriation"
interchangeably.
3 A typical corporate inversion:
... is accomplished by reincorporating in an appropriate foreign location,
such as Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, typically by having a firm's
foreign subsidiary exchange its shares for those of the American parent
company. Individual shareholders, who previously owned shares of the
American parent company, will then own shares of the foreign (parent)
company, which owns the American company. These transactions are
commonly referred to as "inversions," since their impact is to invert the
[Vol. 24:475
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corporate structure: the erstwhile [foreign] subsidiary becomes the parent,
and the erstwhile [U.S.] parent becomes the subsidiary.
Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 410. The House Ways and Means Committee of the
107th Congress defined "mailbox" inversions, the most widely-reported type of
inversion, as:
... occur[ing] when a U.S. company switches only its place of incorporation
to a low tax foreign jurisdiction (such as Bermuda) but does not change its
overall corporate structure, its operations, or the location of its employees.
For all purposes, other than tax, the company continues to be and act like a
U.S. company.
Ways and Means Summary of American Competitiveness and Corporate
Accountability Act, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 12, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 134-45). See also TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1,
at 1-2 (inversion transactions "all involve little or no immediate operational
change .... [and are] complicated technically but virtually transparent
operationally .... ); S.B. 640, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) ("[a]n expatriate
company is a United States based company that has moved in name and on paper
only to a tax haven country and has no substantial business activities in the country of
reincorporation."); NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION TAX SECTION REPORT ON
OUTBOUND INVERSION TRANSACTIONS (2002), available at http://www.nysba.org/
content/contentgroups/SectionInformationl/TaxSectionReports/1014report.pdf
[hereinafter NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT]:
The inverted corporation typically is a "shell" corporation, which inverted
corporation, although in substance operationally headquartered in the U.S.,
achieves foreign status merely by filing organizing papers in a tax haven
and then typically claims "residency" in a separate U.S. tax treaty
jurisdiction through what can be seen as minimal contacts with that
jurisdiction.
Id. at 25. For interesting details regarding the practical aspects of incorporating in
Bermuda, see DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN
TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH - AND CHEAT EVERYBODY
ELSE 232 (2003).
Some commentators have argued that in the long run a corporate group whose
parent is incorporated outside the United States might be more likely to locate future
investments outside thc United States. See, e.g., Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., & Robert
Allen Clary II, Economic Substance, Inversions, and the Bush-Kerry International Tax
Reform Debate, 103 TAX NOTES 1385, 1386 (June 14, 2004) ("[a]lthough the
outsourcing problem is larger than inversions, it seems clear that inversions contribute
to the movement of capital and jobs offshore."). But see DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FIRMS THAT INCORPORATE ABROAD FOR TAX
PURPOSES: CORPORATE "INVERSIONS" AND "EXPATRIATION," available at Increased
Corporate Inversions Causing Tax Policy Reform Concerns, Says CRS Report, TAX
NOTES TODAY (June 12, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT
113-26) [hereinafter CRS INVERSION STUDY]:
In the long run, inversions may be accompanied by some increased level of
U.S. investment abroad; a firm that inverts reduces its tax burden on new
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change in the country in which the parent corporation's articles of
incorporation are filed.4
Recent corporate expatriations have been driven by a desire to
reduce U.S. income tax liability. The Internal Revenue Code (Code)5
imposes significant tax consequences based on a corporation's
residence,' which is determined solely by its place of incorporation.
Accordingly, by changing the place of incorporation of the corporate
parent, a multinational group might be able to save millions of dollars
in U.S. taxes.8 For example, Cooper Industries anticipated a $55
foreign investment compared to domestic investment. However, any such
shift may be small, and the recent corporate inversions do not appear to be
accompanied by substantive shifts of economic activity from the United
States to locations offshore.
Id.
, As a practical matter the legal steps that must be taken in order to accomplish
this ultimate result are more complicated than merely filing new articles of
incorporation in a foreign jurisdiction. For additional details regarding the technical
structure of corporate inversions, see TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at
4-7. See also NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 14-20.
5 The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (Code), which contains the
laws imposing the federal income tax and other taxes, is codified in Title 26 of the
United States Code.
6 The relevant Code provisions and tax consequences are discussed infra notes
19-40 and accompanying text. Technically, a corporation generally is not classified as
a resident or nonresident under the Code, but instead is characterized as either
"domestic" or "foreign." Cf Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-5 (2004) (discussing the technical
usage of the terms "domestic," "foreign," and "resident" in the context of Treasury
Regulations). For convenience, and because this article focuses on the applicability of
the residence-based theory of taxation to corporations, this article sometimes refers to
the domestic or foreign characterization of a corporation as the corporation's
residence.
7 See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) ("[t]he term 'domestic' when applied to a
corporation ... means created or organized in the United States or under the law of
the United States or of any State...").
8 The anticipated tax benefits flowing from expatriations and related
transactions are discussed in more detail infra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
Despite the relatively recent nature of major corporate inversions, at least some of
the tax incentives underlying inversions were identified in the early days of the
modern income tax. As Professors Graetz and O'Hear observed:
[As early as 1921,] [b]usinesses that derived much income from jurisdictions
with low income taxes had a tax incentive to trade in their American
charters, reincorporate in a foreign jurisdiction, and thereby avoid
American taxes.
Even in the early days of income taxation, experience was proving that the
corporate form could and would be easily manipulated in order to escape
[Vol. 24:475
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million annual tax savings from its expatriation,' while Ingersoll-Rand
expected a $40 million savings in the first year and larger amounts
thereafter."
As might be expected, the prospect of large multinational
corporations reincorporating abroad to escape U.S. tax liability has
attracted significant media and political attention. In the past three
years, more than three dozen bills were introduced in Congress to
address corporate expatriations," and numerous legislative hearings
and debates occurred."
The expatriation phenomenon has, in effect, become a Rorschach
test of international tax policy. In interpreting the causes of and
appropriate responses to corporate expatriations, legislators have
projected their own tax policy belief systems onto the phenomenon.
residence-based taxation. In the 1920s, such manipulation not only
circumvented the residence backstop, but also was considered a threat to
American prestige and economic power; many successful American
businesses abroad might ultimately be transformed into foreign enterprises.
Moreover, those American businesses that remained incorporated in the
United States claimed they were being handicapped in competition with
foreign firms from countries that exempted all foreign source income from
any domestic taxation.
Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International
Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1060 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
9 See COOPER INDUSTRIES INC., SEC FORM 425, Feb. 13, 2002.
10 See INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY., SEC FORM 425, Oct. 18, 2001.
1 See infra note 68.
12 Several Congressional committees and subcommittees have held hearings on
corporate inversions. See, e.g., Dorgan Opening Statement at Hearing on Corporate
Inversions, TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 17, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec.
cit., 2002 TNT 201-34) (hearing before Senate Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm.
on Treasury & General Government); Unofficial Transcript of Hearing on Corporate
Inversions, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 1, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec.
cit., 2002 TNT 126-67) (hearing before House Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm.
on Select Revenue Measures); Unofficial Transcript of W&M Hearing on Corporate
Inversions, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 12, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec.
cit., 2002 TNT 113-32) (hearing before House Comm. on Ways and Means). In
addition, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation published a report on the
topic. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., BACKGROUND AND
DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT-LAW RULES AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO CORPORATE
INVERSION TRANSACTIONS (2002) [hereinafter JCT INVERSION REPORT], available at
http://www.house.gov/jctlx-52-02.pdf. See also TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra
note 1 at 3-30 (providing technical and analytical input to the inversion debate);
Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 321 (2001) (citing
legislative concerns in 2000 regarding an upcoming era of corporate expatriation).
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For example, some legislators view expatriations in a sympathetic
light, as an understandable response to an overreaching tax code, and
argue that the phenomenon reflects the need to curtail drastically the
scope of U.S. international taxation. Others view the U.S.
international tax system as fundamentally sound, or perhaps even too
limited in its scope, and characterize expatriations as unpatriotic tax
avoidance by greedy corporations. The legislative proposals and
debates reflect these widely varying viewpoints.
Despite the significant legislative attention given to corporate
expatriations over the past few years, Congress initially refrained from
enacting legislation directly addressing the tax consequences of
corporate expatriations. Instead, Congress initially targeted the
phenomenon through non-tax legislation. 3 That non-tax legislation,
part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002,14 purports to prevent
expatriated corporations from entering into government contracts
with the Department of Homeland Security. 5 Thus, rather than
directly addressing the tax provisions and underlying tax policies
implicated by corporate expatriations, Congress initially relied on an
"alternative sanction" - i.e., a mechanism outside of the traditional
civil and criminal sanctions that is used to stop a perceived abuse of
the tax law. 6
For almost two years following the enactment of this alternative
sanction, Congress periodically entertained proposals aimed at the tax
13 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 835, 116 Stat. 2135,
2227 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 395 (2003)), amended by Pub. L. No.,
108-7 § 101(c)(2), 117 Stat. 526, 528 (2003).
14 The principal effect of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was to establish the
Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
296, § 101,116 Stat. 2135, 2142 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2003)).
" Section 835 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides, in general, that
"[t]he Secretary [of Homeland Security] may not enter into any contract with a
foreign incorporated entity which is treated as an inverted domestic corporation .. "
Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 835(a), 116 Stat. 2135, 2227 (2002) (codified as amended at 6
U.S.C. § 395 (2003)). A foreign incorporated entity is treated as an "inverted
domestic corporation" if, after the Act's November 25, 2002 enactment date, the
entity engaged in a transaction that satisfies certain specified criteria characteristic of
a corporate inversion. See id. § 835(b), (c)(3), 116 Stat. at 2227-29.
16 Several states have also enacted or proposed alternative sanctions targeting
inverted corporations. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. For a detailed
critique of alternative sanctions in the context of individuals who surrender their
citizenship for tax-avoidance purposes, see Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions
and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a
Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863 (2004).
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consequences of corporate expatriations. The House and the Senate
each developed, and passed, their own respective tax-focused bills,
which adopted significantly different approaches to the
phenomenon." The House-favored bill would have limited certain tax
benefits associated with expatriations, but in general would have
continued to permit corporations to obtain significant tax benefits by
expatriating. In contrast, the Senate-favored bill would have
eliminated all tax benefits associated with expatriations by, in effect,
disregarding the inversion transaction and continuing to treat the
corporate group's parent as a domestic corporation. Ultimately, in
late 2004, Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
(AJCA), which contained a tax-focused expatriation provision based
largely on the Senate's approach. 8
This article addresses Congress's responses to corporate
expatriations - in particular the initial alternative sanction contract
ban and the more recent tax-focused legislation. Applying theories of
symbolic legislation and social norms as well as an analysis of the
normative tax policy arguments underlying the Congressional
responses, the article concludes that these responses reflect an
abdication of Congress's responsibility to create a coherent and
consistent scheme for taxing multinational corporations in an
increasingly globalized economy.
Part I of the article provides background information regarding
the U.S. taxation of multinational corporations and the tax
consequences of corporate expatriations. Part II then provides
relevant details regarding Congress's response to the phenomenon.
Part III analyzes the Congressional response through the lens of
symbolic legislation theory. The analysis focuses on the symbolic
nature of the alternative sanction purporting to deny future
government contracts to inverted corporations, concluding that, like
most symbolic legislation, this provision has little instrumental effect.
Instead, it is principally intended to allow legislators to claim public
credit for having responded to a perceived problem while, at the same
time, permitting them to avoid detrimental tax consequences to a
politically powerful group of corporations. Part III reaches a similar
conclusion with respect to the tax-focused proposal that was favored
17 The House and Senate proposals are discussed infra notes 91-95 and
accompanying text.
IR Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1562 (2004) (adding new Code
section 7874(b)). This legislation is discussed infra notes 96-97 and accompanying
text.
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by the House of Representatives.
Part IV considers whether, despite the lengthy delay in enacting
instrumentally effective legislation, the mere fact that Congress
debated the issue may have had secondary instrumental effects. In
particular, it extends the expressive theory of legislation into an
expressive theory of legislative debate to determine whether Congress
may have influenced social norms regarding corporate expatriations
indirectly.
Finally, Part V focuses on the tax policy implications of
Congress's response. In particular, it addresses the expatriation
provision of the AJCA. It concludes that this tax provision, by
disregarding the expatriated corporation's new foreign place of
incorporation, raises fundamental questions as to the central role a
corporation's place of incorporation plays under current tax law. It
analyzes the tenuous normative justifications for the current place-of-
incorporation rule, concluding that the United States should consider
alternative rules for determining a corporation's place of residence
and should adopt a uniform definition applicable regardless of
expatriation status.
I. BACKGROUND - OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT U.S. TAX LAW
A. U.S. Taxation of Multinational Corporations
Two fundamental principles underlie the U.S. taxation of
corporations in an international context.' 9 First, the United States
exercises broad taxing jurisdiction over corporations that are
considered domestic residents. Unlike some countries, ° which
generally utilize a "territorial" tax system by taxing corporations only
on income that arises within that country,21 the United States taxes
9 The following discussion provides only a general overview of U.S.
international taxation designed to put the corporate expatriation phenomenon in
context.
20 For example, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and France impose a
form of territoriality, whereby resident corporations "can in some circumstances
invest in foreign subsidiaries, pay tax in the country in which they make their
investment, and pay no (or very little) tax when the earnings from abroad are paid
back to the home country." NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 9
(footnote omitted).
21 A territorial system also is referred to as an "exemption" system, because the
country exempts income arising outside of its borders. As a practical matter, even
those countries that purport to have territorial systems often impose tax on certain
types of foreign income, such as passive income earned by their residents. See NY
[Vol. 24:475
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domestic corporations on their worldwide income, regardless of where
the income arises. To the extent a foreign country in which the
income arises also taxes the same income, the United States allows the
domestic corporation to claim a foreign tax credit to alleviate the
potential for double taxation.2 This broad taxation of domestic
corporations is often referred to as worldwide "residence"-based
taxation because it focuses on the relationship between the corporate
taxpayer and the United States rather than focusing on the source of
the income.
Under a residence-based system it is, of course, important to
distinguish between corporations that are U.S. residents and those
that are not.2' The United States utilizes a place-of-incorporation rule
for determining whether a corporation is domestic or foreign.'2 Thus,
a corporation is considered a domestic corporation taxable on its
worldwide income if it is organized under the laws of one of the U.S.
25
states. In contrast, several of the United States's major trading
STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 9 n.25 ("Many jurisdictions have a
modified territorial system that does not afford an exclusion for certain types of
income, such as passive income and income earned through tax haven
subsidiaries....").
" See I.R.C. §§ 901-905.
23 Professor Graetz has recognized the conceptual difficulty of determining a
corporation's residence, observing that "in the case of corporations, the idea of
residence is largely an effort to put flesh into fiction, to find economic and political
substance in a world occupied by legal niceties. It is no accident that we call
corporations doing business around the world 'multinationals."' Graetz, supra note
12, at 320.
24 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) ("[tihe term 'domestic' when applied to a corporation...
means created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United States
or of any State..."). As summarized in a Senate Finance Committee Report:
[The] place of incorporation determines whether a corporation is treated as
domestic or foreign for purposes of U.S. tax law, irrespective of other
factors that might be thought to bear on a corporation's "nationality," such
as the location of the corporation's management activities, employees,
business assets, operations, or revenue sources, the exchanges on which the
corporation's stock is traded, or the residence of the corporation's
managers and shareholders.
S. REP. No. 108-192, at 152 (2003). See also JCT INVERSION REPORT, supra note 12, at
2. For a brief commentary questioning the future viability of the place-of-
incorporation rule, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, For Haven's Sake: Reflections on
Inversion Transactions, 95 TAX NOTES 1793, 1797 (June 17, 2002); cf. Graetz, supra
note 12, at 320-23 (arguing for a general de-emphasis of corporate residence for tax
purposes).
25 For this purpose, the District of Columbia is treated as a state. I.R.C.
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partners that impose worldwide residence taxation utilize standards
other than place of incorporation for determining corporate
residence. 6
In contrast to its broad taxation of domestic corporations, the
United States taxes foreign corporations - i.e., corporations
incorporated under the laws of a foreign country - only on income
connected to U.S. business operations" and certain nonbusiness
income from U.S. sources. 2' Accordingly, a foreign corporation
generally is not subject to U.S. income tax on income that arises
outside the United States.
The second fundamental principle underlying the U.S. taxation of
corporations in an international context is that the United States
generally treats a corporation as a separate taxpayer, distinct from its
shareholders. For example, if a parent corporation owns all the
outstanding stock of a subsidiary corporation, each corporation
generally will be treated as a distinct taxpayer, taxable only on the
income that corporation itself earns.30
§ 7701(a)(10); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-5T (2004).
26 Many countries that have adopted worldwide residence-based taxation utilize
a standard other than place of incorporation for determining corporate residence,
including the location of management, the residence of majority shareholders, or the
principal place of business. See infra note 243; see also JOSEPH ISENBERGH,
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND FOREIGN
INCOME $ 4.4 (3d ed. 2003); DEP'T OF TREASURY, U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996, art. 4(1), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/library/model996.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION]
(contemplating that a foreign country might determine corporate residence based on
"place of management... or any other criterion of a similar nature"). It is possible
that a corporation would be treated as a resident of both the United States under the
place-of-incorporation rule and another country under that country's fact-dependent
residence rule. Cf. I.R.C. § 1503(d) (preventing double-deduction of losses for dual
resident corporations); U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra, art. 4(3) (providing
tiebreaker rules for determining treaty residence of a corporation that is treated as a
domestic resident under each country's laws). In the context of eligibility for tax
treaty benefits, the United States has been willing to look to factors other than place
of incorporation to determine a corporation's residence. See infra notes 313-320 and
accompanying text (discussing the limitation on benefits provision of the recent U.S.-
Netherlands tax treaty protocol).
27 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(5).
I.R.C. § 882.
29 I.R.C. § 881.
30 In the wholly domestic context, affiliated groups of corporations may elect to
be treated as a single, consolidated taxpayer. See I.R.C. §§ 1501-1504 and the
regulations thereunder.
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In the absence of special rules, this separate taxpayer treatment
might significantly undermine the residence-based taxation principle.
For example, a domestic corporation seeking to earn income from
foreign sources could establish a wholly owned subsidiary
incorporated in a foreign country and have that foreign subsidiary
engage in the foreign income-producing activity. To the extent that
the foreign subsidiary is respected as a separate entity, the United
States would not currently tax the domestic parent corporation on the
income earned by its foreign subsidiary. Moreover, the United States
would not tax the foreign subsidiary on the foreign income earned by
the subsidiary because, as discussed above, the United States only
taxes certain U.S.-related income of a foreign corporation.
Eventually, when the foreign subsidiary distributes its earnings to the
domestic parent as a dividend, the United States would be able to
impose tax because the domestic corporation, which is taxable on its
worldwide income, would have received dividend income.3' However,
the timing of that dividend distribution is within the control of the
domestic parent corporation.
In effect, by interposing the foreign corporation and delaying the
distribution of the foreign corporation's earnings, the domestic
corporation could defer the U.S. taxation of those earnings. If the
distributions were delayed long enough, this deferral of U.S. taxation
would approximate a permanent exclusion of the foreign income from
12U.S. taxation. Accordingly, despite the general standard of
worldwide taxation applied to domestic corporations, in the absence
of special rules, well-advised domestic corporations effectively could
exempt significant amounts of foreign income from the U.S. tax base
by utilizing foreign subsidiaries.
In order to lessen this ability of domestic corporations to defer
U.S. taxation on foreign income through the use of foreign
subsidiaries, Congress has enacted several special "anti-deferral"
regimes. The most significant of these regimes, particularly with
31 See I.R.C. § 301.
32 See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., et al., Fairness in International Taxation: The
Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 339-40
(2001). As those authors observed, "deferral can be regarded as an indirect, elective
method for well-advised U.S. residents to achieve an exemption-like treatment for
their foreign-source income." Id. at 340 (footnote omitted). See also Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1593 n.70 (2000) ("[D]eferral is equivalent to exemption of the
yield on the amount deferred. Thus, the income earned on foreign source profits of
U.S. multinationals becomes exempt from U.S. tax.") (citations omitted).
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respect to corporate expatriations, is the "Subpart F" regime.33 In
effect, the Subpart F regime cuts back on the separate taxpayer
treatment generally afforded to corporations by requiring a domestic
corporate parent to include certain income of the foreign subsidiary in
its own current income. In particular, if the domestic corporation
owns a threshold amount of the foreign corporation's stock34 and the
foreign corporation constitutes a "controlled foreign corporation,"
then the domestic corporation is required to include currently as its
own income certain types of foreign income earned by the foreign
corporation even though the foreign corporation has not yet
distributed those amounts to the domestic corporation as a dividend."
The domestic corporation in the simple fact pattern discussed
above, by owning all the stock of a foreign subsidiary, would be
subject to the Subpart F regime." However, the regime does not
completely eliminate the treatment of the foreign subsidiary as a
separate taxpayer. Rather, the Subpart F regime requires the
domestic parent to include in its income only certain types of income
• • 38
(Subpart F income) earned by the foreign subsidiary. Accordingly,
33 See I.R.C. §§ 951-964. The Subpart F regime derives its name from its
structural location within the Code (Subpart F of Part III of Subchapter N of Chapter
1 of Subtitle A of the Code).
14 The domestic corporation is treated as a "United States shareholder" of the
foreign corporation and therefore potentially subject to a Subpart F inclusion, if it
owns (directly, indirectly, or constructively) "10 percent or more of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote of such foreign
corporation." I.R.C. § 951(b).
35 The foreign corporation is a "controlled foreign corporation" if more than
fifty percent of the voting power or value of its stock is owned (directly, indirectly, or
constructively) by "United States shareholders." I.R.C. § 957(a). As discussed supra
note 34, the term "United States shareholder" includes domestic corporations that
own at least ten percent of the foreign corporation's stock.
" The United States is not alone in establishing anti-deferral regimes.
According to the International Fiscal Association, nineteen other developed countries
have anti-deferral rules that resemble the U.S. regimes in their broad outlines. Lee
A. Sheppard, Preventing Corporate Inversions, Part 3, 95 TAX NOTES 1864, 1865-66
(June 24, 2002).
37 The domestic corporation meets the definition of "United States shareholder"
(because it owns at least ten percent of the stock of the foreign corporation) and the
foreign subsidiary meets the definition of "controlled foreign corporation" (because
more than fifty percent of its stock is owned by a United States shareholder).
38 For a detailed background of the Subpart F regime, see OFFICE OF TAX
POLICY, DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S.
CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY (2000) [hereinafter
TREASURY SUBPART F STUDY], available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/
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the domestic parent is still able to utilize the benefits of deferral with
respect to income earned by the foreign subsidiary that is not Subpart
F income.
In very broad terms, the types of income earned by the controlled
foreign corporation that are considered Subpart F income, and that
must therefore be included in the domestic parent's income, include
highly mobile passive income, such as interest, dividends, and
royalties, and certain business income that does not have sufficient
connection to the foreign country in which the foreign subsidiary is
incorporated." The types of income that are not considered Subpart
F income, and that therefore can continue to receive the benefits of
deferral when earned through a foreign subsidiary, include active
business income with a sufficient connection to the foreign country in
which the foreign subsidiary is incorporated.'
B. Tax Consequences of Corporate Expatriations
1. Anticipated Future Tax Benefits to Corporation
The recent wave of corporate expatriations was motivated by
anticipated reductions in U.S. income tax liability.4' These tax savings
library/subpartf.pdf.
" See I.R.C. §§ 952-954 (defining Subpart F income and components thereof).
4o See, e.g., I.R.C. § 954(d)(1), (e)(1) (defining foreign base company sales
income and foreign base company services income components of Subpart F income).
The line between Subpart F income, for which the benefits of deferral are eliminated,
and non-Subpart F income, which continues to receive the benefits of deferral, does
not necessarily reflect a clean, policy-driven divide. Rather, it reflects political
compromises that occurred in 1962, at the time of the enactment of Subpart F, and
subsequently between those who wanted to fully eliminate the benefits of deferral
(i.e., to disregard the separate taxpayer status of foreign subsidiaries) and those who
wanted to continue to allow deferral for all income earned by foreign subsidiaries
(i.e., to respect the separate taxpayer status of foreign subsidiaries). See TREASURY
SUBPART F STUDY, supra note 38, at 12-22. The recent spate of corporate
expatriations has further fueled this ongoing debate.
41 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (giving examples of anticipated
tax savings from corporate inversions by Cooper Industries and Ingersoll-Rand). See
also Unofficial Transcript of W&M Hearing on Corporate Inversions, TAX NOTES
TODAY (June 12, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 113-32)
(providing testimony of Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Pamela Olson that
the "key reasons cited" for inversion transactions are the "substantial reductions in
overall corporate taxes"); NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 8 ("A
review of public securities filings shows that U.S. corporations are implementing (or
at least considering implementing) inversion transactions primarily to save taxes.")
(footnote omitted).
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generally reflected reductions in the U.S. tax on both the foreign
income of the corporate group and the U.S.-source income of the
42
corporate group. The following discussion addresses the anticipated
tax savings prior to the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004.
a. Reduction of U.S. Tax on Foreign Income
The anticipated tax savings with respect to foreign income directly
followed from the interaction of the residence-based taxation system
and the Subpart F regime summarized in the prior section. As an
example, consider a corporate group whose publicly-traded parent is
incorporated in the United States and has many subsidiaries
incorporated in both the United States and in foreign countries. The
corporate parent, as well as each of the U.S.-incorporated subsidiaries,
would be treated as domestic taxpayers, and would be taxable on their
own worldwide income. Moreover, the corporate parent would be
taxable on the foreign income of the foreign subsidiaries to the extent
that the income is Subpart F income.43 In contrast, if the corporate
parent of that group were incorporated outside the United States, the
Subpart F regime would not apply with respect to foreign subsidiaries
of the group (because the ultimate shareholder of the subsidiaries
would be foreign, not domestic)." Thus, by undergoing an inversion
and substituting a foreign-incorporated parent for the U.S.-
incorporated parent, the group could avoid future application of the
Subpart F regime and ensure that the United States would not impose
a corporate-level tax on the foreign income earned by the foreign
41
subsidiaries of the group.
42 For additional discussion of the tax savings underlying corporate
expatriations, see S. REP. No. 108-192, at 136-41 (2003); TREASURY INVERSION
STUDY, supra note 1, at 11-15; NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-
12.
43 This occurs because the corporate parent, as a domestic corporation owning
all the stock of the foreign subsidiary, is a "United States shareholder" of a
"controlled foreign corporation." See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
In addition, the United States would not tax the foreign income earned by the
foreign corporate parent itself. To the extent the group has subsidiaries incorporated
in the United States, the United States would continue to tax those domestic
subsidiaries on their worldwide income. Presumably, the group could structure its
operations so that most of the group's foreign income is earned by the foreign
subsidiaries rather than the domestic subsidiaries.
45 In particular, it would eliminate the U.S. tax on foreign Subpart F income,
described supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text, which would have been taxable
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Because inversions attempt, at least in part, to eliminate, tax on
the corporate group's foreign income, the Treasury Department has
referred to the transactions as "self-help territoriality. ' 46  Several
commentators have defended this self-help use of corporate
inversions to reduce the U.S. taxation on the group's foreign income,
arguing that it is a necessary response by U.S. multinationals who
must compete in the global economy against corporations whose
home countries utilize a more limited territorial system." Others have
strongly criticized this argument as being overly simplistic and
misleading.48
b. Reduction of US. Tax on U.S. Income
In addition to seeking a reduction of U.S. tax on foreign income,
corporations expatriated in an attempt to reduce U.S. tax on their
had the corporate parent remained domestic.
TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 29; see also Unofficial
Transcript of Hearing on Corporate Inversions, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 1, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 126-67) (relating the statement
of Rep. McCrery, Chair of the Select Revenue Measures Subcomm. of the Ways &
Means Comm., that "... the inverted company generally structures its affairs so as to
avoid United States tax on its global income, thereby getting around our worldwide
tax system. This has sometimes been referred to as 'self-help' territoriality."); Samuel
C. Thompson, Jr., Section 367: A "Wimp" for Inversions and a "Bully" for Real Cross-
Border Acquisitions, 94 TAX NOTES 1505, 1507 (March 18, 2002) ("The effect of the
pure inversion and related transactions is to achieve de facto territorial taxation,
which exempts all foreign income from taxation until repatriated."). The self-help
territoriality obtained through an inversion transaction would provide even more
relief than would be provided through a de jure territorial system. According to the
Treasury Inversion Study:
One difference is in the treatment of any passive income earned abroad.
The territorial tax systems of most of our trading partners include rules
imposing tax on passive income earned from foreign sources. Where the
foreign parent of an inverted company is located in a no-tax country,
passive income earned abroad may not be subject to tax anywhere.
TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 29 n.50. See also NY STATE BAR
INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 & n.47 ("[M]ost so-called territorial systems
do not provide a blanket exemption that is as favorable as the intended tax treatment
of the inverted company," particularly with respect to passive income.).
47 See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. See also NY STATE BAR
INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 22 ("This aspect of inversions [eliminating U.S.
taxation on foreign income] has many defenders, who point out that many other
jurisdictions have territorial systems that eliminate home country tax on much (or
even all) foreign source income.").
See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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U.S. income. Indeed, this goal may have been even more important
than the anticipated post-inversion reduction in taxes on foreign
income.
4 9
Following the inversion, only the U.S. subsidiaries of the
corporate group generally would be subject to significant U.S. income
taxation.0  The corporate group could then engage in various
transactions to reduce the taxable income of those U.S. subsidiaries.
For example, a subsidiary could be structured to owe significant
indebtedness to the foreign parent. The large interest payments from
the U.S. subsidiary to the foreign corporation would be deductible in
calculating the subsidiary's taxable income, thereby reducing its tax
liability. 1 Similar opportunities for reducing a domestic subsidiary's
41 See TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 22 ("[N]otwithstanding the
longer-term competitive benefits related to the tax treatment of future foreign
operations or foreign acquisitions, the decision to enter into the inversion may be
dependent in many cases upon the immediate expected reduction in U.S. tax on
income from U.S. operations."). See also Lee A. Sheppard, Turbo-Charged Income
Stripping, TAX NOTES TODAY (Dec. 6, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec.
cit., 2002 TNT 235-4) ("In its inversion report, the Treasury recognized that what
really gets the inverting CFO's attention is the immediate potential for stripping
income out of the United States. Tax savings on foreign income are a future
benefit.").
so The new foreign parent and the foreign subsidiaries generally would not have
significant amounts of income connected with a U.S. business or arising from U.S.
sources. See supra notes 27-29 (discussing taxation of foreign corporations).
Although the foreign parent would generally be subject to a thirty percent
withholding tax with respect to any dividends paid to it by the U.S. subsidiary, see
I.R.C. § 881(a)(1), inversions often are structured so that such dividends are eligible
for a significantly reduced withholding rate under a tax treaty. See TREASURY
INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 12-13, n.27 (describing the use of the U.S.-
Barbados tax treaty to secure a reduced five percent U.S. withholding tax on
dividends paid by the U.S. subsidiary to the new post-inversion foreign parent);
William G. Gale, Notes on Corporate Inversions, Export Subsidies, and the Taxation
of Foreign-Source Income, 27 TAX NOTES INT'L 1495, 1502 (Sept. 23, 2002)
(describing the importance of tax treaties in enabling the inversion structure to reduce
taxation on U.S. income).
5' As the Treasury Department observed:
One of the simplest ways for a foreign-based company to reduce the U.S.
tax on income from U.S. operations is through deductions for interest
payments on intercompany debt.... The U.S. subsidiary can be loaded up
with a disproportionate amount of debt for earnings stripping purposes
through the mere issuance of an intercompany note. Thus, the desired
earnings stripping, and U.S. tax reduction, can be accomplished without any
real movement of assets or change in operations.
TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 21. Senator Grassley described this
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U.S. income exist through the use of structures involving manipulation
of royalties, management fees, administrative fees, and transfer
prices. 2 Because these approaches enable the domestic subsidiary to
shift taxable income away from the domestic subsidiaries that
otherwise would be taxed on it, the phenomenon is often referred to
as "earnings stripping."53
The Code contains several provisions that purport to limit a
corporate group's ability to shift income away from domestic
subsidiaries using these techniques 4 For example, section 1630) aims
to limit "interest stripping" by limiting the extent to which a
corporation that is excessively leveraged with debt can deduct interest
payments to related corporations.5 ' Similarly, section 482 and the
extensive regulations thereunder attempt to prevent corporations
under common control from charging each other non-arms-length
56prices in an attempt to shift income improperly within the group.
However, there is general consensus that these provisions did not
significantly reduce the potential opportunities for reducing U.S. tax
on U.S. income following an inversion. 7
Unlike the reduction of tax on foreign income resulting from
phenomenon in starker terms, noting "[wJith this phony tax haven parent corporation
in place, the U.S. company is positioned to rip its taxable income out of the United
States through artificial interest payments to the tax haven shell, which are legally
deductible on its U.S. return." Bud Newman, Grassley Vows Continued Effort to End
Corporate Inversions, Other Tax Shelters, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), May 27, 2003, at
G-3, available at LEXIS, 101 DTR G-3.
Although the corporate parent (or other foreign recipient of the interest
payment) ordinarily would be subject to a thirty percent withholding tax on the
interest payment, that tax is often substantially reduced or eliminated under an
applicable tax treaty. See TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 13. For more
detailed analysis of the specific structures inverted corporations utilize to reduce U.S.
tax on U.S. income, see id. at 21; NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at
14-20.
52 See NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 23 & n.50.
53 See TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 21.
These provisions are not specific to corporate groups that have undergone
inversions, as they apply generally to any relevant payments between related
corporations.
55 I.R.C. § 1630).
56 I.R.C. § 482.
57 See TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 20-26, The Treasury
Department acknowledged the limitations of section 1630) when it observed "[t]he
prevalent use of foreign related-party debt in inversion transactions is evidence that
these rules should be revisited." Id. at 22.
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inversions, which at least has some defenders, 8 this use of corporate
inversions to reduce U.S. tax on U.S. income has been uniformly
condemned. 9  Even those who defend, or at least express some
sympathy for, corporations inverting to reduce U.S. tax on foreign
income, tend to criticize the use of inversions to reduce tax on income
arising in the United States.6
2. Immediate Tax Consequences to Corporation and Shareholders
The anticipated tax benefits for an expatriating corporation did
not come without a potential tax cost. In particular, a corporate
inversion could generate immediate tax consequences to both the
corporation and also to its shareholders.61
At the shareholder level, Code section 367 and the Treasury
Regulations thereunder could require the shareholders of the
domestic parent corporation to recognize gain at the time of the
inversion, particularly if the inversion is structured as a stock
transaction (i.e., the shareholders exchange their stock in the old
domestic parent for stock in the newly formed foreign parent). In
effect, the shareholder would be treated as if she sold the stock of the
8 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
'9 The New York State Bar Report observed that "[t]he earnings stripping
aspect of inversions has few defenders from a policy perspective." NY STATE BAR
INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 24; see also Martin A. Sullivan, Congress's
Inversion Odyssey: Oh the Places You'll Go, 96 TAX NOTES 9, 11 (July 1, 2002)
("[I]nversions are about tax relief for foreign- and U.S.- source income.... They
provide an off-shore platform for aggressive tax avoidance that borders on evasion.").
While the Treasury study criticizes this aspect of inversions, it tempers its criticism of
inversions by noting that the opportunities for earnings stripping are not limited to
corporate groups that have undergone corporate inversions. See TREASURY
INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 22.
60 See, e.g., TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 22; Cym H. Lowell,
Inversion Transactions: Solutions to Exacerbate Planning Hurdles?, J. INT'L TAX'N,
Oct. 2002, at 31 (sympathizing with the use of inversions in order to prevent U.S.-
based companies from being placed at a competitive disadvantage with respect to
their foreign income, but noting that "careful attention should be focused on ensuring
that an inversion transaction.., cannot be used to reduce inappropriately the U.S. tax
on income from U.S. operations").
61 For a more detailed summary of the relevant pre-AJCA tax consequences to
shareholders and the corporation as a result of the inversion, see TREASURY
INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 7-11. For a thorough analysis of the pre-AJCA
tax consequences to various forms of inversion transaction structures, see Thompson,
supra note 46.
6' I.R.C. § 367.
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old corporation, with the recognized gain equal to the excess of the
fair market value of the stock over the shareholder's adjusted basis in
the stock.63
At the corporation level, Code section 367 and the Treasury
Regulations thereunder could require the old domestic parent
corporation to recognize gain at the time of the inversion, particularly
if the inversion is structured as an asset transaction (i.e., a transfer of
the corporate group assets from the old corporation to the newly
formed foreign corporation). Under this transaction, the domestic
corporation would recognize gain as if all its assets had been sold for
fair market value at the time of the transaction. The corporation
might be able to offset some of the tax on this gain by applying a
foreign tax credit or net operating losses, thereby reducing the tax cost
of the transaction.65
As a practical matter, this potential for tax consequences at the
shareholder and corporation level did not dissuade numerous
corporations from expatriating in the first few years of this decade.
This lack of deterrent effect has been attributed to several factors.
For example, the fall in the stock market from its historic highs in the
late 1990s made the potential section 367 shareholder and corporate
taxable gain significantly smaller." The tax impact was further
63 Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-lT 3(a), (c) (2005). There are significant complexities
and exceptions to this general rule that are not relevant to the discussion in this
article.
64 See I.R.C. § 367(a)(1), (5). See generally TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra
note 1, at 9 (discussing exceptions to this gain recognition requirement); Thompson,
supra note 46, at 1546-48 (arguing that section 367 should be revised to make it a
more effective deterrent to corporate inversions).
65 See I.R.C. § 902. See also H.R. REP. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 244 (2004);
Thompson & Clary, supra note 3, at 1387 (illustrating applicability of foreign tax
credit to reduce tax on gain in Cooper Industries inversion).
66 Because the shareholder's gain is based, in part, on the fair market value of
the stock at the time of the transaction, the depressed value of the stock would limit
the amount of gain recognition. Indeed, if the fair market value of the stock had
fallen below the shareholder's adjusted basis (generally, her original cost), the
shareholder would not recognize any gain from the inversion. See generally
TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 17-18; NY STATE BAR INVERSION
REPORT, supra note 3, at 12-13; Avi-Yonah, supra note 24, at 1794-95; Thompson,
supra note 46, at 1546 ("[W]ith the recent decline in the stock market, many
companies could apparently enter into inversion transactions without causing their
shareholders to realize substantial gains.... This may be one of the reasons that
Cooper Industries has proposed its inversion transaction at this time."); cf. Elizabeth
Chorvat, You Can't Take It With You: Behavioral Finance and Corporate
Expatriations, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 453, 505-09 (2003) (proposing a Code
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reduced to the extent that the corporation's shareholders were tax-
exempt institutions or foreign taxpayers, for which the requirement of
gain recognition had no practical effect."
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO CORPORATE
EXPATRIATIONS
The corporate expatriation phenomenon occupied Congress's
attention for almost three years. During that period, more than thirty
bills were introduced targeting corporations that engage in inversion
transactions. However, despite the strong legislative spotlight
amendment to make gain dependent on the stock's value during a two-year window,
rather than on the value on the date of the transaction, thereby reducing the incentivc
to expatriate during a downturn in the market).
67 NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
See, e.g., American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520,108th Cong. §§ 601-
603, 606 (2004); Fairness for Working Americans Act of 2004, H.R. 4207, 108th Cong.
§ 3 (2004); American Workers and Manufacturers Support Act, H.R. 4177, 108th
Cong. § 501 (2004); Energy Policy Act of 2003, S. 2095, 108th Cong. §§ 1392-1393
(2004); Jumpstart Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong. §§ 441,
443 (2003); American Jobs Creation Act of 2003, H.R. 2896, 108th Cong. §§ 2001-
2004, 2007 (2003); Sales Tax Equity Act of 2003, S. 1436, 108th Cong. §§ 242-243
(2003); Rebuild America Act of 2003, S. 1409, 108th Cong. § 1131 (2003); Rebuild
America Act of 2003, H.R. 2615, 108th Cong. § 1131 (2003); Working Families Tax
Credit Act of 2003, H.R. 2286, 108th Cong. § 251 (2003); Energy Tax Incentives Act
of 2003, S. 1149, 108th Cong. §§ 821-823 (2003); Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and
Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, S. 1072, 108th Cong. §§ 5651, 5653
(2003); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, S. 1054, 108th Cong.
§§ 341-342 (2003); Jobs and Growth Reconciliation Tax Act of 2003, H.R. 2046, 108th
Cong. § 341 (2003); Taxpayer and Fairness Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 1661, 108th
Cong. § 151 (2003); H.R. 6, 108th Cong. § 44001 (2003); Energy Tax Policy Act of
2003, H.R. 1531, 108th Cong. § 401 (2003); Save American Manufacturing Act of
2003, S. 592, 108th Cong. § 501 (2003); Corporate Tax Fairness and Shareholder
Rights Act of 2003, S. 513, 108th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2003); Jobs and Growth Tax Act of
2003, S. 2, 108th Cong. §§ 341-342 (2003); Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003, H.R. 2, 108th Cong. §§ 341-342 (2003); Corporate Patriot Enforcement
Act of 2003, S. 384, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003); Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of
2003, H.R. 737, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003); Dayton Fair Tax Cut Act, S. 135, 108th Cong.
§ 501 (2003); Pension Protection and Expansion Act of 2003, S. 9, 108th Cong. §§ 701-
702 (2003); Business, Investors', and Employees' Bill of Rights Act of 2002, H.R.
5160, 107th Cong. § 201 (2002); American Competitiveness and Corporate
Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 5095, 107th Cong. §§ 202-203, 205 (2002); Executive
Compensation Tax Reform Act of 2002, S. 2722, 107th Cong. § 5 (2002); Executive
Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 5088, 107th Cong. § 4 (2002); No Tax Breaks for
Corporations Renouncing America Act of 2002, H.R. 4993, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002);
Uncle Sam Wants You Act of 2002, H.R. 4756, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002); Reversing the
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focused on inversions, Congress initially enacted only one provision
specifically targeting corporate expatriates. 9 That law, rather than
focusing on tax consequences, instead addresses an area far removed
from tax policy - the ability of the expatriated corporation to enter
into government contracts with the Department of Homeland
Security.7°  As noted above," this purported contract ban is an
example of Congress's recent attempt to impose non-tax "alternative
sanctions" in an effort to address perceived abuses of the tax laws.
Only after an additional two years of debate did Congress enact
legislation targeting the tax consequences of corporate expatriation in
late 2004.
The following subparts first explain the Homeland Security
alternative sanction, and then summarize the legislative proposals and
recently enacted legislation that focus on changing the tax
consequences to expatriating corporations.
A. Alternative Sanctions - Restrictions on Future Government
Contracts
In November 2002 Congress passed, and President Bush signed,
Expatriation of Profits Offshore (REPO) Act, S. 2119, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002); S.
2050, 107th Cong. § 1 (2002); Save America's Jobs Act of 2002, H.R. 3922, 107th
Cong. § 2 (2002); Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 2002, H.R. 3884, 107th Cong.
§ 2 (2002); H.R. 3857, 107th Cong. § 1 (2002).
For additional discussion of some of the legislative proposals during the 107th
Congress, see JCT INVERSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 5-8; Avi-Yonah, supra note
24, at 1796.
69 In addition, Congress tangentially addressed corporate expatriations in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). Under that
Act, which addressed the financial scandals involving Enron and other domestic
corporations, the principal executive officer of certain corporations is required to
certify the corporation's annual financial report. Id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7241). Section 302(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act makes clear that any
certification obligation otherwise required is not eliminated merely because the
corporation undergoes a corporate inversion. Id. § 302(b), 116 Stat. at 778 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(b)). The Treasury Department has also responded to certain
limited aspects of corporate inversions by regulation. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6043-
4T (2003) (requiring reporting of large corporate inversion transactions).
70 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 835, 116 Stat. 2135,
2227 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 395 (2003)), amended by Homeland
Security Act Amendments of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 101(2), 117 Stat. 526, 528
(2003).
71 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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12the Homeland Security Act of 2002, establishing the Department of
Homeland Security. Section 835 of that Act 7 3 contained the
alternative sanction addressing corporate expatriations. That section
provides, in general, that "[t]he Secretary [of Homeland Security] may
not enter into any contract with a foreign incorporated entity which is
treated as an inverted domestic corporation. 74
As originally enacted, this alternative sanction contained
important exceptions. The exceptions provided:
The Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall waive [the ban]
with respect to any specific contract if the Secretary
determines that the waiver is required in the interest of
homeland security, or to prevent the loss of any jobs in the
United States or prevent the Government from incurring any
75additional costs that otherwise would not occur.
Critics quickly noted that these exceptions eviscerated the
statutory ban. In particular, by providing an exception for any
contract that imposes "any additional costs that otherwise would not
occur," the provision continued to allow a foreign corporate parent to
enter into a contract if it was the low bidder.76 Several months later, in
response to these charges, Congress amended the alternative sanction
by eliminating the exceptions concerning loss of jobs or imposing
additional costs on the government.77 Accordingly, only the "in the
interest of homeland security" exception remains. Despite this
72 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
73 Id. § 835, 116 Stat. at 2227-29 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 395 (Supp. II 2004)).
74 Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 835(a), 116 Stat. at 2227. A foreign
incorporated entity is treated as an "inverted domestic corporation" if, after the Act's
November 25, 2002 enactment date, it engaged in a transaction that satisfies certain
specified criteria characteristic of a corporate inversion. See id. § 835(b), (c)(3), 116
Stat. at 2227-29.
75 Id. § 835(d), 116 Stat. at 2229.
76 See infra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
17 See Homeland Security Act Amendments of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 101(2),
117 Stat. 526, 528 (2003). That amendment provides that all of the language in section
835(d) of the Homeland Security Act following the words "homeland security" is
deleted, thereby deleting the contract ban's exception for contracts that may cause the
loss of jobs or that may impose additional costs on the government. Cf text
accompanying supra note 75 (citing the text prior to the amendment). Following this
amendment, section 835(d) of the Homeland Security Act provides that "[t]he
Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall waive subsection (a) with respect to any
specific contract if the Secretary determines that the waiver is required in the interest
of homeland security." 6 U.S.C.A. § 395(d) (West Supp. 2004).
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amendment, the current provision still has only limited instrumental
impact. The significant instrumental shortcomings of the provision
are discussed below in the context of symbolic legislation theory."8
Although this article focuses on the congressional response to
corporate expatriations, it is interesting to note that several states
have also enacted alternative sanctions targeting inverted
corporations. For example, in 2003 California enacted a law
providing, in general, that "a state agency may not enter into any
contract with an expatriate corporation or its subsidiaries.
Similarly, North Carolina enacted a provision prohibiting state
contracts for goods or services with corporations or their affiliates that
incorporate in certain specified tax haven countries after 2001 and the
stock of which is principally traded in the United States. s° Legislators
in several other states have proposed similar bills."
78 See infra notes 101-134 and accompanying text.
79 California Taxpayer and Shareholder Protection Act of 2003, CAL. PUB.
CoNT. CODE § 10286.1(a) (West 2004). Unlike the federal contract ban on Homeland
Security contracts, the California contract ban extends its reach to subsidiaries of the
foreign parent corporation. The California statute contains several exceptions,
including a provision allowing
[t]he chief executive officer of a state agency [to] waive the prohibition...
if the executive officer.., has made a written finding that the contract is
necessary to meet a compelling public interest, ... [such as] ensuring the
provision of essential services, ensuring the public health and safety, or an
emergency....
Id. § 10286.1(c).
80 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-59.1(a)(2) (2004). The North Carolina statute contains
no exceptions.
"' See H.R. 5171, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2004) (Connecticut
proposal to prohibit state agencies from entering into, or renewing, contracts with
expatriated companies); H.R. 4194, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003) (Illinois
proposal to prohibit state agencies from entering into contracts with expatriated
companies or their affiliates); S. 2413, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003)
(Illinois proposal to prohibit state agencies from entering into contracts with
expatriated companies or their subsidiaries, unless the corporation guarantees certain
specified shareholder rights similar to those in the California Taxpayer and
Shareholder Protection Act of 2003. See CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10286.1(a) (West
2004)); H.R. 3053, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (111. 2003) (Illinois proposal to
prohibit state investments in securities of expatriated corporations unless divestment
is determined to be adverse to the state); H.R. 706, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ky. 2004) (Kentucky proposal to prohibit state agencies from entering into contracts
with expatriated corporations or their affiliates); H.R. 1434, 183d Gen. Ct., 2003 Reg.
Sess. (Mass. 2003), S. 96, 183d Gen. Ct., 2003 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003), S. 59, 183d Gen.
Ct., 2003 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003) (Massachusetts proposals to prohibit state pension
funds from investing in securities of expatriated corporations, unless divestment is
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B. Proposals to Modify the Tax Laws
In addition to its enactment of the Homeland Security Act's non-
tax alternative sanction, Congress also debated proposals and
considered numerous bills that would alter the tax treatment of
inverted corporations. After nearly three years, Congress ultimately
enacted a tax-focused provision in late 2004.
The tax-focused proposals regarding corporate expatriation fell
into two broad categories: (a) broad suggestions that the entire U.S.
tax regime applicable to international transactions be overhauled, and
(b) narrower proposals specifically targeted at the post-expatriation
tax consequences applicable to corporate groups that engage in
inversion transactions.
1. Broad Proposals to Overhaul Entire International Tax Regime
With respect to the first category, critics of the federal tax system
argue that corporate expatriations are merely a symptom of much
broader problems underlying the manner in which the United States
taxes income earned in an international context. In particular, it is
argued that the worldwide residence-based income taxation of
corporations hampers the competitiveness of U.S.-based multinational
corporations in an ever more globalized world, thereby forcing
corporations to expatriate in order to remain competitive. For
example, Bill Thomas, the chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, observed with respect to corporate inversions:
I'm less inclined to say "you can't do it" than I am to treat it
determined to be adverse to the pension fund); H.R. 5081, 92d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mich. 2003) (Michigan proposal to prohibit state agencies from entering into
contracts with expatriated corporations or their affiliates); H.R. 5517, 92d Leg., 2004
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2004) (Michigan proposal to require the state department of
management and budget to consider in awarding contracts whether, inter alia, a
contract with an expatriated corporation would be detrimental to the state of
Michigan, its residents, or the state's economy); H.R. 286, 125th Gen. Assemb., 2003-
04 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003) (Ohio proposal to prohibit state agencies from entering into
contracts with expatriated corporations unless the contract is necessary to meet a
compelling public interest, and to prohibit state agencies from awarding state tax
credits or other financial assistance to an expatriated corporation); H.R. 1908, 187th
Gen. Assemb., 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (Pennsylvania proposal to prohibit
commonwealth agencies from entering into or renewing contracts with corporate
expatriates); H.R. 2142, 58th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003) (Washington proposal
to prohibit state agencies from entering into contracts with expatriated corporations,
unless the contract is necessary to meet a compelling public interest).
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as a symptom, examine the underlying disease - and it's the
tax code and [its] failure to be even minimally useful to these
folk - and deal with the fact that the U.S. is out of sync with
the rest of the world[.] ... We are not well equipped to deal
with trade in the 21st century; we have to change our tax
code.
82
Similarly, the Bush Administration, as evidenced by the Treasury
13Inversion Study, views the corporate inversion phenomenon as
evidence of a need to reexamine the tax code to make it more
favorable for U.S.-based companies competing in an international
marketplace. 84  Similar sentiments were expressed in congressional
proposals, primarily by House Republicans, to address corporate
Warren Rojas, Thomas Says House to Consider Taxpayer Protection Bill Tied
to Sunset Repeal; FSC Fix to Follow in Fall, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 16, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 73-1). For critical responses to
Representative Thomas's statement, see Joel Slemrod, Tax Minimization and
Corporate Responsibility, 96 TAx NOTES 1523, 1527 (Sept. 9, 2002); Joe Thorndike,
Civilization at a Discount: The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 95 TAX NOTES 664, 664
(Apr. 29, 2002).
83 TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1.
See TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1, at 2 (in addressing corporate
inversions, "[w]e also must work to address the U.S. tax disadvantages that are caused
for U.S.-based companies that do business abroad relative to their counterparts in our
major trading partners."). The study also states that
[b]oth the recent inversion activity and the increase in foreign acquisitions
of U.S. multinationals are evidence that the competitive disadvantage
caused by our international tax rules is a serious issue with significant
consequences for U.S. business and the U.S. economy. A comprehensive
reexamination of the U.S. international tax rules is needed.
Id. at 29. In a statement accompanying the study, then-Secretary of the Treasury Paul
O'Neill stated:
[I]f the tax code disadvantages U.S. companies competing in the global
marketplace, then we should address the anti-competitive provisions of the
[C]ode. I don't think anyone wants to wake up one morning to find every
U.S. company headquartered offshore because our tax code drove them
away and no one did anything about it.
Office of Public Affairs, Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Releases Preliminary Report on
Inversion Transactions (May 17, 2002), available at http:f/www.treas.gov/press/
releases/po3109.htm. U.S.-based multinationals argue that, in bidding on potential
foreign investments, they are disadvantaged because their overall tax burden might be
higher than that of their foreign-based competitors organized in territorial-type
jurisdictions, and that similar disadvantages occur in operating and disposing of a
foreign investment. NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-12.
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expatriations."
In response, numerous other commentators argue that the focus
on the expatriation phenomenon as a reason to move from a
residence-based system to a territorial system is merely a "red
,,81herring, or an excuse to "change the subject" away from theS • 87
earnings stripping that primarily is driving the expatriations. These
The House Ways and Means Committee report accompanying the original
House-passed version of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th
Cong. (2004), states "tt]he Committee believes that corporate inversion transactions
are a symptom of larger problems with our current uncompetitive system for taxing
U.S.-based global businesses and are also indicative of the unfair advantages that our
tax laws convey to foreign ownership." H.R. REP. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 242-46
(2004). See infra note 93 (discussing House Bill 4520). See also H.R. 1531, 108th
Cong. § 402(b) (2003); H.R. 1308, 108th Cong. § 103(b) (2003) (legislative proposals
expressing the "sense of Congress that passage of legislation to fix the underlying
problems with our tax laws is essential and should occur as soon as possible, so United
States corporations will not face the current pressures to engage in inversion
transactions").
Those arguing for a broad-based overhaul of the U.S. international tax regime
advocate various solutions. For example, some suggest that the United States
abandon the worldwide taxation of the business income of its residents and instead
adopt a territorial approach to taxation. See, e.g., Herman B. Bouma, Corporate
Expatriations: If There's a Problem, It's 'Place of Incorporation' Rule, DAILY TAX
REP. (BNA), Nov. 22, 2002, at J-1 (concluding that a territoriality system is the best
approach for taxing international business income, because under such a system there
generally would be no need for a determination of a corporation's residence).
Bouma, in noting that some kind of anti-abuse rules might be necessary to ensure
taxation of passive income not connected with business activity in any country,
implicitly acknowledges that his proposal might need a definition of corporate
residence for some limited circumstances. See id. Numerous commentators have
argued in favor of moving the U.S. tax system away from a worldwide residence
system for corporations and toward a territorial system even outside of the corporate
inversion debate. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 12, at 320-23. Others argue that more
drastic reforms are necessary, such as the implementation of a value added tax in lieu
of an income tax on international income. See, e.g., James H. Ditkoff, The Real
Solution to Corporate Expatriations: A Territorial VAT, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Jan.
9, 2003, at J-1; see also Chris Edwards, Cato Policy Analysis Addresses Corporate Tax
'Distortions', TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 14, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 2003 TNT 158-23) (arguing that "U.S. firms would not be pursuing
inversions unless there was something seriously wrong with the U.S. tax system," and
that the corporate income tax should be replaced with a cash-flow tax).
86 Avi-Yonah, supra note 24, at 1795 ("I would like to emphasize that in the
inversion context the competitiveness issue is the reddest of red herrings - a
completely irrelevant line of argument.").
Sheppard, supra note 49 (arguing that the principal reason for inversions is the
ability to reduce U.S. taxes on domestic income through earnings stripping, and that
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commentators defend the importance of retaining residence-based
worldwide taxation as the general rule for corporations. Indeed,
some commentators argue that the worldwide residence-based
taxation regime should be strengthened by the expansion of the anti-
deferral regimes, such as Subpart F, so that U.S. corporations cannot
avoid current taxation on their active business income through the use
of foreign subsidiaries."
Because the arguments in favor of and against the broad overhaul
of the U.S. international tax system have been discussed in detail
elsewhere, this article does not purport to revisit them. Rather, this
article assumes that the United States will retain the broad contours of
its existing system for taxing corporations in an international setting.9'
Of more interest for purposes of this article are those tax proposals,
including the tax provision ultimately enacted, that purport to target
the inversion phenomenon without changing the general residence-
based income tax regime applicable to corporations. Those proposals
are summarized in the following section.
the Treasury Inversion Study's suggestion regarding the tax system is an attempt to
"change the subject"). Similarly, another commentator observed that the "bluster
about big-picture concepts of territoriality and tax reform" is "just a sideshow,"
Sullivan, supra note 59, at 9-10, and that
the biggest problem with the assertion of the close relationship between
territoriality and inversions is that territoriality is about tax relief for
foreign-source income while inversions are about tax relief for foreign- and
U.S.-source income. Inversions are more than self-help territoriality. They
provide an off-shore platform for aggressive tax avoidance that borders on
evasion.
Id. at 11; see also Thompson & Clary, supra note 3, at 1388 (criticizing the Treasury
Department's assertion that corporate inversions are evidence of the need to
reconsider the existing tax regime in order to maintain U.S. corporations'
international competitiveness).
88 See, e.g., Brookings Institution Fellow's Testimony on Corporate Inversions,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 17, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002
TNT 201-26) (testimony of William G. Gale before the Senate Appropriations
Comm., Subcomm. on Treasury and General Government, that a shift to a territorial
tax system would not be an appropriate response to corporate inversions).
89 See Fleming et al., supra note 32, at 350-54.
90 That is, the worldwide taxation of corporations considered to be domestic
residents, along with a foreign tax credit to prevent double taxation and some type of
anti-deferral regime, such as Subpart F, that backstops worldwide taxation with
respect to certain income earned through foreign subsidiaries. See supra Part I.A.
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2. Narrow Proposals Targeted at Inversion Transactions
As noted above, legislators introduced more than thirty bills
addressing corporate expatriations." The large majority of these
proposals targeted the specific tax consequences that flow from
corporate expatriations. From these bills, two leading proposals
emerged: (i) a proposal passed by the Senate that would have treated
the new foreign corporate parent as a domestic corporation following
a corporate inversion, " and (ii) a proposal passed by the House that
would have modified specific provisions of the tax code that affect the
tax consequences of certain inversion transactions, but would have
respected the new post-inversion parent corporation as a foreign
91 See supra note 68.
92 See Jumpstart Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 441
(2004) (as passed by the Senate on May 11, 2004). The bill passed the Senate by a 92-
5 margin. 150 CONG. REC. S5218 (daily ed. May 11, 2004) (roll no. 91). The text of
Senate Bill 1637 was subsequently incorporated in full into the Senate-passed version
of House Bill 4520, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. (2004), as substitute language for the
House-passed text of House Bill 4520. See 150 CONG. REC. S8150-51 (daily ed. July
15, 2004) (amendment no. 3562). In order to avoid confusion with the House-passed
House Bill 4520, this article cites the original Senate Bill 1637 numbering of the
Senate-passed proposal.
The Senate-passed proposal was introduced by Senator Charles Grassley,
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and co-sponsored by Senator Max
Baucus, ranking minority leader of the Committee. The bill would have added a new
Code section 7874, which would have provided that "[i]f a foreign incorporated entity
is treated as an inverted domestic corporation, then, notwithstanding section
7701(a)(4), such entity shall be treated for purposes of this title as a domestic
corporation." S. 1637, § 441(a). A foreign corporation was to be treated as an
inverted domestic corporation if (i) the inversion transaction was completed after
March 20, 2002, (ii) there was at least 80 percent continuity of ownership in the post-
inversion foreign corporation by the stockholders of the pre-inversion domestic
corporation, and (iii) the corporation's expanded affiliated group did not have
substantial business activities, relative to its worldwide activities, in the new country
of incorporation. Id. In this regard, the Senate bill is similar to the Reversing the
Expatriation of Profits Offshore (REPO) Act, S. 2119, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002), co-
sponsored by Senators Grassley and Baucus during the 107th Congress, and to S.
2050, 107th Cong. (2002). For analysis of the inversion provisions of the earlier
REPO Act, see NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 48-59.
While the domestic taint of the Senate bill would have applied only to inversions
occurring after March 20, 2002, the bill also would have imposed lesser tax
consequences with respect to inversions occurring after December 31, 1996, and
before March 20, 2002, which are similar to the proposed rules regarding inversion
gain contemplated by House Bill 4520, discussed infra note 93. See S. 1637, § 441(a)
(adding Code section 7874(b)-(d)).
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corporation under general Code definitions. 93
The Senate bill, by continuing to treat the post-expatriation
foreign-incorporated parent as a domestic corporation, would have
overridden the place-of-incorporation rule in the case of inversion
transactions. In so doing, it would have effectively shut down future
inversions by removing the potential tax benefits - i.e., the ability to
escape the Subpart F regime for income earned through foreign
subsidiaries and the ability to shift some U.S. income out of the U.S.
tax base.94
Although the House provisions might have reduced some tax
benefits associated with inversion transactions, the expatriated
company still would have been able to obtain the benefits of avoiding
the Subpart F regime on future foreign income, as it could have under
then-existing law. Accordingly, the House proposal would have had
less of an impact on companies contemplating expatriation than the
Senate proposal would have had.95
C. Enactment of New Tax Provision
As part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA),
93 H.R. 4520, § 601(a) (as passed by the House on June 17, 2004). The bill
passed the House by a 251-178 margin. 150 CONG. REC. H4433 (daily ed. June 16,
2004) (roll no. 259). Representative Bill Thomas, Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, introduced the bill. The bill would have added a new Code
section 7874(a) limiting the ability of the former domestic parent corporation to
utilize tax attributes, such as net operating losses or foreign tax credits, to reduce the
tax owed on any gain recognized in an inversion transaction occurring after March 4,
2003. In addition, the bill would have imposed an excise tax on certain stock options
held by executives of expatriating corporations. See H.R. 4520, § 602(a). The bill also
requires the Treasury Department to conduct several studies with respect to
corporate expatriations, including studies on the effects of the transfer pricing rules,
tax treaties, and the U.S. income tax provisions generally. See H.R. 4520, § 606.
94 The potential tax benefits arising from expatriations under current law arc
discussed supra notes 41-60.
95 As Thompson and Clary observed:
[The Senate] approach would effectively bring an end to inversions....
[The House proposal] contains a much weaker anti-inversion provision
than the one in the JOBS Act. [The House proposal] contains a provision
that would not permit net operating losses and other tax attributes to offset
corporate-level gain realized by the inverted corporation. Because a
corporation can control the amount of corporate-level gain it recognizes in
an inversion, this provision is not likely to be effective in stopping
inversions.
Thompson & Clary, supra note 3, at 1386.
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Congress ultimately adopted a tax-focused provision based on the
Senate approach.96 In particular, the AJCA provision treats the post-
expatriation foreign-incorporated parent as a domestic corporation,
thereby overriding the place-of-incorporation rule in the case of
inversion transactions. 9 This continued domestic taint removes the
96 Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat. at 1562 (2004). The Act added new
Code section 7874(b), which provides:
(b) INVERTED CORPORATIONS TREATED AS DOMESTIC
CORPORATIONS. - Notwithstanding section 7701(a)(4), a foreign
corporation shall be treated for purposes of this title as a domestic
corporation if such corporation would be a surrogate foreign corporation if
subsection (a)(2) were applied by substituting "80 percent" for "60
percent".
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat. at 1563 (2004). The foregoing provision cross-
references the definition of "surrogate foreign corporation" in new Code section
7§74(a)(2)(B), which provides in relevant part as follows:
(B) SURROGATE FOREIGN CORPORATION. - A foreign
corporation shall be treated as a surrogate foreign corporation if, pursuant
to a plan (or a series of related transactions) -
(i) the entity completes after March 4, 2003, the direct or indirect
acquisition of substantially all of the properties held directly or
indirectly by a domestic corporation ....
(ii) after the acquisition at least 60 percent of the stock (by vote or
value) of the entity is held -
(I) in the case of an acquisition with respect to a domestic
corporation, by former shareholders of the domestic corporation
by reason of holding stock in the domestic corporation,....
(iii) after the acquisition the expanded affiliated group which includes
the entity does not have substantial business activities in the foreign
country in which, or under the law of which, the entity is created or
organized, when compared to the total business activities of such
expanded affiliated group.
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat. at 1563 (2004).
This domestic taint generally applies only with respect to an inversion
completed after March 4, 2003. See I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(i), (b) (as added by Pub.
L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat. at 1563). In contrast, the Senate proposal would
have applied the domestic taint to inversions completed after March 20, 2002. See
H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 453 (2004). Also, this domestic taint applies only if there is
at least eighty percent continuity of ownership in the post-inversion foreign
corporation by the stockholders of the pre-inversion domestic corporation. See
I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(ii), (b) (as added by Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat. at
1563). If there is less than eighty percent continuity of ownership, but at least sixty
percent continuity, lesser tax consequences apply. See I.R.C. § 7874(a) (as added by
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat. at 1562-63). These consequences are similar
to the House-passed proposal, which would have limited the ability of the former
domestic parent corporation to utilize tax attributes, such as net operating losses or
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potential tax benefits otherwise available if the corporate parent were
treated as a foreign corporation.
III. SYMBOLIC ASPECTS OF CONGRESS'S RESPONSE TO CORPORATE
EXPATRIATIONS
A. Symbolic Legislation - In General
Congress's initial legislative response to corporate expatriates -
the alternative sanction barring contracts with the Department of
Homeland Security - is best understood through the lens of symbolic
legislation theory. In addition, this theory sheds light on the tax-
focused proposal that was favored by the House of Representatives.
According to this theory, "symbolic legislation serves the needs of
the public by indicating that Congress is 'doing something' about a
perceived problem and, accordingly, serves the needs of its legislative
supporters by making them appear effective and enhancing their
chances for reelection."9 s Murray Edelman is credited with laying the
foundation for the modern study of symbolic legislation.99 The author
previously summarized Edelman's theory as follows:
Under Edelman's view, for most individuals politics is "a
series of pictures in the mind, placed there by television news,
foreign tax credits, to reduce the tax owed on any gain recognized in an inversion
transaction. See supra note 92.
The AJCA also imposes an excise tax on certain stock options held by certain
insiders in expatriated corporations, which is based on similar provisions that
previously were included in the House and Senate bills. See Pub. L. No. 108-357,
§ 802, 118 Stat. at 1566. In addition, the legislation requires the Treasury Department
to prepare a study, no later than December 31, 2006, analyzing the effectiveness of the
AJCA provisions with respect to corporate inversions. Id. § 806(c), 118 Stat. at 1575.
98 Kirsch, supra note 16, at 921 (footnote omitted). As Daniel Shaviro observed,
"proposing and enacting legislation is a means of symbolic communication with
members of the general public, of causing them to like a politician without the
inconvenience (and possible political inconsequence) of actually having to benefit
them tangibly. Thus, without regard to its actual effects, legislation can promote
reelection." Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
8-9 (1990) (footnote omitted).
99 MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964); see also
CHARLES D. ELDER & ROGER W. COBB, THE POLITICAL USES OF SYMBOLS 1 (1983).
For the author's detailed application of the theory of symbolic politics in the context
of Congress's response to U.S. citizens renouncing their citizenship to avoid taxes, see
Kirsch, supra note 16, at 921-30. For an extensive list of research applying symbolic
politics theory to federal tax legislation and other areas, see id. at 921 n.255.
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newspapers, magazines, and discussions," constituting a
"passing parade of abstract symbols." As a result, "most
citizens have only a foggy knowledge of public affairs though
often an intensely felt one." This observation may be
particularly true in the context of tax legislation, where the
details are often mired in the densely worded, definition-
laden, exception-filled language of the Code. In this context,
according to Edelman's theory, the principal function of
much legislation, as well as other forms of political
participation, is to provide symbolic reassurance to the public,
while only a small group of interested, involved persons
generally receives any tangible benefit from the legislation."0
Subpart B explores the implications of this theory in the context
of the Homeland Security contract ban alternative sanction. Subpart
C applies a similar analysis to the House's proposed tax legislation
addressing corporate expatriations.
B. Alternative Sanctions as Symbolic Political Response
In 2002, during the second session of the 107th Congress,
Congress spent considerable time focusing on the perceived problem
of corporate expatriations, holding several hearings'0 ' and entertaining
numerous bills."0 This Congressional attention coincided with
extensive coverage of the topic in the popular press.0 ' Much of the
100 Kirsch, supra note 16, at 921-22 (footnotes omitted).
1 See supra note 12.
102 See supra note 68 (listing tax proposals addressing corporate inversions,
including more than ten bills introduced during the 107th Congress).
103 The following is a limited sample of the many newspaper and magazine
articles and editorials that addressed this topic during 2002: Editorial, Inversion
Subversion, WASH. POST, June 9, 2002, at B6; Molly Ivins, Commentary, GOP Gifts:
Payback Not Patriotism, CHI. TRI., Nov. 28, 2002, at N21 ("The polite term for these
corporate tax-dodgers is 'corporate inversion' or 'corporate expatriates,' but they are
tax cheats, pure and simple."); David Cay Johnston, Vote on an Offshore Tax Plan is
Roiling a Company Town, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at Al (discussing proposed
inversion by Stanley Works); David Cay Johnston, U.S. Corporations are Using
Bermuda to Slash Tax Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at Al; Alison Mitchell,
Companies Use Ex-Lawmakers in Fight on Offshore Tax Break, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2002, at Al; Allan Sloan, The Tax-Free Bermuda Getaway, NEWSWEEK (U.S. ed.),
Apr. 15, 2002, at 41; Jonathan Weisman, Patriotism Raining on Tax Paradise:
Lawmakers are Chafing at Firms that Exist Offshore Only on Paper, WASH. POST,
Aug. 21, 2002, at El. In addition, the topic was discussed on numerous television
programs during 2002. See, e.g., Nightline: Nightline Matter of Trust: Profits or
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media attention and legislative debates centered on the symbolic
aspects of the phenomenon. For example, critics of inversions
characterized the corporations as Benedict Arnolds,1 4 traitors, tax
dodgers,'O tax cheatsj 7 and participants in a Bermuda beach party.'O,
The names of several bills introduced by critics of inversions -
including the No Tax Breaks for Corporations Renouncing America
Act, the Uncle Sam Wants You Act, and the Corporate Patriot
Enforcement Act'09 - as well as the September 11, 2001, retroactive
effective date used for several of the bills,11° reflected this symbolic
Patriotism (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 7, 2002); Crossfire: Rumsfield Turns Up
Heat in Afghanistan; Does President Deserve Month-Long Vacation? (CNN television
broadcast, Aug. 2, 2002 (transcript no. 080200CN.V20)). The N.Y. State Bar
Inversion Report commented on the public attention inversions received in 2002 as
well:
This seemingly dry, technical tax issue has given rise not only to numerous
news stories in the tax press, but also several prominent stories in major
newspapers such as the New York Times, including four front page stories,
the Wall Street Journal, the New York Post, and the Houston Chronicle
and in weekly magazines such as U.S. News and World Report and even
The New Yorker.
NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at I (footnotes omitted).
Additional press reports in 2003 included Robert Kuttner, How Corporate Tax
Evaders Get Away with Billions, Bus. WK., June 23, 2003, at 24; The Flipside: Tax
Dodging Companies Go Overseas (CNNFN television broadcast, May 27, 2003
(transcript no. 052702cb.132)). During 2004, corporate expatriations were featured in
a New York Times nonfiction bestseller addressing tax evasion. See JOHNSTON, supra
note 3, at 229-50 (2003).
104 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S109 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 2003) (comments of Sen.
Harkin); Hearing on Corporate Inversions, Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Ways and Means Comm., 107th Cong. 107-75 (2002), available
at LEXIS, ALLNWS lib., FEDNEW file (statement of Rep. McNulty, Member,
House Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures); Crossfire: Rumsfeld Turns Up Heat
in Afghanistan; Does President Deserve Month-Long Vacation? (CNN television
broadcast, Aug. 2, 2002 (transcript no. 080200CN.V20)) (statement of Paul Begala).
105 A popular website criticizing corporate inversions is
http://www.corporatetraitors.com (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
106 Ivins, supra note 103, at N21; Sloan, supra note 103, at 41.
107 Ivins, supra note 103, at N21.
106 Sloan, supra note 103, at 41.
109 See supra note 68.
110 See, e.g., Uncle Sam Wants You Act of 2002, H.R. 4756, 107th Cong. § 2(b)
(2002); Save America's Jobs Act of 2002, H.R. 3922, 107th Cong. § 2(c) (2002);
Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 2002, H.R. 3884, 107th Cong. § 2(b) (2002).
The relationship between corporate expatriation and September 11 is a recurring
theme in the symbolic rhetoric. For example, Rep. Richard Neal observed:
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atmosphere. In contrast, supporters of the corporations argued that
the corporations were being forced to expatriate by an overly broad
and complex tax Code,"I favorably comparing a corporation's actions
against unfair taxes to "rumrunners of Prohibition days"'12 and the
nation's founding fathers.' 3
Despite the spotlight focused on corporate expatriations, as the
107th Congress approached its adjournment Congress had not yet
enacted legislation directly targeting the phenomenon.' 14 Finally, on
the last day of the session, the alternative sanction purporting to ban
expatriated corporations from entering into contracts with the
Department of Homeland Security was approved by Congress and
sent to the President for signature as part of the Homeland Security
Act." 5 However, just hours before the legislation was approved by
[T]he same company whose jackhammers carved Mount Rushmore
[Ingersoll-Rand] paid $28,000 to rent a mailbox in Bermuda in order to
avoid a $40 million tax bill from Uncle Sam. The board of directors of that
company voted less than a month after the tragic attacks of September 11th
to renounce [the company's] U.S. citizenship.
Neal Radio Address on Corporate Expatriates, TAX NoTEs TODAY (Apr. 14, 2003)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 71-68)
See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
12 David Greising, Investors Pay for Tax Runners' Fun in the Sun, CHI. TRI.,
Aug. 9, 2002, at
3-1.
13 Crossfire: Rumsfeld Turns Up Heat in Afghanistan; Does President Deserve
Month-Long Vacation? (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 2, 2002 (transcript no.
080200CN.V20)) (statement of Joe Matthews); see also Herman B. Bouma,
Corporations that Reincorporate Abroad are Not Traitors or Tax Cheats, DAILY TAX
RE'. (BNA), Oct. 16, 2002, at J-1 (arguing that "[clompanies who reincorporate
abroad are in fact playing by the rules.... [i]t is wrong to refer to these corporations
as traitors and tax cheats."). An official of Cooper Industries, which underwent an
inversion transaction in 2002, observed while speaking at a tax conference: "[q]uite
frankly .... the charges of any kind of patriotism [issues] leveled at inverted
companies, I found to be offensive.... The real reason for inversions.., is that the
U.S. tax system is out of sync with its trading partners." Cathy Phillips, Congress
"Certain" to Revisit Corporate Inversion Imbroglio, Angus Says, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Dec. 16, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 241-8).
114 As noted supra note 69, inverted corporations were tangentially addressed in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
15 The Homeland Security Act was approved by the Senate on November 19,
2002, 148 CONG. REC. D1167 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002), and cleared the House of
Representatives on November 22, 2002, 148 CONG. REC. H9040 (daily ed. Nov. 22,
2002). The second session of the 107th Congress adjourned on November 22, 2002.
148 CONG. REC. H9126 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 2002). President Bush signed the bill on
November 25, 2002.
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Congress,116 language was inserted that significantly undermined any
instrumental effect the alternative sanction might have had.
Specifically, a statutory exception was inserted allowing a waiver of
the contract ban to "prevent the Government from incurring any
additional costs that otherwise would not occur." '117 Thus, as a
practical matter, despite the purported contract ban, a corporate
expatriate could enter into Homeland Security contracts as long as it
was the low bidder. 118
This purported ban on Homeland Security contracts was
prototypical symbolic legislation. It enabled its supporters to claim
credit for some legislation that purported to address a perceived
problem, thereby satisfying the general public's demand for action.119
At the same time, consistent with Edelman's theory, it ensured that
the interested, involved group that would actually be affected by the
legislation - in this case, corporations that have engaged in an
inversion transaction - received their desired result. In particular,
given that some legislation was to be enacted, the best outcome for
116 Senators' Statement on Inversion Provision in Homeland Security Bill, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Jan. 13, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT
8-79) (Senators Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins referring to "a special-interest
provision included in the last hours of consideration of the Homeland Security bill");
Warren Rojas, Lawmakers Vow to Remove Vaccine Language from Homeland
Security Plan, TAX NOTES TODAY (Dec. 12, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit., 2002 TNT 239-3) (referring to the statutory exception as "one of the seven
last-minute adds House Republicans rolled into the final homeland security bill ...
before shutting out the lights on the 107th Congress").
117 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 835(d), 116 Stat. 2135,
2229 (2002). See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
118 See Snowe, supra note 116 ("[T]he legislation as enacted would have required
federal contracts to be awarded on the basis of the lowest bid, or if job losses could
follow, regardless of where a company was incorporated."). For contemporary
criticisms of the instrumental effectiveness of the provision, see Ivins, supra note 103,
at N21 (the exceptions make the statute a "toothless provision that affects no
company"); Daniel J. Mitchell, Commentary, Competitive Bidding Benefits, WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at A21 (the exceptions "almost completely emasculated" the
provision); Maj. Thomas Modeszto, ed., Contract and Fiscal Law Developments of
2002 - The Year in Review, 2003 ARMY LAW. 1, 254 (2003) (because of these
exceptions, "[t]he provision is not as stringent as originally proposed").
19 According to Rep. Richard Neal, an advocate of tighter alternative sanctions
in this area, the provision in the Homeland Security Act was "nothing more than a
phony attempt by the Republican leaders to address the serious issue" of corporate
expatriations. Rep. Richard E. Neal, Neal Release on Awarding Federal Contracts to
"Corporate Runaways," TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 14, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 220-50).
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the targeted group of expatriate corporations was a provision that had
little, if any, practical effect on their ability to enter into government
contracts. As one reporter observed during the course of the
Congressional debates over the contract ban provision in 2002,
"[riecognizing that there may be no way to stop Congress from taking
high-profile action on the politically potent issue this year, the
businesses are looking for ways to limit the damage."' 20
Several months after the enactment of this alternative sanction,
Congress revisited the provision in response to complaints by some
lawmakers regarding its ineffectiveness. 1E' In February 2003, Congress
amended the alternative sanction by eliminating the exceptions
concerning loss of jobs or imposing additional costs on the
government. 122 Accordingly, only the "in the interest of homeland
security" exception remains.
Despite this amendment, the current provision has only limited
practical impact. The alternative sanction prohibits the Department
of Homeland Security from entering into a contract with a "foreign
incorporated entity"'123 that is treated as an "inverted domestic
120 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Big Guns Hired to Fight Tax Reforms; Firms Enlist Ex-
Lawmakers to Limit Expected Changes to Offshore Finance Breaks, BALT. SUN, Aug.
9, 2002, at lA. See generally infra note 134 (describing lobbying efforts surrounding
anti-inversion legislation).
121 Indeed, at the time of the original enactment of the Homeland Security Act,
the Republican leadership promised several swing voters that three "'egregious'
special interest provisions," including the broad exceptions to the federal contract
provision, would be revisited. See Snowe, supra note 116. As summarized in the tax
press:
House members scaled back the language last week, making it ineffective,
by adding a waiver to the compromise package just before members voted
on final passage....
Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., agreed to settle the disputed
new language in the next Congress. He accommodated concerns by
promising to take up the corporate expatriate provision (along with two
other nontax items) on the first appropriations bill to be considered in
January.
Patti Mohr & Warren Rojas, Senate Passes Homeland Security Bill Including
Expatriation, Charitable Trust Provisions, TAX NOTEs TODAY (Nov. 20, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 224-1).
122 See Homeland Security Act Amendments of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 101(2),
117 Stat. 526, 528 (2003). For details regarding the text of the amendment, see supra
note 77.
123 A "foreign incorporated entity" is "any entity which is, or but for subsection
(b) would be, treated as a foreign corporation for purposes of the Internal Revenue
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corporation.' ' 124  As those terms are defined in the statute, the ban
generally extends only to the new foreign parent arising from the
inversion transaction. It does not apply to any domestic subsidiaries
that are part of the inverted group. Thus, following the inversion, the
corporate group can continue to enter into Homeland Security
contracts through the group's domestic subsidiaries. As
Representative Richard Neal complained, the provision "bans only
contract applications from the foreign parent, leaving unaffected the
U.S. subsidiaries, where U.S. federal contracts are normally
managed."'
Code of 1986." Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 835(c)(3), 116
Stat. 2135, 2229 (2002). In other words, a "foreign incorporated entity" refers to a
corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4),
(5).
"4 Section 835 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides in relevant part:
(a) IN GENERAL. - The Secretary may not enter into any contract with
a foreign incorporated entity which is treated. as an inverted domestic
corporation under subsection (b).
(b) INVERTED DOMESTIC CORPORATION. - For purposes of this
section, a foreign incorporated entity shall be treated as an inverted
domestic corporation if, pursuant to a plan (or a series of related
transactions) -
(1) the entity completes after the date of enactment of this Act, the
direct or indirect acquisition of substantially all of the properties held
directly or indirectly by a domestic corporation or substantially all of
the properties constituting a trade or business of a domestic
partnership;
(2) after the acquisition at least 80 percent of the stock (by vote or
value) of the entity is held -
(A) in the case of an acquisition with respect to a domestic
corporation, by former shareholders of the domestic corporation
by reason of holding stock in the domestic corporation;...
.... [and]
(3) the expanded affiliated group which after the acquisition includes
the entity does not have substantial business activities in the foreign
country in which or under the law of which the entity is created or
organized when compared to the total business activities of such
expanded affiliated group.
Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 835, 116 Stat. at 2227-28.
125 Neal, supra note 119; see also David Cay Johnston, Key Company Assets
Moving Offshore, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at C3 (the provision "allows [inverted]
companies to win government contracts if the work is done by an American
subsidiary"). As a further limitation, the contract ban applies only to contracts
entered into by the Department of Homeland Security. It does not apply to contracts
entered into by other government departments or agencies. Cf. Patriotic Purchasing
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The instrumental ineffectiveness of the contract ban was recently
demonstrated in a high-profile contract awarded by the Department
of Homeland Security. In May 2004, Accenture LLP, a domestic
subsidiary of Accenture Ltd., a Bermuda company,12 was awarded the
$10 billion prime contract by the Department of Homeland Security
to develop and implement the new U.S.-VISIT system. This system,
which is intended to "help strengthen security at America's borders
and modernize the border management process,' 128 involves the
deployment of "end-to-end management and sharing of data on
foreign nationals covering their interactions with federal officials
before they enter, when they enter, while they are in the United
States, and when they exit. '' 129  Although the foreign parent,
Accenture Ltd., is a Bermuda company that is the successor to a
former U.S.-based entity (Arthur Andersen), 13 the contract ban in the
131Homeland Security Act did not bar the award.
Act of 2002, H.R. 4831, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002) (legislative proposal that would have
prevented award of any federal contiact to an expatriated corporation, although the
ban would have applied only to the foreign corporate parent of the group).
126 See ACCENTURE LTD., SEC FORM 10-K (2003), at 12, 85-86 (describing
Bermuda registration of Accenture Ltd. and its subsidiary structure).
127 Press Release, Dept. of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland
Security Announces Award of US-VISIT Prime Contract to Accenture LLP, June 1,
2004, available at http://www.dhs.govfdhspublic/displaycontent=3694.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See ACCENTURE LTD., supra note 126, at 85-86 (describing organization's
history).
131 As discussed supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text, the statutory ban
does not apply to domestic affiliates of a foreign parent. Also, Accenture's move to
Bermuda occurred in 2001, whereas the statutory contract ban applies only to
corporations that engage in an inversion after the November 25, 2002, enactment date
of the Homeland Security Act. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
296, § 835(b)(1), 116 Stat. 2135, 2228 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. 395). It
should also be noted that representatives of Accenture LLP have argued that the
Accenture group, although headquartered in Bermuda as of 2001, was not, as a
technical matter, formed pursuant to a corporate inversion. According to a recent
press release:
It is important to remember that the global Accenture organization has
never been a U.S.-based or U.S.-operated organization and has never
operated under a U.S. parent corporation. Despite what critics say,
Accenture did not undertake what is called a "U.S. corporate inversion."
Press Release, Accenture, Accenture Statement Regarding U.S. House Appropriations
Committee Vote on US-VISIT Contract, June 9, 2004, available at
http://www.accenture.com/xd/xd.asp?it=enweb&xd=_dyn\dynamicpressrelease_733.x
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Thus, even the 2003 amendment to the Homeland Security
contract ban provision, which purported to eliminate significant
exceptions to the ban, itself has the markings of symbolic legislation.
Supporters of the amendment are able to claim that they have taken
additional steps to combat the perceived problem of corporate
inversions. In so doing, they would be acting in accordance with
Edelman's theory that the enactment of some legislation, regardless of
its effectiveness, may be enough to satisfy the public that the
perceived problem of corporate expatriation was addressed."'
The amendment is also consistent with the second aspect of
Edelman's theory - "that a small group of interested, well-organized
persons receive tangible benefits while the public receives only
symbolic reassurance." '133 In this situation, the expatriate corporate
ml. See also Dan Ackman, Accenture Tax Dodging the Bullet, Forbes.com June 10,
2004, available at http://www.forbes.comlpersonalfinance/taxes/2004/06/1O/
cx da_0610topnews.html (Accenture "has typically drawn a distinction between itself
and companies like [Tyco International, Ingersoll-Rand,. and Cooper Industriesj
which were once based in the United States and moved to Bermuda. Accenture, once
known as Andersen Consulting... insists it was born in Bermuda...."); Amy
Hamilton, Accenture Says It's "Unfairly and Inaccurately" Accused of Inverting, TAX
NOTEs TODAY (Feb. 3, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT
22-4).
Soon after the Accenture contract was announced, the House Appropriations
Committee amended the then-pending Homeland Security Appropriations bill, H.R.
4567, 108th Cong. (2004), to block funding for the Accenture contract. However, the
House of Representatives subsequently voted 234-197 to allow that language to be
removed from the bill. See 150 CONG. REC. H4193-96, H4204-05 (daily ed. June 16,
2004) (roll no. 244). See also Associated Press, House Backs Security Contract for
Accenture, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2004, at C6. A subsequent attempt to reintroduce
the language was defeated by a 221-182 vote. See 150 CoNG. REC. H4523, H4553
(daily ed. June 18, 2004) (roll no. 268). See also Anti-Inversion Amendment to
Security Spending Bill Defeated, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 21, 2004) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2004 TNT 119-7). Cf Accountability and
Responsibility in Contracting Act, H.R. 4394, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004) (recently
proposed bill banning all Federal contracts for three years, for both the parent and
subsidiaries of an expatriated group).
132 See Kirsch, supra note 16, at 926.
133 Id. (footnote omitted). In this regard, the Congressional response is
consistent with recent interest group models. As Professor Sara Sun Beale observed
in the criminal law context, "[i]nterest group models provide an explanation for the
phenomenon described by Edelman, in which politicians deliver legislation conferring
tangible benefits on powerful interest groups, while they placate the general public
with legislation or administrative action that provides only empty symbolic gestures."
Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool
for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1249 (2000).
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groups undertook well-organized, well-funded lobbying pressure on
legislators.M  By limiting the instrumental effectiveness of the
amendment, Congress enabled these expatriate corporations to
continue to enter into lucrative government contracts, despite the
purported denial of those contracts under the Homeland Security Act
and the 2003 amendment.
Thus, Congress's initial legislative enactment targeting corporate
expatriates - which was the only legislative response for nearly three
years - is best understood through the lens of Edelman's symbolic
legislation theory, rather than as a substantive response to a perceived
exploitation of the tax code.
134 For a detailed description of the high-profile lobbyists hired to combat anti-
inversion legislation, see Davis, supra note 120. According to that article:
To lead the effort, the companies have assembled a formidable display of
political muscle - among them, former Senate Majority Leader Dole, a
Kansas Republican former House Ways and Means Committee Chairman
Bill Archer, a Texas Republican; former Sen. Dennis DeConcini, an
Arizona Democrat; and Kenneth M. Duberstein, a former Reagan White
House chief of staff.
According to lobbying records, Dole is registered on behalf of Tyco,
Duberstein and DeConcini are working for Accenture, and Archer is
signed up on behalf of energy companies Weatherford International Inc.,
which reincorporated in Bermuda in June, and Noble Drilling Services Inc.,
which did so in the Cayman Islands in May.
[C]ompanies that have moved offshore.., have turned ... to veterans of
the Washington establishment, who can use their friendships and political
influence to open doors that might otherwise be slammed in what has
become a decisively anti-corporate environment on Capitol Hill.
Id. See also Martin A. Sullivan, The Real K Street: Tax Lobbyists Prosper from ETI
Legislation, 101 TAX NOTES 189, 191-95 (Oct. 13, 2003) (listing amounts paid to top
four tax lobbying firms with respect to various tax legislation, including inversion
bills.). For a detailed description of the lobbying conducted by one company with
respect to proposed anti-inversion legislation, see Hamilton, supra note 131
(describing Accenture's expenditure of approximately $1 million in six months on a
"battalion of lobbyists," including several "heavy hitters, " to lobby "the Senate, the
House, the Treasury Department, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Office of
Management and Budget, and the Executive Office of the President" against various
anti-inversion proposals); see also Ackman, supra note 131 (in defeating more
stringent proposals that would have banned future government contracts, "Accenture
and its lobbyists - who are based in Washington, D.C., not Bermuda - won the day
then, and they seem confident they'll win again.").
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C. House Proposal as Symbolic Political Response
Symbolic legislation theory not only explains the alternative
sanctions that Congress has. enacted in response to corporate
expatriations, but also is relevant in understanding the leading tax-
focused proposal favored by the House of Representatives. As
discussed supra, the House favored a bill that would have altered
two tax consequences flowing from corporate inversion. The bill
would have (i) limited the ability of the former domestic parent
corporation to utilize tax attributes, such as net operating losses or
foreign tax credits, to reduce the tax owed on any gain recognized in
an inversion transaction occurring after March 4, 2003,"' and (ii)
imposed an excise tax on certain stock options held by executives of
expatriating corporanons.
As with the debate leading to the passage of the Homeland
Security alternative sanction, supporters of the House bill argued that
it would address a perceived problem. However, supporters of this
provision defined the perceived problem more narrowly than did the
supporters of the alternative sanction contract ban. As discussed138
supra, these supporters asserted that "corporate inversion
transactions are a symptom of larger problems with our current
uncompetitive system for taxing U.S.-based global businesses and are
also indicative of the unfair advantages that our tax laws convey to
foreign ownership." '39 Accordingly, they were less willing to define
corporate inversions as necessarily bad and to invoke rhetoric
challenging the patriotism of the expatriating corporations.
Nonetheless, apparently recognizing the need to be seen as doing
something about inversions, the House Report accompanying the
House proposal claimed that the bill "contains provisions to remove
the incentives for entering into inversion transactions."'4
Accordingly, at least to some extent, the House proposal can be
viewed as satisfying the public's desire to "do something" about a
perceived problem in accordance with Edelman's theory. This
conclusion is further supported by Edelman's observation that the
public generally has only a vague understanding of the intricacies of
135 See supra notes 93 and 95 and accompanying text.
136 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520,108th Cong. § 601(a) (2004).
137 Id. § 602(a).
138 See supra notes 46-47 & 82-85 and accompanying text.
139 H. R. REP. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 244.
140 Id.
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legislation."' Thus, even if the subtleties of the House Republicans'
arguments regarding the anticompetitive aspects of the current tax
system were lost on the general public, the proponents of the bill
could claim that they were "doing something" about corporate
expatriations.
In addition to providing the public with some assurance that
something was being done to address a perceived problem, the House
proposal can be viewed as conforming with the second aspect of
Edelman's theory: it ensured that the interested, involved group that
would actually be affected by the legislation - in this case,
corporations that have engaged in an inversion transaction - received
their desired result. In particular, given that some legislation was to
be proposed, the best outcome for the targeted group of expatriate
corporations would be a provision with little, if any, practical adverse
effect on their ability to expatriate.
As noted above,142 several commentators pointed out the
instrumental ineffectiveness of the House proposal. For example, the
principal proposal to limit the use of tax attributes to offset inversion
gain may have had only limited effects, due to a corporation's ability
143to control the amount of gain recognized in an inversion transaction.
Perhaps of even greater relevance, a provision that might actually
have had a significant adverse impact on expatriating corporations
was dropped prior to passage of the House proposal, due to significant
opposition from business interests. That provision, which had been a
part of earlier bills sponsored by Chairman Thomas,' 44 would have
tightened Code section 1630) to make it more difficult for certain U.S.
subsidiaries to deduct interest payments made to related foreign
parties. As discussed supra, such earnings stripping techniques
provide opportunities for post-inversion groups to reduce the U.S.
income tax on their U.S. income, so a provision limiting this technique
141 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. As the author previously noted,
"[t]his observation may be particularly true in the context of tax legislation, where the
details are often mired in the densely worded, definition-laden, exception-filled
language of the Code." Kirsch, supra note 16, at 922.
142 See supra note 95.
143 Thompson & Clary, supra note 3, at 1386.
1 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2003, H.R. 2896, 108th Cong. § 2001
(2003) (the predecessor bill to the House proposal); American Competitiveness and
Corporate Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 5095, 107th Cong. § 201 (2002); cf
NYSBA Comments on Proposals to Modify Earnings-Stripping Rules, TAX NOTES
TODAY (Sept. 15, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 178-49)
(analyzing the section 1630) proposal in H.R. 2896).
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might have reduced the incentive for expatriating. Multinational
corporations had been lobbying extensively against the inclusion of
the proposed tightening of Code section 1630), and that lobbying
ultimately convinced Chairman Thomas to drop that provision from
146the House proposal, leaving only the relatively benign provisions
limiting the use of tax attributes to offset inversion gain and modifying
the treatment of stock options held by executives of the inverted
corporation. 147  The extent to which the proposal's instrumental
145 See H.R. REP. No. 108-393, at 158-61 (2003) ("[T]he ability of foreign-based
companies to strip earnings out of the United States through the use of related-party
interest payments provides the 'juice,' or immediate financial incentive, for a
company to invert .. "). Foreign companies that have not undergone expatriations
can also use the interest stripping technique. Id. at 158. The provision would not,
however, have eliminated other potential methods by which inverted corporations,
and foreign corporations generally, may be able to engage in earnings stripping. See
Sullivan, supra note 59, at 12-13 (observing that, even if Code section 1630) is
amended to limit earnings stripping through related company interest payments,
other techniques involving royalty payments and tax treaties will still be available).
146 Alison Bennett, Extraterritorial Income Earnings Stripping Dropped to Win
Progress On Export Tax Repeal Measure, Thomas Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA),
June 8, 2004, at G-6, available at LEXIS, 109 DTR G-6 (Chairman Thomas "said he
decided to drop controversial earnings-stripping language from [the bill] simply so the
bill could move as time grows short on the legislative calendar.").
147 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. The excise tax imposed on stock
options held by executives of the inverted corporation may have the same limited
effect as the excise tax imposed on "golden parachute" payments received by
executives following a takeover of a corporation. See I.R.C. § 4999 (imposing a
twenty percent excise tax on excess parachute payments). Over time, senior
executives of most major corporations have negotiated for gross ups in their
compensation packages so that the corporation will ultimately pay the excise tax
resulting from a golden parachute payment. See Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap
Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to Control Executive
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1681-83 (2004) (citing
recent surveys illustrating the extensive use of gross ups).
The House proposal also included a mandate requiring the Treasury
Department to conduct several studies with respect to corporate expatriations,
including studies on the effects of the transfer pricing rules, tax treaties, and the U.S.
income tax provisions generally. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520,
108th Cong. § 606 (2004). Given that the Treasury Department and the Joint
Committee on Taxation had already issued studies on corporate expatriation, see
supra notes 1 & 12, and that Congress had held numerous hearings on the issue, see
supra note 12, it is not clear what additional information, if any, these studies would
have provided to Congress. In particular, given that the mandated report on
expatriations would not be due until December 31, 2005, which is half a decade after
Congress first became interested in this issue, and three and one-half years after
Treasury issued its initial inversion report, the House proposal's requirement of
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effectiveness was undercut at the behest of interested corporate
stakeholders, consistent with Edelman's theory, is illustrated by a
quotation from a representative of a corporate lobbying group
following the removal of the section 1630) provision from the House
proposal: "[w]e're thrilled with the apparent decision to take the
earnings-stripping language out of the bill," and following the
provision's removal "we expect to be lobbying in support of the
[revised] version of the bill as hard as we can.' 148
Thus, the House proposal to address corporate inversions had the
hallmarks of symbolic legislation as described by Edelman's theory. It
would have allowed supporters to claim to the public that the
purported problem of corporate expatriations was being addressed,
while the small group of interested taxpayers - the relevant
multinational corporations - would receive the tangible result they
desired (i.e., a provision with limited adverse tax effects).
IV. SOCIAL NORM-RELATED ASPECTS OF CONGRESS'S RESPONSE
A. Social Norms and Corporations - In General
As the preceding part illustrates, for several years Congress
postponed enacting legislation with significant instrumental effects on
corporate expatriations. Nonetheless, the absence of such legislation
does not necessarily mean that Congress's actions did not affect the
corporate inversion trend. Indeed, the mere fact that Congress
addressed the issue, thereby raising its public profile, had an impact
on corporations contemplating inversions. This part briefly analyzes
this secondary effect of Congressional action.
In considering whether to expatriate, a corporation obviously
considers the anticipated tax benefits and costs. 149 As discussed above,
Treasury studies itself has the earmarks of symbolic legislation - provisions that give
the public the appearance that something is being done about a problem, but that do
not adversely affect the specific taxpayers involved.
148 Bennett, supra note 146 (statement of Todd Malan, executive director of the
Organization for International Investment). According to Bennett,
"[s]takeholdrs... said they were delighted by the decision to drop language from
H.R. 4520 that would have limited earnings-stripping deductions under Section
1630)." Id.
149 For a detailed analysis of the importance of anticipated tax benefits and costs
in the expatriation decision, see Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 416, 421. The
corporation also considers legally circumscribed benefits and costs in non-tax areas.
For example, the change of the corporate parent's place of incorporation might have
effects on shareholder rights and other important considerations. See infra notes 255-
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Congress initially did not enact any provisions that would directly
influence this calculation.5 In addition to the tax benefits and costs,
the expatriation decision might be influenced by a less tangible
consideration - nonlegally enforceable rules and standards,
sometimes referred to as social norms.151
An extensive body of literature recognizes that actors are
influenced not only by legal rules, but also by social norms." 2 Much of
288 and accompanying text.
15 Desai and Hines identify three principal tax considerations that drive the
expatriation decision:
(i) the tax consequences that arise from no longer being subject to rules
arising from the U.S. treatment of foreign source income, (ii) the tax
consequences that arise from triggering capital gains at the firm level or
shareholder level, and (iii) the tax consequences that arise from enhanced
opportunities to relocate profits worldwide in a tax-advantaged way after
an expatriation.
Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 416, 421 (footnote omitted). The House proposal to
limit the use of tax attributes to offset the tax on inversion gain, if enacted, would
have affected the second factor identified by Desai and Hines. However, as explained
supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text, the practical effect would have been
small. While earlier proposals to modify Code section 163(j) to limit earnings
stripping might have had a significant impact on the third factor identified by Desai
and Hines, that provision was dropped from the House proposal. See supra notes
144-148 and accompanying text.
151 This article utilizes the "nonlegally enforceable rules and standards"
interpretation of social norms set out by Rock and Wachter in order to emphasize the
self-governing aspect of social norms and to distinguish the concept from legally
enforceable rules and standards. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms
& Corporate Law: Introduction, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1612-13 (2001); Edward B.
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1641 (2001); see also Marcel Kahan,
The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1869, 1870-71 (2001) (summarizing the various formulations of the definition of
"social norms" in legal literature and criticizing the lack of an agreed-upon definition,
but observing that "Rock and Walter deserve applause for using the precise (if
inelegant) acronym of NLERS to denote their concept of norms") (footnotes
omitted); see generally Kirsch, supra note 16, at 913 n.219 (citing legal and non-legal
scholarship on social norms).
152 See generally Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1239-
41 (2001) (summarizing the various theories regarding the mechanisms by which
social norms influence a target's behavior); Kirsch, supra note 16, at 914 n.221
(comparing Richard McAdams's esteem-driven model, in which individuals' desire
for respect or prestige drives norm creation, and Eric Posner's signaling model, in
which "in a world of private information, an individual behaves in certain ways and
punishes those who do not behave in that way, in order to signal to others that she is a
'good' type with whom others might want to engage in future cooperative
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this social norms literature focuses on the extent to which social norms
affect the behavior of individuals. 53  However, some recent
scholarship addresses the effect of social norms on corporations.
154
According to the social norms literature, norms "influence[] an
actor's preferences either directly, through internalization, or
indirectly through the imposition of second-order social sanctions
such as shaming or ostracism.""' To the extent a corporate inversionS • • 156
violates social norms, the impact might be felt at two separate levels.
exchanges").
153 Early studies addressing the importance of social norms to individual conduct
include ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution
Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986) (addressing
importance of social norms, rather than legal rules, for rural landowners settling
disputes involving trespassing livestock); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
115 (1992) (addressing importance of social norms in diamond industry). See also
Kirsch, supra note 16, at 913-21 (noting the ineffectiveness of Congress's attempts to
alter social norms to prevent individuals from surrendering their U.S. citizenship to
avoid taxes). Professor McAdams has cited additional studies on the role of social
norms in
the stability of racial discrimination in competitive markets, the
effectiveness of various anti-dueling statutes from the previous century and
safe-sex education efforts from this one, the reason people vote, the
transitional difficulties in moving from a Marxist to a market economy, the
general efficiency of the common law, and the operation of the elder share
regime governing sumo wrestling in Japan.
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 340-41 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
154 For example, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review recently published
several articles on the topic as part of a Symposium on Norms and Corporate Law.
See Symposium, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001). Even
within the context of the corporation, much norm analysis focuses on the behavior of
individuals. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2001)
(focusing on importance of trust and trustworthiness in discouraging "corporate
participants from stealing, shirking their duties, or otherwise mistreating each other");
Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1726 (2001) ("Our main concern is with good agent character,
by which we mean the disposition of an agent of a firm to adhere to the firm's
normative standards, reflexively or on the basis of commitment even when against
interest.") (emphasis in original).
155 Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms,
86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1623 (2000).
156 For a detailed analysis of the enforcement of social norms in the context of
corporations, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
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First, it could impact at a personal level the directors or corporate
officers involved in the expatriation decision, either through an
internalized sense of the incorrectness of expatriation, or through fear
of sanctions, such as shaming or ostracism. With respect to the latter,
commentators have recognized the importance of communities in
defining and enforcing social norms. 1' Corporate directors and
officers are members of communities, 15 and to the extent their actions
in supporting an expatriation were viewed as violating a community's
• 159
social norms, they might be subject to sanction by that community.
Second, it could impact the corporation at the corporate level. A
corporation, as an entity, cannot internalize a norm in the way an
individual can. However, a corporation could be the target of second
order sanctions to the extent social norms disfavored a corporate
parent changing its place of incorporation in pursuit of tax savings.
For example, the firm might experience a backlash from U.S.
customers and a possible reduction in revenue.' 6 This potential
decrease in revenue might, in turn, lower the value of the
1811 (2001). Skeel notes that when social norms are enforced against corporations
through shaming mechanisms, "the target may be either the corporation, an
individual offender [such as individual managers], or both." Id. at 1829,1832-35.
157 See Kirsch, supra note 16, at 919-20.
158 Indeed, these individuals are members of several potentially relevant
communities. To the extent a director or officer resides in the same local community
as the corporate headquarters, the social norms of that local community might be
relevant. Cf David Cay Johnston, Vote on an Offshore Tax Plan Is Roiling a
Company Town, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at Al (describing the hostility of residents
of New Britain, Connecticut, the headquarters of Stanley Works, toward CEO John
Trani in the context of Stanley Works' contemplated inversion in 2002). Moreover, to
the extent the directors or officers interact with leaders of other large corporations
across the country, the social norms of that community are also relevant.
159 See Skeel, supra note 156, at 1812 ("[C]orporate directors are enmeshed in
communities in which reputation does indeed matter. The directors of large U.S.
corporations are, in the words of one shareholder activist, 'the most reputationally
sensitive people in the world."') (footnote omitted).
160 In this sense, an expatriation in violation of existing social norms could be
viewed as analogous to a corporation engaging in other behavior that violates social
norms. For example, a U.S. clothing retailer that purchases its apparel from factories
in developing countries that employ child laborers might experience a public backlash
and a potential earnings loss. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1197,
1285-87 (1999) (discussing the adverse public reactions to Wal-Mart's Kathie Lee
Gifford clothing line and to Nike in response to disclosures of unfavorable labor
conditions at their overseas factories).
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corporation's stock.161 Concern over these potential sanctions against
the corporation could induce the directors or shareholders to oppose
inversion proposals even if the social norms do not influence these
individuals at a personal level.
B. The Stanley Works Example
Prior to the announcement of the proposed inversion by Stanley
Works in February 2002162 and the congressional focus on
expatriations soon thereafter,6 3 there was reason to believe that social
norms would not significantly constrain the corporate expatriation
trend. 16 With respect to the pre-February 2002 expatriations,"' it is
161 An anticipated decrease in future revenue would be only one factor that
would affect the stock price of an expatriating corporation. Other important factors
would include the anticipated future tax savings to the corporation following the
inversion and the anticipated immediate tax cost arising from the inversion
transaction. For a detailed analysis of the effect of these latter factors on the stock
price of an inverting corporation, see Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 416-22. Cf.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 2151, 2152 (2001) ("[Clompliance with nonlegally enforceable social norms can
significantly affect market value and ... innovative legal engineering designed to
develop credible signals of such compliance may be one of the most important
services that corporate attorneys can perform for their clients.").
162 Stanley Works announced its proposed inversion on February 8, 2002. See
STANLEY WORKS, SEC SCHEDULE 14A (Feb. 8, 2002).
163 See supra notes 12 & 68 (citing Congressional hearings in 2002 and numerous
bills introduced in 2002). The first of the inversion-targeted bills cited supra note 68
was introduced on March 6, 2002. See H.R. 3857, 107th Cong. (2002). The Treasury
Department also focused significant attention on inversions in the first half of 2002.
See, e.g., TREASURY INVERSION STUDY, supra note 1; Alison Bennett, Treasury Close
to Issuing Preliminary Study On Corporate Inversions, Angus Tells ABA, DAILY TAX
REP. (BNA), May 13, 2002 at G-10, available at LEXIS, 92 DTR G-10 (statement of
Treasury International Tax Counsel Barbara Angus that the increasing size, scope,
and frequency of inversions is "'certainly a source for concern and further
examination"').
16 The possibility that relevant social norms might have changed as a result of
Congress's involvement with corporate expatriations is discussed infra Part IV.C.2.
1 Significant inversions announced prior to Februar 2002 include:
Company Industry Announcement Date
Triton Energy Oil & gas February 8,1996
Tyco Electric components, March 17, 1997
security & fire protection,
healthcare, financial
services
Fruit of the Loom Apparel February 11, 1998
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difficult to measure precisely the effect of social norms at the
corporate director level. However, given that several corporations
undertook expatriations during that period, it is reasonable to assume
that the individual directors of those corporations did not fear
significant informal sanctions from peers within their community, and
did not feel internalized constraints against approving the inversion.'
66
Indeed, within certain industries - such as the oil and gas industry -
the significant number of inversions provides strong evidence that
directors within some industries felt no such constraints imposed by
their community.
Similarly, at the corporate level, the early adopters apparently
assumed that there would be no significant public backlash against the
company. This assumption is borne out by an economic study
showing that share prices of these corporations rose by an average of
1.7 percent immediately following the expatriation announcements.
Transoccan Offshore drilling March 15, 1999
Everest Reinsurance Insurance September 17, 1999
Foster Wheeler Engineering, consulting, November 29, 2000
and equipment
manufacturing for power
industry
Cooper Industries Electrical products, tools, June 11, 2001
hardware, metal support
products
Global Marine Offshore drilling September 4, 2001
Ingersoll Rand Industrial & construction October 16, 2001
equipment, refrigeration,
locks & security
Nabors Industries Land & offshore drillin January 2, 2002
Noble Drilling Deepwater drilling January 31, 2002
See Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 418-20, tbl.1.
166 As discussed supra notes 155-158, compliance with social norms can come
from either an internalization of the norm, a fear of sanctions from the community for
violating the norm, or both. While the directors of the first few corporations to
expatriate might have feared that their actions violated the social norms of their
community, once several corporations successfully inverted with no adverse
consequences to their directors, directors of other companies considering expatriating
probably had less concern about this issue.
167 As noted supra note 165, a significant percentage of the large inversions
announced prior to 2002 involved participants connected to the oil and gas industry
(Triton Energy, Transocean, Global Marine, Nabors Industries, Noble Drilling).
1 See Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 430. This increase in share price does not
necessarily indicate that the market anticipated no adverse revenue effect from the
expatriation. However, to the extent any adverse revenue effect was anticipated, it
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Indeed, a leading commentator, citing the early inversions, observed
that "after Tyco, it became clear that share prices do not drop as a
result of reincorporation - on the contrary, recently inverting
companies have seen their share prices rise in reaction to the expected
tax savings. Thus... there seems to be no market downside to
inversions."'69
While it is possible that the lack of significant adverse reaction
against the early corporate expatriation reflected a lack of norm
violation, it is also possible that the expatriations violated then-
existing social norms"7 but the public was largely unaware of the
transactions. Scholars have recognized that public awareness of the
potentially transgressing behavior is a necessary prerequisite for the
informal enforcement of social norms. 7' After all, if a community is
not aware that a person engaged in disfavored conduct, those
members will not be able to impose informal sanctions, such as
boycotts or other public campaigns, against the transgressor. In the
context of corporate expatriations, even if significant segments of the
population would have viewed the early tax-motivated inversions as
violating acceptable norms, a lack of information might have
prevented the public from being able to impose informal sanctions
against the corporations. Although corporations publicly disclose
details of inversion transactions in their Securities and Exchange
Commission filings, 7 1 it seems safe to assume that the general public
would have been outweighed by the expected net tax savings (after considering the
immediate tax costs associated with the transaction).
169 Avi-Yonah, supra note 24, at 1794.
170 The potential social norms that might have been violated are discussed infra
notes 208-212.
171 See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1880, 1917 (1991) (noting that "audience awareness" is one of the conditions
necessary for effective shaming); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White
Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L.
& EcoN. 365, 371 (1999) (in the case of effective shaming, "everyone knows or can
easily discover that the offender is a bad type.").
172 For examples of Securities and Exchange Commission disclosures by firms
inverting in the late 1990s, see FRUIT OF THE LOOM, INC., SEC FORM 8-K (Feb. 11,
1998) (announcing approval by Fruit of the Loom directors of a Cayman Islands-
based inversion transaction in order "to avail itself of certain business, tax and
financing advantages that are not available in the United States," particularly
because, unlike the United States, "the Cayman Islands generally imposes no
corporate income taxes on foreign income."); TRITON ENERGY CORP., SEC
SCHEDULE 14A (Feb. 23, 1996) (announcing proposal by Triton Energy directors of a
Cayman Islands-based inversion transaction in order "to avail ourselves of certain
business, tax and financing advantages compared to those that would be available to
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does not regularly consult these filings."' Moreover, the general press
paid little attention to the pre-2002 inversion transactions. 4
Circumstances changed significantly in February 2002. On
February 8, Stanley Works announced that its directors had approved
an inversion transaction to reorganize the company under a Bermuda
parent corporation, subject to a shareholder vote. 175  Stanley Works
was incorporated in Connecticut in 1852, and has its principalr .. .176
executive offices in New Britain, Connecticut. The company is a
worldwide producer of tools and door products for professional,
industrial and consumer use,'77 and is the best-selling hand-tool
manufacturer in the United States.7
us if the parent were a United States corporation. The creation of a Cayman Islands
parent corporation will minimize corporate income taxes because the Cayman Islands
generally imposes no corporate income taxes on foreign income.").
"' Cf. Kirsch, supra note 16, at 908 & n.199 ("[I]t seems safe to assume that the
overwhelming majority of Americans do not regularly read the Federal Register,"
and therefore the publication therein of the names of individuals who surrendered
citizenship will have little effect in triggering potential norm-based shaming
sanctions.).
174 For example, during the twelve months following Fruit of the Loom's
February 1998 expatriation announcement, only a half-dozen articles in major market
newspapers mentioned the transaction, and most of these references consisted of brief
factual statements in the context of other business news. See Diary, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland, OH), Feb. 12, 1998, at 1C (one paragraph reference to transaction
announcement); Financial Desk, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at D3 (one paragraph
reference to transaction announcement); Fruit of Loom 4'-Qtr. Charges Result in
Loss, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at 58 (one sentence reference to inversion plan
in context of article announcing earnings results); Fruit of the Loom Posts 4h-Quarter
Loss, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Feb. 13, 1998, at B5 (one sentence reference to
inversion plan in context of article announcing earnings results); Heather Pauly, Fruit
of Loom Seeks Cayman Islands Tax Deal, CH. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at 56 (short
article announcing proposed transaction and paraphrasing company's press release
describing anticipated tax benefits); The Ticker, Midwest Briefs, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13,
1998, at N2 (one paragraph statement announcing shareholder approval of the
transaction). Given the fact that Fruit of the Loom, an apparel maker that sold
underwear and other items under its own name, was a well-known company, it is
reasonable to anticipate that the public might have focused on the Fruit of the Loom
transaction, had the public been aware of it and had the public perceived it as
violating social norms.
175 See STANLEY WORKS, SEC SCHEDULE 14A (Feb. 8, 2002). For additional
details regarding the Stanley Works expatriation proposal saga, see JOHNSTON, supra
note 3, at 237-47.
176 STANLEY WORKS, SEC FORM 10-K (Mar. 28, 2003).
177 Id.
178 See Matthew Lubanko, Stanley's Brand Tarnished?; Experts: Over Long Haul,
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Shortly after this announcement, the media and Congress began
focusing on the corporate expatriation trend.79  In May 2002, after
significant press attention, Stanley Works shareholders narrowly
approved the proposed inversion, but the following day Stanley
Works announced that a new shareholder vote would be held due to
confusion surrounding the initial shareholder vote.4'° Because of the
extensive press and Congressional focus on the proposed Stanley
Works transaction, in part because Stanley Works' tools and garage
door openers made it a familiar household name,' Stanley Works
soon became the "poster child" for the corporate inversion trend. 2
Consumers Aren't Likely to Hammer Toolmaker, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 3, 2002,
at El (stating that as of 2000, Stanley Works held twenty-six percent of the U.S. hand-
tools market, nearly double its nearest rival.).
179 In particular, in February 2002, the New York Times ran a front page article
on the corporate expatriation "megatrend," naming several large corporations that
had undertaken, or were planning, one of these "paper transaction[s]." David Cay
Johnston, U.S. Corporations are Using Bermuda to Slash Tax Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2002, at Al; see also Daniel Mitchell, Commentary, Europe's Tax Hit on America,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at A16 (mentioning Accenture, Ingersoll-Rand, Tyco,
and Fruit of the Loom expatriations, but defending them as understandable attempts
to escape a "punitive" American tax system).
180 See STANLEY WORKS, SEC FORM 425 (May 13, 2002) ("Although the
company believes that the shareowner vote was fair and appropriate, it acknowledges
concerns raised at yesterday's shareowners meeting that some people may have been
confused about 401K plan voting procedures."); see also David Cay Johnston, Stanley
Voids Bermuda Vote and Promises to Try Again, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2002, at C1
(noting that Stanley Works' decision to invalidate the initial shareholder vote was
influenced by a lawsuit by Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal
alleging that Stanley Works had used deception to win shareholder approval).
181 See Johnston, supra note 179 (quoting a tax expert's observation that, of the
corporations that had expatriated or were considering doing so, Stanley Works was
one of the first "verging on a household name").
1 Several contemporaneous news reports referred to Stanley Works as the
"poster child" for corporate expatriations. See, e.g., Nancy Cleeland, Corporate
Misdeeds a Benefit for Labor?, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2002, at A28 (statement of Andy
Stem, president of the Service Employees International Union, in the context of
Stanley Works, that "[w]e need to pick out a poster child for irresponsible corporate
behavior and really expose the effect that has on the people who work for them.");
Doggett Statement on Stanley Works Withdrawal of Reincorporation Plans, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Aug. 5, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT
150-61) (statement by Rep. Lloyd Doggett referring to Stanley Works as "the poster
child for one blatant chapter in chronic corporate tax evasion"); Editorial, The Flight
to Bermuda, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2002, at A18 (referring to John Trani, the chairman
of Stanley Works, as the "latest political poster child for corporate evil"); John M.
Moran, An Offshore Storm Ends; Vote: Stanley Board's About-Face Followed a
Barrage of Criticism, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 3, 2002, at At (statement of
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In the months following the voided shareholder vote, numerous public
protests were held against the company,"' and hundreds of newspaper
articles, editorials, and letters to the editor criticized Stanley Works
for its proposed transaction. Finally, in August 2002, after enduring
this bad publicity for several months, the Stanley Works board of
directors voted to cancel the proposed inversion transaction.' The
company did not directly cite the bad publicity as a reason for
canceling the proposed transaction. Rather, "the company cited the
growing prospect of comprehensive tax legislation.... Most
positively, Congress has started down a path to deliver comprehensive
tax reform that would eliminate the inequities of U.S. international
taxation and thereby accomplish Stanley's original and continuing
goal."'8
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal that "Stanley Works became the
poster child, in part, because of the way that it sought to do this [expatriation]");
Stacey Stowe, Stanley Works Decides to Stay Put After All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002,
at CN5 (statement of John Sweeney, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., describing
Stanley Works as the "poster child for corporate greed"); see also Anthony C. Infanti,
Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in the Professionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX
REV. 589, 595 (2003) (subsequent law review article referring to Stanley Works as
"the poster child for the debate over corporate inversions") (footnotes omitted).
183 See, e.g., Thomas Bieluczyk & William Weir, Stanley Drops Bermuda Plan;
Board, Under Pressure, Decides Not to Reincorporate to Save Taxes, HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 2, 2002, at Al (describing protest, attended by John J. Sweeney, the
national AFL-CIO president, at which "several hundred demonstrators convened in
New Britain next to a giant, inflatable rat holding a Bermuda flag"); William M.
Welch, Offshore Tax Shelters Under Fire, USA TODAY, July 31, 2002, at 3B
("Stanley's decision touched off a storm of protest."); Ben White, Labor Demands
Corporate Reform, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at El (citing protest in New Britain,
Connecticut, the location of Stanley Works' corporate headquarters); David Cay
Johnston, Pressure on Companies Using Tax Dodge, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2002, at C3
(citing protests). These protests were principally led by labor unions opposed to the
inversion.
184 A search in the LEXIS "news" library, "allnws" file, revealed approximately
360 documents during the relevant period mentioning the company's proposed
Bermuda transaction, the large majority of which were themselves critical of the
transaction or described criticism by others.
185 See STANLEY WORKS, SEC FoRM 8-K (Aug. 2, 2002).
186 Id. The only reference in the press release to the outside pressures being
imposed on the company was the statement by the Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer that
[w]e have been asked by the Congressional leadership on both sides of the
aisle to support their efforts toward rectifying this situation by enacting
legislation that will create a level playing field for companies incorporated
in the U.S. We have honored their request, and the ball is now in their
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To some extent, Stanley's decision to abandon its expatriation
appears to stem not from informal social norm enforcement, but from
concern about legal-based instrumental factors. For example,
according to the previously cited press release, members of Congress
offered Stanley directors assurances that legislation providing tax
relief for domestic manufacturers might be forthcoming.f 7
Furthermore, by the time of the August 2002 abandonment, numerous
tax-focused bills had been introduced in Congress that might have
eliminated many of the tax benefits Stanley sought by expatriating.'
8
For example, the Grassley-Baucus REPO Act proposal in the
Senate,"' had it been enacted as proposed, would have continued to
treat the post-expatriation Stanley corporate parent as a domestic
parent. Also, in August 2002, Congress was actively considering the
Homeland Security provision that would have banned corporate
expatriates from future Homeland Security contracts.' 9 In addition,
the Connecticut attorney general had sued Stanley Works to prevent
the company from completing its plans. 9'
Nonetheless, there also appear to have been some aspects of
nonlegal social norms enforcement in play. Despite the official press
release's focus on the legislative assurances received by Stanley as an
inducement to abandon its plans, press reports at the time were more
forthcoming about the role that outside public pressure, spearheaded
court.
Id.
187 Id.
188 See generally supra note 68.
189 The REPO Act is discussed supra note 92. Because the Stanley Works
inversion had not been completed by March 20, 2002, the REPO Act would have
applied to it. See S. 2119, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2002). Although the tax legislation
ultimately enacted in 2004 contains a domestic taint provision similar to that in the
REPO Act, it applies only to inversions completed after March 4, 2003. See supra
note 97.
190 See David Cay Johnston, Musical Chairs on Tax Havens: Now It's Ireland,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 2002, at C1 (noting effect of potential government contract ban
on Stanley's decision). As discussed supra notes 114-125 and accompanying text, the
alternative sanction purporting to ban future Homeland Security contracts was
subsequently enacted in an instrumentally ineffective form.
191 See Virginia Groark, Stanley Works is Staying, and a Tax Issue Remains, Too,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, at CN1; Noam Scheiber, State Attorneys General as
Corporate Cops, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 126 ("Connecticut's
attorney general, Richard Blumenthal, waged his own battle to keep the New Britain-
based Stanley Works from reincorporating in Bermuda.").
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by labor unions and politicians, played on the company. 192 In
particular, the public press highlighted the potential effect that the
inversion might have had on Stanley's sales in the United States. As
one contemporary newspaper article observed, "The question is
whether all this ill will [arising from the planned expatriation] is
headed out to the Home Depot in Peoria."'93 Another article on the
same topic observed that "[t]he typical Stanley customer is an
American male, age 25 to 54. Often, he is a tradesman who belongs to
a union. And union members generally know which companies are
perceived as friendly to American workers and American causes. ' 94
To the extent the Stanley Works decision to cancel the planned
transaction resulted from concerns about this type of public backlash,
it represents an example of the ability of social norms to influence an
actor's behavior. 195
192 See, e.g., Bieluczyk & Weir, supra note 183, at Al (citing the "months of
pummeling from state officials, national lawmakers of both parties, New Britain
leaders, Stanley employees and top union leaders").
193 Dan Haar, Image Hammered: Stanley Move Draws Sharp Criticism, But Will
Customers Stick with Brand?, HARTFORD COURANT, May 10, 2002, at El.
194 Lubanko, supra note 178.
195 As discussed supra notes 155-161 and accompanying text, social norms can
influence a corporation's actions not only through concern about potential sanctions,
such as boycotts, against a violator, but also at the personal director's level due to a
director's internalized sense of the incorrectness of expatriation, or through fear of
sanctions, such as shaming or ostracism, from the director's peers. It appears unlikely
that this latter effect played a significant role in compelling the Stanley directors to
cancel the planned inversion. For example, it is unlikely that within the broad
community of directors of large publicly-held corporations the initial decision to
undertake the inversion was viewed as a violation of acceptable norms, particularly
because numerous other public companies had recently undergone such transactions.
While the residents of New Britain, Connecticut, where Stanley Works has its
corporate headquarters, were hostile to the planned transaction, see Johnston, supra
note 158, it is unlikely that the Stanley directors, particularly the outside directors
who had little regular contact with New Britain, would have internalized the norms of
that community or felt significant concern about shaming or other informal sanctions
of that community. See generally notes 157-158 and accompanying text (discussing
role of communities in social norm enforcement).
However, John Trani, the President and CEO of Stanley Works, did
acknowledge that he and other directors of the company did feel at least some
personal pressure regarding the issue, though not enough to influence their decision.
When asked by a reporter "How is the mood of Stanley executives?", Trani replied:
No one likes to be vilified in the press. We're all human beings. On the
other hand, you have to do what you believe is right. A CEO likes to be
popular, but respect is mandatory. Respect only comes when people you
lead believe what you're doing and saying is right.
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The concern about public backlash may have been significantly
greater for Stanley Works than for corporations that had expatriated
previously. Whereas Stanley sold retail products to the public under
its own name, most of the other expatriating corporations had little
direct public contact.' 96 Accordingly, the public was less likely to pay
attention to those other companies' inversion transactions and, even
had the public been aware of them, the lack of a public consumer base
would have lessened the opportunities for the public to boycott or
otherwise impose sanctions on those other companies.
In this regard, concern about social norm compliance has the
potential to create a de facto two-tiered corporate residence regime.
U.S.-based multinationals with little direct public contact could
expatriate and become foreign corporations for U.S. tax purposes,
while U.S.-based multinationals with significant public contact might
feel pressure to retain their U.S. incorporations, thereby remaining
domestic corporations.
C. The Role of Congress
As discussed previously, beginning in 2002 Congress entertained
numerous legislative proposals, held several hearings, and passed the
Homeland Security alternative sanction purporting to ban contracts
with expatriated corporations. Although the alternative sanction
197legislation that Congress enacted had no direct instrumental effect,
Scott Whipple, Stanley CEO Speaks Out about Future, NEW BRITAIN HERALD (New
Britain, CT), June 9, 2002, reprinted in STANLEY WORKS, SEC FORM 425 (June 10,
2002).
196 See supra note 165 (listing and describing companies that announced
expatriations prior to February 2002). See also JOHNSTON, supra note 3, at 237:
Most of the companies that made the Bermuda move had little contact with
consumers because they sold to other businesses. They had much less to
worry about.., than... Stanley, whose profits depended not just on the
quality of its tools, but on the positive attitude consumers had toward the
company."
Id.; Johnston, supra note 179, at A12 (quoting a tax expert's observation that some
companies had turned down expatriation proposals because of concerns about the
public reaction, and that "[tlhe companies most willing to [expatriate] are not
household names, but Stanley Works is verging on a household name."). Although
the 1998 Fruit of the Loom expatriation involved a well-known brand with sales to the
public, that transaction received little press attention and, accordingly, was not subject
to any significant public backlash. See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text
(discussing importance of information in the context of social norm enforcement).
197 The instrumental ineffectiveness of the alternative sanction ban on Homeland
Security contracts is discussed supra Part III.B. As discussed supra notes 188-191 and
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it is important to consider whether Congress's initial actions might
have had some indirect effect on expatriations in the context of social
norms. This subpart considers two possible effects in this regard.
First, Congress's activity in 2002 might have played an informational
role, helping to provide information about expatriation activities that
generally would not have come to the public's attention. The public
then could have used this information to sanction informally
corporations or their directors for violating an already existing social
norm against corporate expatriation (if, indeed, such a norm existed).
Section 1 of this subpart concludes that the Congressional focus on
expatriations served this informational role, at least to some extent.
Second, the Congressional activity might have had an
"expressive" effect, altering the then-existing social norms regarding
corporate expatriations. After briefly examining the legal literature's
theories regarding expressive legislation, section 2 of this subpart
extends these theories to address the expressive effects of legislative
debate and concludes that Congress's actions had, at most, only a
small amount of expressive effect.
1. Information-Providing Effect
As discussed in the prior subpart, prior to February 2002, there
was reason to believe that social norms would not significantly
constrain the corporate expatriation trend.9 In this context, it is
possible that Congress, merely by publicly discussing the names of
companies that engaged in inversion transactions, might have had
some social norm-related impact. Regardless of whether the
legislators viewed the corporations as violating social norms,' 99 the
publicity surrounding the legislative proposals and hearings helped
furnish information to the public about affected corporations so that
members of the public who perceived the transactions as violating
social norms might have been able to act on that information.
Just prior to Congress's heavy focus on corporate expatriations,
accompanying text, the mere threat of future legislation eliminating the potential tax
benefits for expatriated corporations may also have had an instrumental effect, apart
from any influence on social norms. The present subpart focuses on the social norms
aspect.
198 See supra notes 162-169 and accompanying text.
199 Presumably, those legislators who defended the expatriations as
understandable responses to an unfair and anti-competitive tax code would not view
the expatriations as violating relevant social norms, while those legislators who
characterized the corporations as "traitors" would consider the corporations as norm
violators. See supra notes 101-113 and accompanying text.
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the general press had begun to place a spotlight on the
phenomenon.200 Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that the media's
attention to the issue made various legislators aware of the potential
political benefits of focusing on the issue.20 However, it is also clear
that once anti-inversion bills were introduced in Congress and
202hearings were scheduled, press coverage increased significantly.
Thus, Congress's focus on the inversion phenomenon in 2002
appears to have been part of a snowballing effect - by focusing on
the phenomenon as a result of early press coverage, Congress
produced additional press coverage, which in turn heightened the
political importance of the issue in Congress, ensuring additional
Congressional attention and further press coverage. In the end, this
heightened publicity increased the likelihood that members of the
200 As noted supra note 179, media attention to expatriations was precipitated by
a February 2002 New York Times front page article on the corporate expatriation
"megatrend," which named several large corporations that had undertaken, or were
planning, one of these "paper transaction[s]." Johnston, supra note 179.
201 For example, when interviewed for the February 2002 New York Times front-
page article that helped focus attention on the inversion phenomenon, "Senator
Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, the ranking Republican on the Senate Finance
Committee, expressed alarm. 'There is no business reason for doing this, other than
to escape U.S. taxation. I believe the Finance Committee needs to investigate this
activity."' Johnston, supra note 179, at A12; see also Rob Hotakainen, Wellstone Bill
Aims to Close Offshore Tax Loophole, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, MN), Mar. 8, 2002,
at 3D (implying that the February 2002 New York Times article spurred Sen. Paul
Wellstone to introduce an anti-inversion bill in March 2002). Some prescient
legislators, however, had mentioned the issue previously. See Unofficial Transcript of
Finance Committee Hearings on Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 16, 2000)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2000 TNT 52-28) (Sen. Daniel Patrick
Moynihan asking witnesses "[s]hould we be concerned about this, and if so, what
should we do about it? Are we entering an era of, my goodness, corporate
expatriation?"); Remarks by Rep. Bill Archer to the National Italian American
Foundation, (Oct. 15, 1999), available at LEXIS, ALLNWS lib., FEDNEW file ("Go
to Bermuda, go to Aruba, go to the Cayman Islands - see the thousands of
American corporations that have fled this country for only one reason, and that is
because of our tax code. They'll all come back home" if the income tax is abolished
and replaced by a sales tax.).
202 Starting on March 6, 2002, and throughout the remainder of that year,
approximately one dozen legislative proposals targeting expatriation were introduced.
See supra note 68. Also, during 2002, numerous committee and subcommittee
hearings were held in both the Senate and House. In contrast to the dearth of articles
focusing on the inversion phenomenon prior to March 2002, dozens of newspaper
articles and radio and television broadcasts were dedicated to the inversion
phenomenon from April 2002 onward. See supra note 103 (citing some of these
articles and broadcasts).
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public would become aware of the fact that certain corporations had
engaged in an inversion transaction, or planned to do so. In turn, this
increased the possibility that the public might informally sanction
those corporations, to the extent the transactions were viewed as
violating then-existing social norms.
It is difficult to quantify the extent, if any, to which the public
imposed informal sanctions for violations of already-existing norms,
utilizing the factual information that Congress helped provide. While
some corporations - particularly Stanley Works0 3 - apparently
changed their behavior at least in part because of the public reaction
to a planned inversion, it is not clear whether the public was enforcing
previously existing norms against expatriation, utilizing Congress as
merely a source of factual information about the companies engaged
in the activity, or whether Congress's actions themselves altered the
then-existing norms. This latter possibility is discussed in the
following subpart.
2. Expressive Norm-Altering Effect
The prior section treated social norms as an exogenous variable,
implicitly assuming that Congress, while possibly providing
information to the public, was not itself influencing the public's view
of whether corporate expatriations violate social norms. However,
social norms are not static. Numerous commentators have studied the
mechanisms by which norms arise and change over time.2°4 Of
particular relevance for this discussion, there is general agreement
that legislation enacted by Congress can have an expressive effect that
changes social norms and thereby alters an actor's behavior, apart
from any direct instrumental aspects of that legislation. There is
203 The Stanley Works saga was discussed in detail supra Part IV.B.
"4 For example, under Richard McAdams's esteem-based theory of norm
development, a norm may arise for some behavior X if:
(1) there is a consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of
engaging in X (that is, either most individuals in the relevant population
grant, or most withhold, esteem from those who engage in X); (2) there is
some risk that others will detect whether one engages in X; and (3) the
existence of this consensus and risk of detection is well-known within the
relevant population.
McAdams, supra note 153, at 358 (footnotes omitted).
225 For a summary and comparison of the competing theories of expressive
legislation, see Scott, supra note 155, at 1623-26 (acknowledging the explanatory
power of expressive theories of law in particular contexts, but questioning their
usefulness as general, predictive, testable theories).
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disagreement, however, as to the precise mechanism by which this
"expressive" function of legislation works and how effective it is. For
example, as previously summarized by the author:
[U]nder Richard McAdams's esteem-based theory of norm
development, the enactment of legislation plays an important
role in publicizing to the community that a consensus on
desired (or undesired) behavior exists. Once individuals
become aware of this consensus, they are more likely to
perceive that an esteem gain is available by complying with it.
Thus, under McAdams's theory, the enactment of legislation
can provide "the jolt necessary to create a new norm, or
strengthen an old one."
Cass Sunstein also advocates a role for expressive legislation
in norm management. He recognizes the collective action
problem that faces agents who seek to alter norms and views
politicians as potential norm entrepreneurs who are in a
position to overcome this collective action problem, alerting
the public to the existence of a shared complaint and
suggesting a collective solution. Under certain circumstances,
the enactment of legislation may lower the cost to individuals
of expressing the new norms, resulting in a norm bandwagon
that encourages an ever-increasing number of people to reject
a previously popular norm. Eventually, a tipping point is
reached, where the new norm becomes generally accepted
and adherence to the old norm produces social disapproval.2
The relevant question is to what extent, if any, do these theories
apply to Congress's response to corporate expatriations? That is, to
what extent might Congress's actions have altered social norms that
existed prior to Congress's focus on expatriations, rather than merely
highlighting factual information about inversion transactions to enable
enforcement of existing norms?
In order to analyze the extent to which Congress's actions fulfilled
this expressive role altering social norms, it is important to consider
the state of social norms regarding corporate expatriations at the
206 Kirsch, supra note 16, at 915-16 (footnotes omitted). McAdams's theories on
norm development are set out in McAdams, supra note 153. Sunstein's theories are
detailed in Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903
(1996) and Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996).
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outset of the recent inversion trend. Prior to the late 1990s, few large
publicly-held corporations underwent corporate inversions.
Accordingly, the corporations that were the early adopters of this
strategy faced an important uncertainty - i.e., to what extent would
the corporate expatriation be viewed as violating social norms.
Several social norms could have been viewed as having relevance
with respect to a corporate group changing the place of incorporation
of its corporate parent in order to reduce taxes.2°8 For example, given
the high profile accorded tax reduction by newly-elected President
Bush in 2001, these transactions could have been viewed as legitimate
steps to ameliorate excessive U.S. taxation. Also, to the extent the
inversions were undertaken in order to "level the playing field"
between U.S.-based multinationals and foreign-based multinationals,
they could have been viewed as consistent with general norms
involving fair play.' °9 On the other hand, norms of fair play might
have dictated that a U.S.-based corporation not engage in tax-cutting
maneuvers unavailable to U.S.-based individuals. Similarly, even if
the corporation complied with all its tax obligations arising from the
inversion transaction, it could have been viewed as violating general
norms of tax compliance to the extent it was reducing its tax
obligations in a manner not available to the general public.1 The
public might have been particularly predisposed to this perception in
light of the high profile corporate scandals involving Enron,
WorldCom, and others, which were unfolding at approximately the
. 2 1 1
same time as the inversion trend. In addition, particularly after
207 See supra note 1 (discussing the eleven-year gap between the first and second
modern corporate inversions, and the increasing trend starting in the late 1990s).
208 For an analogous discussion of the relevant social norms in the case of an
individual surrendering U.S. citizenship to reduce taxes, see Kirsch, supra note 16, at
913-21.
209 Cf supra note 186 (quoting Stanley Works executive's desire for a "level
playing field" between companies incorporated in the United States and those
incorporated elsewhere).
210 As the author observed in the related context of individuals surrendering
citizenship to avoid future tax obligations:
In a technical sense, an individual who surrenders citizenship to avoid taxes
would not be violating this [tax compliance] norm as long as he complies
with the [existing relevant tax laws]. Nonetheless, some individuals might
perceive tax-motivated expatriation as cheating in violation of this norm,
even if all applicable tax code provisions are complied with, because it
involves a reduction in taxes in a manner not available to most individuals.
Kirsch, supra note 16, at 917-18 (footnotes omitted).
211 See Weisman, supra note 103, at E2 (relating statement by Rep. James H.
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September 11, 2001, inversion transactions could have been viewed as
unpatriotic behavior by ungrateful corporations that owed much of
212their original success to the United States.
As discussed in the previous subpart,213 corporate inversions prior
to 2002 faced little public attention and little adverse reaction. This
lack of significant backlash against these early inversions potentially
had important implications for future inversions. Once several large
publicly traded corporations expatriated without significant adverse
consequences to their directors or to the corporations' revenue,
directors of other corporations might have sensed that they would not
suffer informal sanctions at the personal level from their communities,
and their firms would not suffer informal sanctions from the public for
expatriating. As one researcher observed, "firms may have been
reluctant to incorporate abroad for fear of public relations damage.
Once several firms undertook reorganizations, the damage potential
may have been perceived to have fallen, and other firms followed.
2 14
Maloney that "[w]hether it's Enron abusing partnership rules, WorldCom abusing
expensing rules or Stanley Works abusing the tax code, the public sees corporate
abuse.").
212 According to a prominent tax specialist who advised some companies
regarding expatriations, "companies are understandably reluctant to do something
like this because it will not necessarily be properly construed in the marketplace. It
may be seen as not patriotic and in the wake of Sept. 11, that is not a good posture for
a company." David Cay Johnston, U.S. Corporations are Using Bermuda to Slash Tax
Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at A12 (statement of Robert Willens, described as a
"tax expert at Lehman Brothers").
213 See supra notes 162-174 and accompanying text.
214 CRS INVERSION STUDY, supra note 3. A similar observation regarding the
uncertain public reaction surrounding the early inversions was made by Professor
Reuven Avi-Yonah in testimony before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee in
2002:
Until Tyco inverted successfully in 1997, investment bankers generally
assumed that a U.S. company would pay an unacceptable price in its share
value if it reincorporated in Bermuda.... The presumed drop in share
value related to corporate governance concerns and to reputational issues.
But after Tyco, it became clear that share prices do not drop as a result of
reincorporation - on the contrary, recently inverting companies have seen
their share prices rise in reaction to the expected tax savings. Thus, despite
the recent troubles of Tyco and Global Crossing, there seems to be no
market downside to inversions.
Law Professor Testimony on Corporate Inversions, TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 17,
2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 201-20). See also
JOHNSTON, supra note 3, at 237 (observing that "[i]f a company that was a household
name could make the move ... it meant - as Grassley said - Katie, bar the door.").
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Indeed, once a significant number of firms in a particular industry
expatriate, the directors of the remaining U.S.-incorporated groups
might feel compelled to initiate inversions in order to remain
.• • 215compettve."
This shift toward acceptability within the relevant executive
community is analogous to the norm shift that occurred among
professionals in the 1970s with respect to hostile takeovers. As
described by Melvin Eisenberg, until the mid-1970s, "the social norms
of the business, financial, and legal establishment were strongly
opposed to hostile takeovers," and most "establishment"
corporations, commercial banks, investment bankers, and lawyers,
would not participate in hostile takeovers."' However, the norm
quickly shifted in 1974 when International Nickel made a hostile
takeover bid for ESB, a battery company, and "a premier investment
bank, Morgan Stanley, decided to break ranks and assist
[International Nickel's] hostile bid." '217 Eisenberg summarizes the
effect on social norms, observing that "[o]nce Morgan Stanley flipped,
the old, inefficient social norm crumbled.... Once Morgan Stanley
sanctioned hostile takeovers, competitors jumped in."2 '
215 For example, Stanley Works chairman and chief executive John Trani
observed, "[n]ot only are we disadvantaged against our foreign competitors, but two
of our major U.S. competitors, Cooper Industries and Ingersoll-Rand Company have
a significant advantage over Stanley Works because they have already
reincorporated." STANLEY WORKS, SEC FORM 8-K (Aug. 2, 2002), Exhibit 20(i); see
also Weisman, supra note 103, at E2 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley, then the
ranking Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, that "[s]ome companies are
willing to stay and pay. Other companies dash and stash the cash. And that makes the
former into a sucker."). This pressure to follow an industry trend might apply not
only at the corporate level, but might also be felt personally at the director level. As
discussed supra note 158, directors themselves may feel pressure to comply with social
norms of their peer communities, including the community of corporate directors and
executives within their industry.
216 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1288 (1999).
217 Id. at 1288-89.
28 Id. at 1290 (quoting RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 601(1990)); see
also Skeel, supra note 156, at 1828:
Prior to the takeover boom, a strong norm prohibited Wall Street banks
from financing or advising hostile takeover bidders. In the small, close-knit
community of Wall Street financiers, a bank that violated that norm would
be shamed by its peers.... [However,] the norm collapsed once Morgan
Stanley broke ranks by agreeing to participate in a hostile bid for
[International Nickel] ....
Id. at 1828 (footnotes omitted).
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At the corporation's level, there are several possible explanations
for the early lack of public resistance to expatriations. As discussed in
the preceding subpart,219 it is possible that social norms might have
dictated an unfavorable public attitude to expatriating corporations,
but the public was not aware of the early transactions. A related
possibility is that social norms might have disfavored expatriation, but
the public was not in a position to impose meaningful nonlegal
sanctions, such as boycotts, against transgressors. This explanation
might make sense in the case of corporations with little public
• - 220
interaction, such as drilling companies and industrial manufacturers,
but it would not explain the lack of public sanction of well-known
retail companies, such as Fruit of the Loom. 12 A third possibility is
that then-existing social norms might not have viewed corporate
expatriation as "bad" behavior.
Had the inversion trend continued without significant public
attention, it is possible that at some point informal sanctions would
have become ineffective, even if the public (once informed of the
trend) viewed expatriations as inappropriate. In particular, if
significant percentages of the market leaders in various industries had
already undergone expatriations by the time the public became aware
of the phenomenon, it is unlikely that public sanctions, such as
boycotts, would have much affect, even if the collective action
222problems described by Sunstein could have been overcome. At that
219 See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text.
220 By the nature of their industries, Triton Energy, Transocean, Foster Wheeler,
Global Marine, Nabors Industries, and Noble Drilling, among other expatriating
companies, would have little interaction with the public. See supra note 165.
221 See supra note 196. Sunstein's model might suggest that even if the public had
been aware of Fruit of the Loom's expatriation, and even if a significant portion of
the public disfavored the transaction, collective action problems might have
prevented the public from imposing meaningful sanctions against the company. See
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 206, at 911. Others who have
focused on the importance of collective action problems in norm development are
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 993-1016
(1995), and Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585
(1998).
222 Assume, for example, that most of Fruit of the Loom's competitors in the
apparel industry had also expatriated by the time the public became aware of the
disfavored phenomenon. Even if the expatriations were viewed as violating social
norms, it is unlikely that the public could successfully boycott all of the major
manufacturers in the apparel industry. Also, at the personal director level, once a
sufficient number of firms in the industry expatriated, directors would no longer fear
sanctions from within their community. See supra notes 206-208 and accompanying
text.
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point, even if the public initially would have reacted unfavorably to an
isolated expatriation, the public probably would have accepted the
new reality once a significant number of U.S.-based multinational
corporations had moved their parents' place of incorporation abroad.
However, as discussed previously, the corporate inversion trend
did not continue to stay "below the public radar" long enough to
allow significant expatriation across large numbers of industries, and
thus the state of affairs described in the prior paragraph was not
reached. Sparked by media reports, Congress focused significant
223
attention on the phenomenon beginning in 2002.
As noted above, the literature addressing the expressive function
of law focuses on the norm-shaping effects of legislation actually
224
enacted by Congress. Under this focus, Congress's initial response
appears to have had little expressive effect on the social norms
surrounding corporate expatriation. As previously discussed, despite
focusing on the expatriation issue throughout much of 2002, Congress
did not actually pass legislation - the Homeland Security contract
ban - until late in the year.2 ' However, the informal social
disapproval of corporate expatriations - particularly as evidenced by
the reaction to the Stanley Works proposal226 - took place before
Congress finally enacted the Homeland Security alternative sanction
in late November 2002. Thus, social norms opposed to corporate
expatriations appear to have been in place before Congress finally
enacted legislation purporting to condemn corporate inversions.
It is possible, however, that a slightly modified version of the
theories on expressive legislation might have been in effect. In
particular, rather than focusing on the expressive effect of statutes
enacted by Congress, it is possible that the legislative debate itself had
127
an expressive effect on social norms, even before Congress actually
enacted legislation at the end of 2002.
It is possible to fit this modified theory - which I will refer to as
2" See supra note 68 (listing proposed legislation targeting inversion
transactions).
224 See supra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
225 The Homeland Security Act was approved by the Senate on November 19,
cleared the House of Representatives on November 22, and signed by the President
on November 25, 2002. See supra note 115.
226 The possible effect of social norms on the Stanley Works proposal is discussed
supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
227 Again, as mentioned before, this theory focuses on whether Congress's
activities actually helped change then-existing social norms, rather than merely
providing information by which the public could act on then-existing social norms.
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the theory of expressive legislative debate - into the framework of
the expressive theory of legislation set out by McAdams, Sunstein,
and others. For example, extending McAdams's theory of expressive
legislation, if the legislative debates and hearings reflected that a clear
• 228
consensus on desired (or undesired) behavior existed, it is possible
that members of the public would receive the jolt they needed to
perceive an esteem gain by complying with the reflected norm. For
example, if the legislative debates and hearings made clear that there
was widespread disapproval of expatriations, members of the public
might be more willing to comply with informal sanctions, such as
boycotts, of violators. Similarly, extending Sunstein's theory of
expressive legislation, if the legislative debates and hearings reflected
a clear consensus against expatriation, the debates might help
overcome collective action problems and encourage members of the
public to join a norm bandwagon enforcing informal sanctions against
corporate violators
It appears that this theory of expressive legislative debate had, at
most, only limited applicability with respect to the corporate
expatriation trend. One limitation of the theory is that the public
might pay little attention to the details of ongoing debate inC229
Congress. More importantly, even if the public were aware of the
debates, the debates and related political pronouncements did not
produce a clear consensus as to the acceptability (or lack thereof) of
corporate expatriations. A significant number of legislators -
primarily House Democrats and Senate leaders of both parties -
publicly expressed their views that corporate expatriations were
inappropriate and should be stopped.230 In contrast, several leading
28 It is conceivable that legislative debate on a topic could reflect a clear
consensus among legislators, even though Congress has not yet been able to enact the
underlying legislation. For example, unrelated procedural obstacles may have
prevented the legislation from being considered, or the issue on which there is
consensus might be part of a larger legislative package upon which disagreement still
exists.
229 This factor is similar to the earlier observation that the public is unlikely to
read SEC filings on a regular basis. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
230 For example, the Washington Post quoted Sen. Charles Grassley, the ranking
Republican on the Senate Finance Committee, as stating "[t]he companies are right
from the standpoint that they're not doing anything illegal, but I take a position that it
is immoral and unethical.... Some companies are willing to stay and pay. Other
companies dash and stash the cash. And that makes the former into a sucker."
Weisman, supra note 103, at E2. These legislators' views were also conveyed in
regional newspapers. See, e.g., Dan Rather, Patriotism vs. Profit, THE TIMES UNION
(Albany, NY), July 14, 2003, at A6 (statement by Senator Grassley that "[i]t's
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legislators - primarily House Republicans - defended corporate
expatriations as legitimate responses to an overburdensome tax
code.2 1' To the extent the public perceived this lack of agreement
regarding the merits of corporate expatriation, the legislative debates
would not have an expressive effect in altering or confirming social
232
norms regarding this issue.
It is possible, however, that the public perceived a legislative
consensus against corporate expatriations despite statements by some
legislators defending corporate expatriations. In particular, some
legislators who viewed the inversion trend primarily as a legitimate
response to an overburdensome tax code nonetheless made some
public statements critical of expatriating corporations. For example,
Chairman Thomas "told reporters that he might draft a three-month
moratorium to send a signal to firms that are currently considering
setting up parent corporations abroad." 3 To the extent the public
outrageous.., that some companies are willing to leave their country during a war
and a recession just to save some taxes."); Associated Press, Senate Panel OKs
Charitable-Giving Tax Break, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, UT), June 19, 2002, at
A9 (statement by then-Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus that the
then-current tax code inappropriately "let[s] a corporation, with nothing more than a
file folder or post office box in a tax haven country, escape millions in U.S.
taxes. .. ."). For similar statements in the Congressional Record by Senators Baucus
and Grassley, see 148 CONG. REC. S10,576 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Charles Grassley arguing for a ban of federal contracts for corporate expatriates, on
the grounds that "[y]ou would think that the 'greed-grab' of corporate inversions
would satisfy most companies, but unfortunately it is not enough.... Imagine the
nerve. They create phony foreign headquarters to escape taxes and then use other
peoples' taxes to turn a profit. That's really something, something that needs to be
stopped."); 148 CONG. REC. S2594 (daily ed. April 11, 2002) (similar statement from
Sen. Max Baucus).
231 For example, USA Today disseminated then-House Majority Leader Dick
Armey's observation that "penalizing businesses for minimizing their tax burden by
legally moving offshore 'is akin to punishing a taxpayer for choosing to itemize
instead of taking the standard deduction."' Welch, supra note 183. A New York
Times article observed that "[t]he chief tax writer in Congress, Representative Bill
Thomas... reiterated his view that American tax law was forcing corporations to
acquire an offshore mailbox, [saying] 'We need to do the rest of the job by passing
legislation that removes incentives for companies to acquire an offshore address."'
Johnston, supra note 190, at C3.
232 Indeed, given the disagreement reflected in much legislative debate in a broad
range of areas, it is likely that legislative debate will rarely have expressive effect.
233 Sue Kirchoff, Bush Backs Tax-Haven Moratorium, BOSTON GLOBE, June 7,
2002, at D1, D8. There is a potential relationship between the potential expressive
effect of the legislative debates and the symbolic legislation theory discussed supra
Part III. In the context of symbolic politics, to the extent Rep. Thomas and others
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viewed these statements as reflecting at least a baseline sentiment that
corporate inversions were "bad" (even if they were understandable
responses to a problematic tax code), the legislative debate
surrounding expatriations might have had at least some minimal
expressive effect in solidifying social norms against the transactions,
even before any expatriation-targeted legislation was enacted.
In summary, Congress's initial response to the wave of corporate
expatriations appears to have played only a limited role in the social
norms context. By giving significant attention to the issue, Congress
served an indirect informational role, furnishing information about
expatriating corporations so that members of the public who
perceived the transactions as violating social norms might have been
able to act on that information. However, Congress's actions appear
to have had little expressive effect in altering social norms. In
particular, the alternative sanction legislation Congress passed in late
2002 had little expressive effect because, by that time, there already
appeared to have been a significant public consensus against
expatriations. At most, the legislative debate and hearings on the
issue might have had some small expressive effect to the extent the
public perceived a limited consensus among legislators that
expatriations were "bad."
V. TAx POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESS'S RESPONSE
A. Tension Between New Tax Provision and Place-of-Incorporation
Rule
Thus far, the article has focused on two aspects of the
Congressional responses to corporate expatriations - the enacted
alternative sanction purporting to ban Homeland Security contracts
and the House-passed proposal modifying certain tax provisions. Part
III concluded that these two responses are best understood as
symbolic legislation that purports to do something about a perceived
problem, but that has (or would have had, in the case of the House
proposal that was not enacted into law) little direct instrumental
effect. As discussed in Part IV, at most these responses and the
debate surrounding them might have had limited impact on shaping
who generally defend expatriations believe that social norms already disfavor
expatriations, they might make limited statements criticizing expatriations in order to
create the appearance that they are addressing a perceived problem. In the context of
the expressive effect of legislative debate, once they make such statements they might
contribute to the solidification of social norms against corporate expatriations.
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the social norms, thereby indirectly affecting corporate expatriations.
In contrast to these limited impacts on corporate expatriations,
the ultimate Congressional response - the AJCA tax legislation
passed in 2004, based on the Senate-passed tax proposal -
undoubtedly has a direct instrumental effect on corporate
234 235
expatriations. As discussed previously, the AJCA provision treats
the new foreign parent arising from the inversion transaction as a
domestic corporation for U.S. income tax purposes.236 As a result of
this domestic taint, the two principal tax benefits of an inversion
transaction - avoidance of the Subpart F regime with respect to
certain income earned by foreign subsidiaries and the ability to use
earnings stripping techniques to reduce U.S. tax on income arising in
231the United States - are no longer available to an expatriating
corporation.
A corporate inversion involving the transfer of substantially all of
the properties of a domestic corporation to a foreign corporation after
March 4, 2003, is subject to the new provision if two factual tests are
satisfied:
238
234 Indeed, even before the enactment of the AJCA, the mere possibility that the
Senate-preferred approach might be enacted may have created an in terrorem effect
on corporations that otherwise might have undertaken an inversion transaction. The
Senate-passed provision would have applied to inversions completed after March 20,
2002. S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 441(a) (2004) (proposed I.R.C. section 7874(a)(2)(A)).
This date was carried over from the Reversing the Expatriation of Profits Offshore
(REPO) Act, which had been favorably reported by the Senate Finance Committee in
the 107th Congress and which also was sponsored by Senators Baucus and Grassley.
See S. 2119, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2002) (proposed I.R.C. section 7874(a)(2)(A)). Any
corporation considering expatriation after March 20, 2002 would have had to consider
the possibility that the desired tax benefits would be lost if the Senate proposal
eventually were enacted. As discussed above, the version ultimately enacted in the
AJCA adopted March 4, 2003 as the operative date. See supra notes 96-97 and
accompanying text.
... See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
236 This discussion focuses on the provisions applicable when there is at least
eighty percent continuity of ownership in the post-inversion foreign corporation by
the stockholders of the pre-inversion domestic corporation. See supra note 97. In the
case of corporate expatriations where there was less than eighty percent, but at least
sixty percent, continuity of ownership, the AJCA adopted the approach favored by
the House, which merely limits the ability of the expatriating corporation to utilize
various tax attributes to offset gains from the inversion, but respects the resulting
corporation as a foreign corporation. See supra note 97.
237 These two tax goals of corporate inversions are discussed in detail supra notes
43-60 and accompanying text.
'3' The AJCA provision also addresses partnership inversions. See Pub. L. No.
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(i) after the transaction, at least eighty percent of the stock of
the foreign corporation is held by former shareholders of the
domestic corporation (the ownership continuity test),2 39 and
(ii) neither the foreign corporation nor its corporate group
has substantial business activities in the foreign country under
whose laws the foreign corporation is organized (the no
substantial business activity test)- 240
Accordingly, if these tests are satisfied, the post-inversion
corporate parent is treated as a domestic corporation for U.S. tax
purposes, even though it is incorporated in a foreign country, such as
Bermuda, rather than the United States.
This newly enacted provision addressing corporate inversions
constitutes a significant departure from the long-standing place-of-
incorporation rule for determining corporate residence. The place-of-
incorporation rule, which has been the jurisdictional touchstone for
corporate taxation since the early days of the modern income tax,24'
looks solely to the jurisdiction in which the corporation is
incorporated: corporations incorporated under the laws of one of the
U.S. states are domestic, while those incorporated under the laws of a
foreign country are foreign. 4' Factual inquiries, such as the identity
and residence of the corporation's shareholders, the location of the
corporation's management, or the place where the corporation
. -. 243
conducts its business activities, are ignored under the place-of-
108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat. at 1562 (2004). This article, however, focuses only on the
implications of the proposal with respect to the taxation of multinational
corporations.
239 I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B), (b) (as passed in Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118
Stat. at 1563 (2004)).
240 I.R.C. § 7874(a)(2), (b) (as passed in Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat. at
1563 (2004)). These requirements are discussed in detail supra notes 96-97 and
accompanying text.
"' See Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 8, at 1060.
242 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (5). See also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
243 In contrast to the U.S. tax code's focus on place of incorporation, other
countries often base corporate residence on fact-specific inquiries, focusing on "some
economic or commercial connection such as the place of management, principal
business location, or less frequently, residence of shareholders." HUGH J. AULT ET
AL., COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 371 (1st ed. 1997).
More recently, some countries have combined the place-of-incorporation test and the
fact-specific tests, "treating a corporation as resident if either test is satisfied." Id. at
371-73 (explaining the use of combined tests by the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, Germany, and the Netherlands).
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incorporation test . '
Even after enactment of the AJCA provision, the place-of-
incorporation rule remains the general rule for determining corporate
residence, applicable to the vast majority of corporations. The
legislation's special domestic taint rule applies only in the case of
inverting corporations that run afoul of the ownership continuity and
no substantial business activity tests. In effect, the tax code now has a
two-tiered test for determining corporate residence: the place-of-
incorporation rule for most corporations, and the domestic taint rule
for certain corporate inversions.
The normative justifications offered for this two-tiered approach
cast significant doubt on the continuing viability of the general place-
of-incorporation rule. In particular, the very reasons given by the
Senate Finance Committee Report for supporting the special rule for
inversions lead to the logical conclusion that the place-of-
incorporation rule should be reconsidered and, perhaps, abandoned.
In effect, the arguments supporting the special rule for inversions are
the tax policy equivalent of declaring that the Emperor (in this case,
the long-standing place-of-incorporation rule) has no clothes. 45
According to the Senate Finance Committee Report
accompanying the Senate-passed proposal (upon which the AJCA
provision was based), the reason for enacting a special residence test
244 See supra note 25. Factual inquiries have some tangential relevance under
current law, particularly in determining the source of an income item paid by a
corporation to another taxpayer. The rules for determining the source of income -
which rules are relevant in determining the scope of taxation if the recipient of the
income is a foreign taxpayer and the availability of a foreign tax credit if the recipient
of the income is a domestic taxpayer - sometimes depend on the residence of the
corporation paying the item (as determined under the place-of-incorporation rule).
For example, interest paid by a domestic corporation generally is treated as domestic
source, see I.R.C. § 861(a)(1), and dividends paid by a domestic corporation generally
are treated as domestic source, see I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(A), whereas interest paid by a
foreign corporation generally is treated as forcign source, see I.R.C. § 862(a)(1), and
dividends paid by a foreign corporation generally are treated as foreign source, see
I.R.C. § 862(a)(2). However, if a domestic corporation receives at least eighty
percent of its gross income from the active conduct of a foreign business, the interest
it pays is treated, at least in part, as foreign income. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(1)(A), (c).
Similarly, if a foreign corporation receives at least twenty-five percent of its gross
income from the conduct of a U.S. business, a portion of the dividends it pays are
treated as domestic income. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(B). Cf Joseph L. Andrus,
Determining the Source of Income in a Changing World, 75 TAXES 839, 841-54 (1997)
(discussing the role of residence in determining the source of income).
"' Cf HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, The Emperor's New Clothes, in STORIES FOR
THE HOUSEHOLD 56 (Porter and Coates 1877).
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for inversion transactions is that these transactions, by changing the
place of the parent's incorporation, generally result in only
a minimal presence in a foreign country of incorporation....
In particular, these transactions permit corporations and
other entities to continue to conduct business in the same
manner as they did prior to the inversion, but with the result
that the inverted entity avoids U.S. tax on foreign operations
and may engage in earnings-stripping techniques to avoid
U.S. tax on domestic operations. The Committee believes
that certain inversion transactions.., have little or no non-tax
effect or purpose and should be disregarded for U.S. tax
246purposes.
Statements by the supporters of the recently-enacted AJCA
provision further reflect this view that a change in place of
incorporation is a mere paperwork formality, devoid of any substance.
For example, on a nationally syndicated television show, Senator
Grassley summarized an inversion transaction as follows: "Go down
there [Bermuda], set up a file cabinet with a sheet of paper in it."247
Also, the late Senator Paul Wellstone, who had sponsored legislation
148
similar to the Senate proposal, argued that
a number of prominent U.S. corporations, using creative
246 S. REP. No. 108-192, at 142 (2003). Similarly, the California legislature, in
passing the California Taxpayer and Shareholder Protection Act, discussed supra note
79, made a finding that "[ajn expatriate company is a United States based company
that has moved in name and on paper only to a tax haven country and has no
substantial business activities in the country of reincorporation." S.B. 640, 2003 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
247 John McLaughlin's One on One (PBS broadcast, April 19, 2002), available at
LEXIS, ALLNWS lib., FEDNEW file (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley). Senator
Grassley used a similar characterization during Senate debates. See 148 CONG. REC.
811,451 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002) (statement by Sen. Grassley that "[i]nverting
corporations set up a folder in a foreign filing cabinet or a mail box overseas and call
that their new foreign 'headquarters."').
248 See S. 2050, 107th Cong. § 1(a) (2002). The Wellstone proposal, like the
recently-enacted AJCA provision, would have treated a post-inversion foreign-
incorporated parent as a domestic corporation for tax purposes. Unlike the AJCA
provision, the Wellstone proposal would have required this domestic taint if there was
at least fifty percent (rather than eighty percent) continuity of ownership, without
regard to whether substantial business was conducted by the foreign corporation in its
country of incorporation, and without regard to the date of the inversion transaction
(i.e., even if the transaction occurred on or before March 4, 2003). Id.
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paperwork, have transformed themselves into Bermuda
corporations in order to avoid paying their share of U.S.
taxes. These new Bermuda companies are basically shell
corporations. They have no staff, no offices, no business
activity in Bermuda. This exists for the sole purposes of
shielding income from the IRS.2 49
This lack of confidence in the tax code's general focus on place of
incorporation is furthered by the "no substantial business activity" test
of the legislation.5 By calling off the special domestic taint if the
post-inversion corporate parent conducts substantial business
activities in the country in which it is incorporated, the provision
implies that the location of a corporation's business activities may be a
more legitimate determinant of residence than is the place of
251incorporation. Indeed, a bill introduced by Senator Evan Bayh,
which would have imposed a domestic taint on expatriated
corporations in a manner similar to the AJCA provision, went so far
as to use the defined term "nominally foreign corporation" to refer to
252the post-inversion parent .
If, as the supporters of the new provision imply, a change in the
corporate parent's place of incorporation is mere "paperwork"
involving a new "sheet of paper," the logical question is why does the
U.S. tax code generally rely on a corporation's place of incorporation
as the touchstone for defining residence? After all, if the place of
incorporation is a mere formality devoid of substance, it seems
249 148 CONG. REC. S8184 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 2002).
250 See supra note 240.
251 Similarly, statements during Senate debates imply that the location of a
corporation's management headquarters and production and service facilities might
be a better determinant of residence than is the place of incorporation. For example,
Senator Levin, in arguing for applying a domestic taint test to the post-inversion
parent corporation, described corporate inversions as "when a U.S. corporation
reincorporates on paper in a tax haven and establishes a headquarters there when, in
reality, its primary offices and production or service facilities remain right here in the
United States." 149 CONG. REP. S2520 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2003). Also, a "sense of the
Congress" provision approved by the House Ways and Means Committee implies that
factors other than place of incorporation - particularly the location of the owners of
the corporation - are more accurate gauges of whether a corporation is a "United
States corporation." See H.R. 1531, 108th Cong. § 402(a) (as reported in the House
April 9, 2003) (using the term "domestically-owned corporation" synonymously with
the term "United States corporation").
252 See Corporate Tax Fairness and Shareholder Rights Act of 2003, S. 513, 108th
Cong. § 2.
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difficult to justify imposing worldwide taxation, as well as the Subpart
F anti-deferral regime, based solely on that factor.
The remainder of this part examines this inherent tension
between the recently-enacted domestic taint provision for inverted
corporations and the general place-of-incorporation test. In
particular, Subpart B examines the allegations by supporters of the
new provision that a corporation's place of incorporation, and thus a
change in its place of incorporation, is merely a matter of paperwork
with no substantive meaning. In particular, it focuses on the extent to
which the benefits, rights, and obligations of the corporation and its
stakeholders are dependent on the place of incorporation. The
subpart concludes that there are some substantive non-tax
consequences that depend on the place of incorporation, but that
these factors might not be sufficient to justify the significant tax
consequences that flow from a domestic characterization under the
place-of-incorporation test. Subpart C then considers whether any
other considerations might justify a distinct test for determining
corporate residency in the context of a corporate expatriation.
Subpart D concludes that the recently enacted two-tiered system is
not justifiable, and that Congress should adopt a uniform rule for
determining whether a corporation is treated as domestic or foreign
for tax purposes. This could be accomplished by either retaining the
place-of-incorporation rule, with its inherent weaknesses described in
Subpart B and its inherent facilitation of inversion transactions, or,
preferably, by eliminating the place-of-incorporation rule and
replacing it with a more substantive test of corporate residence as the
general rule.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is important to consider one
additional preliminary issue. The following discussion of a
corporation's residence implies that residence is relevant in
determining a corporation's tax liability. In particular, it assumes that
the United States will retain a residence-based tax system that taxes
domestic corporations (however defined) on their worldwide income,
providing a foreign tax credit to alleviate the potential for double
taxation.15  This article does not address the merits of whether the
213 The general differences between a worldwide residence-based tax system and
a territorial tax system are discussed supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. The
article also assumes that the United States will, as a general matter, continue to treat a
corporation as a separate entity from its shareholders and subsidiaries. Cf. Graetz,
supra note 12, at 316:
International income tax law is composed of legal concepts and constructs
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United States should retain a residence-based system for corporations
or should, instead, move toward a territorial system. That issue has
been addressed in detail by other commentators .
B. Substantive Aspects of Place of Incorporation
As discussed in the prior subpart, supporters of the recently-
enacted provision, which imposes a domestic taint on a corporation
that undergoes an inversion, argue that the inversion transaction
should be ignored because it is merely a shuffling in paperwork,
devoid of substance. This subpart explores this claim.
1. Corporate Governance
One potential difference between the pre-inversion corporate
parent (incorporated under the laws of a U.S. state, such as Delaware)
and the post-inversion corporate parent (incorporated under the laws
of a foreign country, such as Bermuda) concerns corporate
governance. The laws of the two jurisdictions regarding shareholder
that no longer reflect the economic realities of international business, if
they ever did. The continuing insistence of the international tax regime in
treating different divisions of an integrated multinational business as
separate entities, whenever their legal status implies such separation, is but
one illustration of the problem.
Id. (footnote omitted).
254 For a summary of articles advocating the adoption of a territorial, or
exemption, system, whereby the United States generally would tax only a
corporation's income that arises in the United States, see Fleming et al., supra note
32, at 303 n.9. Recent articles defending worldwide taxation of U.S.-resident
corporations and arguing for its expansion by eliminating the opportunities for
deferral include Fleming et al., supra note 32; Fleming et al., Deferral: Consider
Ending It Instead of Expanding It, 86 TAx NOTES 837 (Feb. 7, 2000); Peroni et al.,
supra note 1. Even if the United States were to move toward a territorial system,
there would probably still be a need to define corporate residence. In particular,
many proponents of territoriality do not advocate the full exemption of all foreign
source income but, instead, contemplate only the exemption of foreign business
income. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 12, at 330. Broadly exempting all foreign
income "would create a substantial incentive to move mobile and portfolio capital
abroad, creating an unacceptable risk to both the U.S. Treasury and U.S. residents."
Id. Accordingly, to the extent that the United States under a territorial system might
still tax domestic corporations on some residual categories of income (e.g., foreign
portfolio income earned in tax haven countries), there would still be a need to define
a "domestic" corporation. Cf. id. at 323 (arguing that the "fragility and
manipulability" of corporate residence tests suggest that "U.S. international tax
policy, to the extent possible, should reduce the tax consequences of determinations
of residence for corporations.").
552 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 24:475
rights and the actions of directors and officers might differ
significantly.
Indeed, these potential differences have led to some of the most
vocal criticisms of corporate inversions. In particular, numerous
institutional investors and labor unions have objected to the potential
loss of shareholder rights following a corporate inversion. 25  For
example, the California Public Employees' Retirement System
(CalPERS), in urging the Tyco Board of Directors to undo Tyco's
expatriation by reincorporating in the United States, argued that:
Shareowners lost a significant level of accountability when
Tyco reincorporated from Delaware to Bermuda....
Bermuda incorporation makes it more difficult for
shareholders to hold companies, their officers and directors
legally accountable in the event of wrongdoing; class actions
are generally not available under Bermuda law; and
shareholders have extremely limited ability to sue officers and
.- 256
directors derivatively on behalf of the corporation.
255 These critics of inversions often adopt rhetoric similar to that of supporters of
the recently-enacted tax provision. For example, the California Public Employees'
Retirement System (CalPERS) has referred to inversion transactions as "sham
relocations." Laura Mahoney, CalPERS Calls on Expatriate Companies to Return
Incorporation to United States, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Nov. 20, 2002, at G-5,
available at LEXIS, 224 DTR G-5. However, these institutional investors, by
criticizing inversions based on the accompanying loss of shareholder voting rights,
implicitly acknowledge that the change in place of incorporation has at least some
substantive consequences.
CalPERS, labor unions, and other shareholder activists have initiated several
(so-far unsuccessful) attempts to cause expatriated corporations to return to the
United States. See, e.g., TYcO INTERNATIONAL LTD., SEC SCHEDULE 14A (Jan. 23,
2004), at 63-67; see also Alison Bennett, Inversion Critics Laud Ingersoll-Rand Vote
Showing Support for Moving Back to U.S., DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), June 3, 2003, at
G-8, available at LEXIS, 106 DTR G-8 (describing Ingersoll-Rand vote where 41.4
percent of shareholders voted in favor of reincorporating in United States, and Tyco
vote where twenty-six percent of shareholders voted in favor of reincorporating in
United States); Phyllis Plitch, Activists Engage Ingersoll-Rand About Tax Haven,
WALL ST. J., May 28, 2003, at B6E; Laura Mahoney, McDermott Will Weigh Move
Back to U.S. Under Agreement with CalPERS, AFSCME, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA),
April 2, 2003, at G-2, available at LEXIS, 63 DTR G-2 (describing pressure by
CatPERS and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees);
Mahoney, CalPERS Calls on Expatriate Companies to Return Incorporation to United
States, supra (discussing proposals regarding Ingersoll-Rand, McDermott
International, and Tyco).
256 Laura Mahoney, CalPERS Urges Tyco's Largest Shareholders to Move
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Moreover, inversion opponents have criticized the lack of
transparency and predictability of Bermuda corporate law relative to
Delaware law.2" The expatriated corporations have challenged some
Company from Off-Shore Tax Haven, DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA), Feb. 28, 2003, at
G-2, available at LEXIS, 40 DTR G-2. The California legislature, in passing the
California Taxpayer and Shareholder Protection Act of 2003, CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE
§ 10286.1 (West 2004), discussed supra note 79, cited similar concerns in making the
following findings:
(c) When a company expatriates, its shareholders are generally left without
the opportunity to pursue derivative lawsuits and without the ability to
enforce legal judgments against the company under the United States and
California securities laws. Therefore, matters relating to standard fiduciary
duties of officers and directors of the corporation may be less dutifully
monitored or controlled.
(d) Further, the shareholders of expatriate companies stand to lose their
rights to submit a shareholder proposal, inspect or obtain copies of the
company's corporate records, or approve a sale, lease, or exchange of all or
substantially all of the corporation's assets. In some cases, an expatriate
company may significantly limit shareholder voting rights or dissenting
shareholders' appraisal rights.
(e) This diminution of shareholder rights... undermine[s] the faith and
confidence of investors in the integrity of the financial markets.
S.B. 640, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003).
257 In written testimony submitted to a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, the
AFL-CIO asserted:
Delaware... has an advanced and flexible corporate law, expert
specialized courts dealing with corporate-law issues, a responsive state
legislature and a highly developed body of case law that allows
corporations and shareholders to understand the consequences of their
actions and plan accordingly. Bermuda, by contrast, does not even have
published reports of legal cases, making it difficult to determine how the
courts have ruled on corporate law issues. It is also difficult to obtain
access to books on Bermuda law, since public law library resources are
almost non-existent. We believe the stability, transparency and
predictability of Delaware's corporate law is superior to Bermuda's and
provide advantages to shareholders.
AFL-CIO Testimony on Corporate Inversions, TAX NoTEs TODAY (Oct. 17, 2002)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 201-22). Similarly, the New
York Times reporter who first brought the expatriation phenomenon to widespread
public attention observed:
[T]here were two practical benefits of choosing Bermuda as a tax
headquarters. Bermuda does not have law books that neatly organize and
arrange the decisions of its court. Lawyers who want to know Bermudian
case law must either ask their peers or go through the court decisions in the
court clerk's office one case at a time. Even better from the point of view
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of the assertions about post-expatriation diminution of shareholder
rights,2 8 but have acknowledged that at least some of these concerns
regarding shareholder rights "are well-founded."25'9
of managements who want to run companies as they see fit without
interference from shareholders, there are no Bermuda law firms that
specialize in representing plaintiffs against corporations. Bermuda is a
country with a one-sided bar.
JOHNSTON, supra note 3, at 237; cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 589-90 (1990) (arguing that
Delaware's prominence in attracting corporate charters primarily is attributable to
the expertise of its judges in interpreting the law); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The
Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 746 (2002)
(arguing in another context that even though there are many indeterminacies in
Delaware corporate law, it offers more predictability than other jurisdictions,
particularly because "Delaware currently offers a single corporate tribunal that
regularly hears corporate cases with expert judges and without juries.").
258 For example, the Tyco Board of Directors recently stated that
the proponent's assertion that shareholders have extremely limited ability
to sue officers and directors derivatively, on behalf of the Company is
based on a misunderstanding of Bermuda law. Bermuda law does in fact
permit shareholders to bring claims, on behalf of the Company, where it is
alleged that there has been wrongdoing at the expense of the Company and
the alleged wrongdoers are in control of the Company. Similarly, the
proponent's assertion that Bermuda law does not allow class action
litigation fails to take into account that Tyco is fully subject to all U.S.
federal securities laws, as well as all U.S. federal law concerning the ability
of shareholders to initiate class action litigation asserting violations of those
securities laws.
TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD., supra note 255, at 65.
2.9 Id. According to a recent Tyco proxy statement,
The Board also determined, however, that some of the arguments advanced
by the proponents and others regarding differences between Bermuda and
U.S. law are well-founded. With respect to those arguments, the Board
considered whether those differences could be addressed by changes to the
Company's governing documents. As a result, the Board has concluded
that the rights of shareholders [concerning sales of substantially all the
company's assets and the adoption of shareholder rights plans] can be
adequately protected by two amendments to the Bye-laws [sic].
Id. In addition, the Tyco Board noted:
The proponent also contends that a Bermuda court may not enforce a U.S.
judgment. While it is true that Bermuda courts have refused to enforce
certain U.S. judgments in very limited circumstances and that Bermuda
courts, as a general matter, do not enforce non-compensatory damage
awards, Tyco has assets in the U.S. sufficient to satisfy any judgment, and,
even if Tyco attempted to use its Bermuda domicile to avoid a U.S.
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The differences in shareholder rights before and after an
inversion flow from the judicially created "internal affairs" doctrine.
As summarized by the Supreme Court:
[t]he internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle
which recognizes that only one State should have the
authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs -
matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the
corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders - because otherwise a corporation could be
260faced with conflicting demands.
judgment, Bermuda courts generally enforce final judgments of U.S. courts
(other than awards of non-compensatory damages) where jurisdiction in
the U.S. court was proper, the U.S. proceeding observed the rules of
natural justice, the judgment was not obtained by fraud, and its
enforcement would not contravene the public policy of Bermuda.
Id. See also INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY LIMITED, SEC FORM S-4 (Oct. 16, 2001), at
16 (acknowledgement in Ingersoll-Rand prospectus that "enforcement of judgments
in shareholder suits against [the company] may be more difficult" following the
expatriation).
260 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). The internal affairs doctrine
also is reflected in the Model Business Corporations Act. See MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 15.05(c) (1998) ("This Act does not authorize this state to regulate the
organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to transact
business in this state."); see generally Detlev F. Vagts, Extraterritoriality and the
Corporate Governance Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 289, 293 (2003) (arguing that the
internal affairs doctrine "has been regularly observed in the United States and forms
the basis on which Delaware's preeminence as a home to corporations rests.
Departures have been few and insignificant."). Professor Gilson has noted that
[b]ecause in the United States a corporation's internal affairs (including
especially its corporate governance) is governed by its state of
incorporation without regard to its principal place of business, a U.S.
corporation can choose the state corporate law that governs its affairs by
choosing its state of incorporation. The aggregated choices of a majority of
publicly traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a convergence on the
Delaware General Corporation Law as a de facto national corporate law.
Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) (footnote omitted); see also Note, The
Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative Explanations for Its
Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480 (2002).
The doctrine does not, however, extend to transactions between a corporation or
its shareholders and a third party. See, e.g., MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 645 (holding that
the doctrine does not extend to transactions between stockholders and a third party,
such as tender offers); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 301 & cmt. a
(1971) (explaining that the rights and liabilities of a corporation to a third person -
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The internal affairs contemplated by this doctrine include the
election or appointment of officers and directors, the adoption and
amendment of bylaws, the holding of directors' and shareholders'
meetings, and the determination of methods of voting. Indeed, the
Delaware Supreme Court applied the internal affairs doctrine to a
shareholder rights dispute following an early corporate inversion,
finding that Delaware corporate law did not apply to a voting rights
dispute after the corporation was incorporated in Panama.
Thus, the internal affairs doctrine appears to support, at least to a
limited extent, the concern of inversion opponents concerning the
possible loss of shareholder rights after a corporate parent
reincorporates from a U.S. state to a foreign country that has less
protective (or less transparent) corporate governance laws.
There is one additional consideration that might limit this
corporate governance concern, particularly with respect to publicly
traded corporations that expatriate. Following recent inversions, the
corporations generally have retained significant benefits concerning
the marketability of their stock - in particular, the expatriating
companies remain included on the S&P 500 (if they were included
- 263
prior to the inversion), and the stock of the new parent corporations
i.e., a person other than the state of incorporation and the corporation's directors,
officers or stockholders - are determined by the same choice-of-law principles that
apply to non-corporate parties); Vagts, supra:
[i]t does not follow that a state may not act within reason to regulate an
activity that falls under other headings of jurisdiction. In the United States
and other countries it has been common to assert the right to apply
securities regulation to sales of stock issued by foreign entities but aimed at
domestic investors.
Id.
261 According to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, matters falling
within the internal affairs doctrine include:
steps taken in the course of the original incorporation, the election or
appointment of directors and officers, the adoption of by-laws, the issuance
of corporate shares, preemptive rights, the holding of directors' and
shareholders' meetings, methods of voting including any requirement for
cumulative voting, shareholders' rights to examine corporate records,
charter and by-law amendments, mergers, consolidations and
reorganizations and the reclassification of shares.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. a (1971).
262 See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987).
263 See, e.g., COOPER INDUSTRIES, LTD., SEC FORM S-4 (June 11, 2001), at 12:
The S&P 500 tracks the performance of 500 stocks considered
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continues to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).26"
As a result of this continued NYSE listing, the corporations remain
subject to the exchange's listing agreement, which includes certain
corporate governance-related provisions. '65 However, these listing
agreement provisions are relatively limited, and foreign-incorporated
entities are exempt from several of them.'66
In summary, while the claims of labor unions and institutional
investors regarding the diminution of shareholder rights upon an
expatriation might be somewhat overstated, there is at least some
merit in them. Accordingly, claims by proponents of the recently-
enacted AJCA legislation that corporate inversions are mere
representative of the U.S. economy generally. [The pre-inversion
corporation] is currently included in the S&P 500 Index. There are a
number of companies incorporated outside the United States that have
been included in the S&P 500 Index. Based on a review of the factors
considered by the S&P to determine inclusion in the S&P 500 Index, we
believe that [the post-inversion corporation] will satisfy the criteria for
continued inclusion in the S&P 500 Index.
COOPER INDUSTRIES, LTD. at 12; INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY LIMITED, supra note
259, at 16 (containing language substantively identical to that in the Cooper Industries
prospectus). In a mid-2002 press release, the committee responsible for supervising
the Standard & Poor's market indices observed:
Lately there has been a lot of discussion regarding U.S. companies that
transfer their registration to Bermuda to reduce their U.S. tax liability....
In situations where the only factor suggesting that a company is not a U.S.
company is its tax registration in Bermuda or another location chosen for
tax-related reasons, Standard & Poor's normally determines that the
company is still a U.S. company.
Press Release, Standard & Poor's Index Committee, Focusing the S&P 500 on U.S.
Large Cap Stocks and the Removal of Non-U.S. Companies in the S&P 500, July 9,
2002, at 16, available at http://www.standardandpoors.com. The press release
confirmed that Ingersoll-Rand remained on the S&P 500 following the inversion
because "[t]he company's operations, corporate structure, accounting standards and
offices did not change when its tax registration changed. Further, the company was
and still is traded on the New York Stock Exchange." Id.
264 See, e.g., COOPER INDUSTRIES, LTD., supra note 263, at 19 ("Immediately
following the reorganization .... common shares of [the post-inversion corporation]
will be listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol 'CBE,' the same
symbol under which [pre-inversion corporation] common stock is currently listed.");
INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY LIMITED, supra note 259, at 22 (containing language
substantively identical to that in the Cooper Industries prospectus).
26 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641,
687-88 (1999).
266 See id at 687.
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paperwork shams, with no substantive non-tax consequences, 267 are
themselves not fully accurate in light of these corporate governance
268
consequences.
2. Trade, Commerce, and Investment Benefits
Although a thorough analysis of the trade, commerce, and
investment law implications of corporate inversions is beyond the
scope of this article, it is useful to consider briefly whether the place of
incorporation has significant consequences for international trade,
commerce, and investment law purposes.269
With respect to the broad range of international treaties and
agreements dealing with trade in goods to which the United States is a
party, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), 270 a corporate parent's place of incorporation has only
limited effects. In particular, the focus of these trade treaties is the
origin of the goods - where they are produced - rather than the
place of incorporation of the producer.27 ' However, a company's
267 It is possible to interpret some of these claims as merely stating that there is,
in substance, no change in the corporate headquarters as a result of the inversion. For
example, the California legislature limited its finding regarding the substance of
inversions transactions as follows: "[a]n expatriate company is a United States based
company that has moved in name and on paper only to a tax haven country and has
no substantial business activities in the country of reincorporation." S.B. 640, 2003
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). However, much of the rhetoric of inversion opponents
has been more reaching, claiming that there are no substantive consequences to the
inversion. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
268 However, given the fact that numerous inversions nonetheless occurred, these
corporate governance consequences may not have constituted significant enough
"friction" to offset the anticipated benefits of reincorporating abroad. See generally
David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1312 (2001) (analyzing the extent to which non-tax frictions act as a constraint on
aggressive tax planning).
269 Several recent articles address the relevance of place of incorporation for
purposes of international trade, generally concluding that it is of decreasing relevance
in a globalized economy. See Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the
Postnational Economy: Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 445-47
(2002); Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy:
Rethinking the Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEO. L.J. 563, 582-93 (1999).
270 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA].
271 Id. at Art. 401; see also Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference on
Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Latin America: Adapting to a Changing Legal
Environment, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 33 (1994) [hereinafter Proceedings] ("If your clients
are dealing in goods, if you have a trade issue, you need to think about the origin of
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place of incorporation might have some relevance in determining
272
eligibility with respect to cross-border services under NAFrA.
the goods, and their North American content.... [T]he points of attachment for
trade are the origin of the goods."); Cao, supra note 269, at 462-63 (discussing
importance of origin of goods under free trade agreements and other preferential
regimes).
272 For example, a place-of-incorporation rule generally applies to determine an
"enterprise of a Party" that is eligible for NAFTA benefits in the other country.
Thus, a Bermuda-incorporated corporation is not eligible for benefits. However, a
U.S.-incorporated subsidiary of that Bermuda corporation is eligible for benefits. See
Eric Leroux, NAFTA and the Financial Services Sector, in 1 NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS COMMENTARY C.19, p. 16 & n.88 (James R. Holbein & Donald
J. Musch eds., 1998). Accordingly, while the corporate parent following an inversion
would not be covered by the trade-in-services provisions of NAFTA, a U.S.-
incorporated subsidiary would be. As summarized by a former Deputy Assistant
Commerce Secretary for Service Industries and Finance:
Which service firms are entitled to benefit from these [NAFTA benefits]?
There are two options for standards. The nationality of a service firm can
be judged based upon where it is incorporated, or alternatively on the basis
of its ultimate parentage. For example, consider the Deutsche Bank USA;
is it a U.S. bank or a German bank? Under the place of incorporation
standard, it is a U.S. bank, entitled to all of the benefits of NAFTA. Under
the ultimate parentage test, it is a German bank, not entitled to any of the
benefits of NAFTA.
In the general services chapter, Cross-Border Trade in Services (Chapter
12), the standard selected is the place of incorporation. The United States
considers this appropriate because we want subsidiaries of U.S. firms in
Europe to be treated the same as if they were indigenous European firms.
This is in our bilateral investment treaties. Unfortunately, in the Financial
Services Chapter, we were unable to get Canada to agree with that. Canada
insisted on an ultimate parentage test. Thus, in the Financial Services
Chapter, each of the three countries will select which standard it is going to
use. The United States and Mexico will still use the place of incorporation
standard; thus, it will only be Canada which will use the ultimate parentage
test.
Linda Powers, NAFTA and the Regulation of Financial and Other Services, 1 U.S.-
MEx. L.J. 65, 68-69 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see also Proceedings, supra note 271,
at 33 ("[I]f you are dealing with a services or an investment issue, think of the
nationality of those who own the capital stock of your client and its place of
incorporation, because for services and investment the points of attachment are
nationality of the company and place of incorporation."). Even if the corporate
group's parent would lose some benefits under the NAFTA service provisions as a
result of a change in place of incorporation, a U.S.-incorporated subsidiary of the
group would still be considered a U.S. national to the extent the place-of-
incorporation rule applied, thereby limiting potential adverse consequences to the
group.
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The United States also has a network of more than three dozen
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), 273  which protect foreign
274investments of U.S. investors. The current draft of the Model BIT
defines an "enterprise of a Party," which is entitled to investment
protection under the treaty, to mean "an enterprise constituted or
organized under the law of a Party, and a branch located in the
territory of a Party and carrying out business activities there." 275 Thus,
under this language, eligibility for protection under a BIT is not
dependent solely on a corporate parent's place of incorporation, but
would apply also to a business branch of the corporate parent in the
United States (in the unlikely event the post-expatriation parent had
such a branch).27' However, earlier iterations of U.S. BITs use only a
place-of-incorporation rule to define the company eligible for BIT
273 Dep't of State, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program Fact Sheet (Sep. 15,
2004), available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/22422.htm.
274 The Bilateral Investment Treaties are the modern succcssors to Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties. See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MicH. J. INT'L L. 621, 624
(1993) ("The BIT program was launched in 1977 as a successor to the 190 year old
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaty program."). The history of the
United States' network of FCN treaties, including the history of predecessor treaties
dating back to 1778 and the wave of modern FCNs entered into after World War II, is
discussed in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185-88 (1982).
See also Vandevelde, supra, at 624-25 (providing general historical context for FCN
treaties, and noting that no new FCN treaties were negotiated after the mid-1960s).
The Supreme Court in Sumitomo Shoji America applied the plain language of
the U.S.-Japan FCN treaty to find that a place-of-incorporation rule applies to
determine whether a corporation is a "company of" a particular treaty country for
purposes of the treaty. 457 U.S. at 188. Accordingly, the Court held that a New
York-incorporated subsidiary was a company of the United States for purposes of the
treaty (and thus not eligible for benefits otherwise available to a Japanese company),
even though it was wholly owned by a Japanese company. Id. at 182-83. However,
the Court then noted that many other operative provisions of the FCN treaty apply
not only to a company of a treaty country (i.e., a company incorporated under the
laws of that country), but also to a company controlled by nationals or companies of a
treaty country. Id. at 183 & n.8. Thus, it is possible that a corporate parent, following
an expatriation to a third country, might still be eligible for certain FCN treaty
benefits to the extent it is controlled by U.S. nationals or companies.
275 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, Section A, art. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter MODEL BIT], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
29030.doc. The term "enterprise of a Party" is incorporated into the term "investor of
a Party," which is entitled to benefits under Article 2(1)(a) of the treaty. Id., arts. 1,
2(1)(a).
276 The Model Bilateral Investment Treaty would also cover a U.S.-incorporated
subsidiary of the group.
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coverage. Thus, under these earlier BITs that are still in force, place
of incorporation has some relevance.
In addition to these potential treaty consequences, a change in
place of incorporation might affect eligibility for various trade and
commercial benefits under U.S. law. The Homeland Security Act
contract ban on expatriated corporations could be viewed as one such
178adverse consequence. However, as discussed supra, this alternative
sanction is primarily symbolic and has little instrumental effect on an
expatriating corporation.279
Another potential example of the relevance of place of
incorporation concerns recent reconstruction-related contracts arising
from the recent war in Iraq. In a highly publicized action,' 8° the
Deputy Secretary of Defense announced that twenty-six major
construction and services contracts to be awarded by the Coalition
Provisional Authority and by the Department of Defense would only
be awarded to "firms from the United States, Iraq, Coalition partners
and force contributing nations."' 1  The Deputy Secretary's
declaration listed sixty-three countries whose companies were eligible
2,82to bid on these prime contracts, but it did not contain any details
specifying how to determine whether a company was "from" a
particular country&3  However, subsequent contract solicitations by
See, e.g., Investment Treaty with the Republic of Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993,
U.S.-Ecuador, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-15, art. I(1)(b) ("'[C]ompany' of a party
means any kind of corporation ... legally constituted under the laws and regulations
of a Party or a political subdivision thereof ...."').
211 See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 101-134 and accompanying text. As noted supra notes 79-81,
several states have enacted contract bans with respect to expatriated corporations. To
the extent an expatriated corporation would otherwise have bid on a state contract,
these state bans would have some instrumental effect because they do not have the
significant exceptions contained in the Homeland Security alternative sanction.
See, e.g., Dave Moniz & Bill Nichols, No Iraq Contracts for War Foes; Nations
Kept Out of $18.6B Bidding, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2003, at Al; David E. Sanger &
Douglas Jehl, Bush Seeks Help of Allies Barred from Iraq Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2003, at Al.
281 DEPUTY SEC'Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DETERMINATION AND FINDINGS
(Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.rebuilding-iraq.net/pdflDF.pdf. The ban
focuses only on the companies awarded the prime contracts. Of particular note, it
does not prevent companies from non-participating countries from acting as
subcontractors. See Sanger & Jehl, supra note 280, at A15.
m See DEPUTY SEC'Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 281, attachment 2.
283 Cf. Misguided Iraq-Contract Policy, CHATT'ANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Dec.
30, 2003, at B6 (noting the difficulty of defining to which country a multinational
company belongs for purposes of enforcing the Iraq contract directive).
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the Department of Defense set forth a narrow definition of a
company's home country for this purpose. In particular, a company
is considered to be "from an eligible country" only if it is "organized
under the laws of an eligible country and.., has its principal place of
business in an eligible country. Further, the corporation ... cannot be
a subsidiary (wholly owned or otherwise) of a parent company that is
organized under the laws of a non-eligible country." 2 85
Accordingly, a corporate expatriation might have substantive
consequences in this context. In particular, if the post-expatriation
corporate parent were incorporated in a non-eligible country, neither
the parent nor its subsidiaries (even subsidiaries incorporated in the
United States and with their principal place of business in the United
States) would be eligible to bid as a prime contractor. 2 8 6
In summary, U.S. laws, treaties, and administrative guidance
regarding international trade and commerce do not adopt a uniform
287standard regarding the relevance of place of incorporation. As a
284 See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CECOM, SOLICITATION, OFFER, AND AWARD NO.
W914NS-04-R-0005, COMMUNICATIONS - IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 58 (Jan. 6, 2004),
available at http://dcsrv03.rebuilding-iraq.net/pdf/COMMUNICATIONS.pdf (request
for proposal to construct communications projects in Iraq); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, SOLICITATION, OFFER, AND AWARD, No. W914NS-04-R-0006
BUILDINGS, HOUSING, AND HEALTH - IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 48 (Jan. 6, 2004),
available at http://dcsrv03.rebuilding-iraq.net/pdf/BUILDINGS.pdf (request for
proposal to construct public buildings in Iraq).
285 U.S. ARMY CECOM, supra note 284, at 58.
286 The principal countries in which expatriate corporations reincorporate are
Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. See Desai & Hines, supra note 1, at 418-20.
Neither of these countries is an eligible country for purposes of the Iraq contract bids.
See DEPUTY SEC'Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 281, attachment 2.
However, McDermott International, which is considered to have undertaken the first
modern corporate inversion in 1983, reincorporated its parent in Panama. See Desai
& Hines, supra note 1, at 418. Because Panama is an eligible country for purposes of
Iraq contract bids, a McDermott subsidiary that is incorporated in the United States
and that has its principal place of business in the United States would be eligible to
bid.
287 In this regard, an observation made at the outset of a 1989 Congressional
hearing concerning the appropriate definition of a "U.S. Company" in another
context remains true:
The swirl of answers and the variations on logic that this question provokes
can lead one to believe he has been transported through the looking glass,
where Humpty Dumpty told Alice, "When I use a word, it means just what
I choose it to mean, neither more nor less." Alice responded, "The
question is whether you can make words mean so many different things."
What is a U.S. Company?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research and
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broad generalization, the place of incorporation of the parent
corporation is significant in some isolated circumstances, such as the
Iraq contract ban, but a corporation's place of incorporation would
not appear to have substantial relevance in many significant trade and
commercial areas. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that recent
prospectuses of companies considering expatriations have not
mentioned the potential loss of trade or other commercial benefits as
218
a potential adverse consequence of the expatriation.
3. Other Possible Benefits
There are other potential benefits to being incorporated under
the laws of a U.S. state. For example, from a symbolic perspective,
there might be additional prestige associated with being incorporated
under U.S. law. Similarly, there may be some marginal benefit to
being perceived by the U.S. public as an "American" corporation to
the extent the U.S. public prefers to "buy American." However, there
is some question as to whether the public would base this buying
decision on a seller's place of incorporation (as opposed to where it
actually manufactures its goods or other factors)
s28 9
In addition, a U.S. legislator might be more willing to champion
the cause of a corporation incorporated within the United States and
U.S. diplomatic personnel might be more willing to provide aid to
290
such a company. However, it is reasonable to assume that such
Tech. and the Subcomm. on Int'l Scientific Cooperation of the House Comm. on
Science, Space, and Tech., 101st Cong. 2 (1989) (statement of Rep. Sherwood L.
Boehlert).
See, e.g., INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY LIMITED, supra note 259, at 14-16
("Risk Factors" section makes no reference to adverse trade or commerce
consequences); id. at 4 ("The reorganization should have no material impact on how
we conduct day-to-day operations."); COOPER INDUSTRIES, LTD., supra note 263, at 11
("Risk Factors" section makes no reference to adverse trade or commerce
consequences); id. at 2 ("The reorganization. .. will have no immediate impact on
how we conduct day-to-day operations."). It should be noted that these prospectuses
were issued prior to the December 2003 Department of Defense determination
regarding Iraq contract eligibility, so that factor was not incorporated into the
prospectuses' analyses.
S9 The 1998 merger of Chrysler Corporation and Daimler-Benz AG to form
DaimlerChrysler AG illustrates this issue. The parent corporation resulting from this
merger is incorporated under German law. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume
that most people continue to view Chrysler automobiles as "American."
290 Cf. J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., et al., The Deferral Debate Continues: Should
Foreign Business Income be Taxed by the U.S.?, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Mar. 20,
2000) (LEXIS, INTTAX lib., TNI file, elec. cit., 2000 WTD 54-10) ("[F]oreign branch
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benefits - particularly support from legislators - would also be
available to a U.S. branch or subsidiary of a foreign-incorporated
entity. For example, even had Stanley Works completed its proposed
Bermuda inversion, it is reasonable to assume that Senators and
Representatives from Connecticut would have continued to represent
the interest of the company to the extent necessary to keep
manufacturing and headquarters jobs located in New Britain,
Connecticut, and elsewhere in the state. 9'
4. Tax Policy Implications
a. Benefits Theory
As discussed in the preceding sections, a corporation's place of
incorporation might have some limited significance regarding
corporate governance, international trade and commerce, and other
areas. It is important to consider the tax policy implications of this
conclusion with respect to the general place-of-incorporation rule for
determining a corporation's tax residence.
One possible justification for the place-of-incorporation rule for
determining tax residence is under a benefits theory."" To the extent
a corporation receives benefits by being organized under the laws of a
country, those benefits might justify the country treating the
corporation as a resident."'
activities benefit from U.S. trade promotion activities, from access to U.S. diplomatic
assistance abroad and, in the worst-case scenario, from access to U.S. military
assistance to protect branch employees and assets.")
291 Cf. Mabry, supra note 269, at 566 ("What companies comprise the 'domestic'
industries we seek to promote and protect? Simply put, what is an 'American
company'?")
292 At least one vocal defender of corporate inversions views the benefits theory
as the principal justification for the place-of-incorporation test. See Herman B.
Bouma, Corporations that Reincorporate Abroad are Not Traitors or Tax Cheats,
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Oct. 16, 2002, at J-1, available at LEXIS, 200 DTR J-1 ("The
apparent rationale for this distinction [based on place of incorporation] is that
companies incorporated in the United States receive benefits that justify taxing them
on their worldwide income."); Herman B. Bouma, Two Arguments Against an
Alternative View of Deferral, 86 TAX NOTES 1303, 1303 (Feb. 28, 2000)
("Incorporation in the United States does not provide any benefits that justify taxing
a U.S. corporation on a worldwide basis.").
... Whereas the text is concerned with the applicability of benefits theory to the
place-of-incorporation test of corporate residence, on a more fundamental level, the
benefits theory has been applied in analyzing the appropriateness of imposing a
separate income tax at the corporate level. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL
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In order for a benefits theory to support a place-of-incorporation
test, it is not sufficient that the corporation receive benefits within a
country. For example, a corporation incorporated abroad but doing
business through a branch in the United States might receive certain
benefits, such as the protections of property and contract law, the
benefits of the transportation infrastructure, and other public services
including police and fire protection. While these broad benefits might
justify the imposition of source-based taxation of income earned in
the United States by a foreign-incorporated entity," they do not
TAX POLICY 135-36 (5th ed. 1987) ("A business enterprise enjoys special privileges
and benefits when it operates in the corporate form .... The Supreme Court's
acceptance of the constitutionality of the corporation income tax was based on the
view that the corporation owes its life, rights, and power to the government."); Alvin
C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J.
1585, 1600 (1974) ("A separate tax on corporate income is sometimes considered
appropriate because of the privileges and benefits granted corporations by the state,
such as perpetual life, limited liability for investors, and marketability of shares.")
(footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court also has invoked the benefits theory in the context of
individuals to justify the worldwide taxation of U.S. citizens. See Cook v. Tait, 265
U.S. 47, 56 (1924) (the United States may impose income tax on the foreign income of
a U.S. citizen residing abroad because the "government, by its very nature, benefits
the citizen and his property wherever found .... "). See generally Kirsch, supra note
16, at 875 n.43 (discussing the applicability of the benefits theory to the worldwide
taxation of citizens). Cf. Alice G. Abreu, Taxing Exits, 29 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1087,
1144-45 (1996) (arguing that citizenship matters to most people and that the
substantive importance of citizenship should be considered in formulating a response
to individuals who surrender citizenship for tax-avoidance purposes); Fleming et al.,
supra note 32, at 309 n.18 (discussing benefits theory in context of individuals who
surrender citizenship).
24 Numerous articles discuss the role of benefits theory in justifying a source-
based income tax. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 12, at 298 ("[F]oreigners, whose
activities reach some minimal threshold, should contribute to the costs of services
provided by the host government.... One need not thoroughly embrace the benefit
theory of taxation.., to recognize a country's legitimate claim to tax income
produced within its borders.") (footnotes omitted); Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 8, at
1036-37, 1076 n.220 (discussing the extent to which the early scholars of the modern
income tax viewed benefits theory as justifying source-based taxation); Robert A.
Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational
Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 29-30 (1993) (questioning the benefits rationale
as a justification for source-based taxation of corporations). As one commentator
observed:
[T]he best reason for taxing corporations is that they benefit from services
provided by the state. Corporations enjoy police, fire, health, education,
and transportation services. And they should pay for those services at least
a little. Now the true beneficiaries of the public services provided to
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provide a basis for a definitional distinction between domestic and
foreign corporations, because they are available regardless of the
place of incorporation. Accordingly, under a benefits theory, in order
to justify treating a corporation as domestic based on its place of
incorporation, the relevant benefits must be available only to a
corporation incorporated in that jurisdiction.95
Certain corporate governance benefits arising from the internal
2961 29,affairs doctrine satisfy this standard. For example, as noted above,
shareholders of corporations incorporated under Delaware law might
have a greater ability to hold directors legally accountable for
wrongdoing than might shareholders of corporations incorporated
under Bermuda law."' Similarly, certain limited international trade
and commerce benefits, such as certain trade-in-service benefits299 and
the ability to bid on Iraq reconstruction contracts,3°° might arise by
reason of incorporating under the law of a U.S. state.
However, it is questionable whether these benefits of
incorporation in the United States are sufficient to justify the
significant adverse tax consequences that flow from being treated as a
domestic corporation under the place-of-incorporation test."' After
corporations are the shareholders. And the shareholders generally do not
reside in the state - this is especially true of publicly traded and
multinational corporations.
The only way of ensuring that the shareholders will pay for benefits
provided by the state is through a corporate income tax.
David Brunori, 'The Politics of State Taxation': Stop Taxing Corporate Income, STATE
TAX TODAY (July 1, 2002), (LEXIS, STATETAX lib., STN file, 2002 STT 126-4).
295 Federalism considerations arguably might limit the ability of the United States
to treat corporations as domestic under this benefits theory. Within the United
States, corporations are generally incorporated under state, rather than federal, law.
Accordingly, under a strict interpretation of the benefits standard, the federal
government might have difficulty treating corporations as domestic to the extent the
benefits flow from incorporation under a U.S. state's laws. Because the relevant
inquiry concerns the general distinction between U.S. corporations and foreign (non-
U.S.) corporations, the analysis in this section adopts a looser interpretation,
considering benefits arising by reason of incorporation in a U.S. state to be benefits
arising in the domestic jurisdiction.
296 See supra notes 260-262 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 255-259 and accompanying text.
298 While shareholders presumably would view this feature as a benefit, directors
might not.
299 See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
300 See supra notes 280-286 and accompanying text.
301 As discussed above, if a corporation is domestic, it is subject to tax on its
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all, a significant number of benefits, including the general protection
of U.S. law as well as trade-in-goods treaties, may be available to the
U.S. branch of a foreign-incorporated entity."" Moreover, with
respect to those benefits that are available only to a U.S.-incorporated
entity, many such entities might not be in a position to utilize the
benefits. For example, it is reasonable to assume that the vast
majority of corporations incorporated in the United States are not
viable candidates for the contracts to rebuild Iraq. Accordingly, due
to the relatively limited scope of benefits available solely by reason of
incorporation in the United States, it is difficult to support a benefits
theory as the normative basis for a place-of-incorporation test for
corporate residency.
b. Other Theories
Given the shortcomings of benefits theory in justifying a place-of-
incorporation test, this subsection briefly considers other theories that
might justify the use of a place-of-incorporation test.
i. Legal Personhood
Perhaps the most fundamental justification for a place-of-
incorporation test is that the corporation derives its legal existence
from the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated. Under this view, the
corporation, as an artificial person, resides in the country whose laws
create the legal fiction. This justification formed the early basis for
using a place-of-incorporation rule to determine a corporation's
nationality in non-tax areas, particularly in conflict of laws inquiries.
3 03
worldwide income and is subject to the Subpart F anti-deferral regime with respect to
certain foreign income of its non-U.S. subsidiaries. See supra notes 19-40 and
accompanying text.
302 Also, some additional benefits might'be available with respect to a U.S.-
incorporated subsidiary of a foreign-incorporated parent, thereby enabling a portion
of the corporate group to obtain U.S. benefits without subjecting the corporate parent
to worldwide taxation or Subpart F.
'03 See Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy:
Rethinking the Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEO. L.J. 563, 583-84 (1999). In
the conflict of law context, Mabry observed:
The place of incorporation rule is rooted in the concession or artificial
person theory of the corporation that was prevalent in the first part of the
nineteenth century, before the adoption of general incorporation statutes.
This theory held that the corporation was a legal fiction: an artificial person
created by the state that existed only in contemplation of the law. Insofar
as the corporation owed its very existence to some national system, jurists
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It is difficult, however, to justify a place-of-incorporation rule
based solely on legal personhood apart from the potential benefits
that such legal personhood conveys (and hence the benefits theory
discussed above). Various core benefits associated with the corporate
form, including limited liability, continuity of life, centralized
management, and transferability of shares,3 4 generally are determined
• .• 05
by the laws of the place of incorporation. As a practical matter,
however, it is unlikely that the laws of a foreign jurisdiction will differ
reasoned that the corporation logically could be a citizen only of the state
whose laws created it.
Id. at 584 (footnotes omitted).
304 These basic corporate characteristics were recognized in Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., in which the Supreme Court upheld the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, a
precursor to the modern corporate income tax. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107,
161-62 (1911) See generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 122 (1990) (analyzing the Flint
case). Indeed, the Supreme Court subsequently relied on these characteristics in
determining whether an unincorporated association should be taxed in the same
manner as a corporation. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935).
These four characteristics also formed the basis for the so-called Kintner Regulations,
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11 (1961), and T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, which formed
the basis for determining whether an unincorporated association was taxable as a
corporation from 1960 until the adoption of the "check-the-box" regulations in 1996.
For the check-the-box regulations, see Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in
2002). But cf. Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U.
L. REV. 185 (2004) (arguing that the Treasury Department did not have authority to
issue the check-the-box regulations, which overrule the Supreme Court's
interpretation in Morrissey).
Under the check-the-box regulations, it is possible that an entity (regardless
under whose laws it is organized) may elect to be taxed as a corporation, even though
it does not have these traditional corporate characteristics. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2002). The present article focuses on entities
traditionally characterized as corporations, rather than unincorporated business
entities that elect to be treated as corporations for tax purposes under this regulation.
305 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2001) (stating that the
determination of whether the owners of a foreign entity have limited liability, such
that the entity might be classified as a corporation for tax purposes, "is based solely
on the statute or law pursuant to which the entity is organized .... ). Similarly, IRS
guidance under the Kintner Regulations, see supra note 304, made clear that the
relevant focus in determining the presence of limited liability, continuity of life,
centralized management, and transferability of shares is the law of the country in
which the entity is organized. See Rev. Rul. 88-8, 1988-1 C.B. 403, 404 (stating that,
with respect to foreign entity, "it is the local law of the foreign jurisdiction that must
be applied in determining the legal relationships of the members of the organization
among themselves and with the public at large, as well as the interests of the members
of the organization in its assets"), obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 98-37, 1998-2 C.B. 133.
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significantly from the laws of a U.S. state with respect to these core
benefits of the corporate form.3°6
The legal personhood justification for a place-of-incorporation
standard is further undermined by considerations of federalism in the
United States. In particular, given that corporations are created
under state law, rather than federal law, it is difficult for the federal
government to define a state-law corporation as a federal tax resident
under a legal personhood theory. 307
ii. Administrative Simplicity
Perhaps the strongest justification for a place-of-incorporation
test for determining corporate residence is its administrative
simplicity. Unlike other potential tests for corporate residence, such
as place of management,"" place of principal business, or residence of
shareholders, which may involve subjective or difficult-to-measure
inquiries, a place-of-incorporation test is straightforward. It merely
requires an inquiry as to the jurisdiction under which the
corporation's charter or other organizing document is created)
9
Accordingly, a place-of-incorporation test provides certainty for both
taxpayers and tax administrators.
Professor Avi-Yonah has acknowledged that a place-of-
incorporation test "draw[s] a bright line,"31 while other residency
tests, such as a focus on where the corporation is managed and
306 The check-the-box Treasury Regulations for determining whether an entity is
taxable as a corporation list numerous foreign-organized entities that are treated as
per se corporations for U.S. tax purposes. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(8)(i) (as
amended in 2002). That list was developed, at least in large part, based on whether
the entity's owners have limited liability under the entity's country of organization.
See I.R.S. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing,
Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, PS-43-95, 1996-1 C.B. 865, 867 (Apr. 16,
1996).
307 See supra note 295 (discussing federalism concerns in the context of the
benefits theory).
In some jurisdictions that focus on the place of management to determine
corporate residence, that inquiry has evolved into an easily manipulable "formal test
by focusing on easily controlled events like the place at which the board of directors
meets, rather than the situs of day-to-day management decisions." AULT ET AL.,
supra note 243, at 371 (emphasis added).
Unlike a partnership, which can be created de facto, a corporation is created
only by complying with specific legal requirements. But see supra note 304
(suggesting that under the check-the-box regulations, some unincorporated entities
can be taxed like corporations for federal tax purposes).
310 Avi-Yonah, supra note 24, at 1797.
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controlled, "involve[] some measure of uncertainty. ' ,31' However, he
downplays the importance of this factor. According to Avi-Yonah:
[the management and control test] is clear enough, and far
more congruent with business realities (and thus less
manipulable) than place of incorporation. U.S. taxpayers
have been living with less well-defined terms, such as
"effectively connected" and "U.S. trade or business." They
can learn to live with "managed and controlled" as well.312
This assertion is strengthened by the recent protocol amending
313the U.S.-Netherlands income tax treaty, which entered into force on
December 28, 2004.314 In particular, the protocol adds a "substantial
311presence" test to the treaty's limitation on benefits provision.
Under this test, a publicly traded corporation that is otherwise eligible
to claim treaty benefits may not claim the benefits if the company has
"no substantial presence in the State of which it is a resident." ' A
311 Id.
312 Id. at 1797-98. See also supra note 244 (discussing the departure from the
place-of-incorporation rule for some aspects of determining the source of income).
113 See Protocol Amending Tax Convention With the Netherlands, Mar. 8, 2004,
U.S.-Neth., S. TREATY DOC. No. 108-25 [hereinafter U.S.-Netherlands Protocol]. The
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings regarding the U.S.-
Netherlands Protocol on September 24, 2004. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
108TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO THE INCOME TAX TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS 1 (2004), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-54-04.pdf.
314 See U.S. -Netherlands Income Tax Treaty Protocol Takes Effect, TAX NOTES
TODAY (Dec. 29, 2004) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2004 TNT 250-19).
The protocol generally is effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1,
2005. Id.
315 See U.S.-Netherlands Protocol, supra note 313, art. 7, S. TREATY Doc. No.
108-25 at 11 (adding a new art. 26, para. 2(c)(i) to the treaty). The limitation on
benefits provision is "intended to limit the benefits of the treaty to qualified residents
of the United States and the Netherlands." STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra
note 313, at 46.
316 See U.S.-Netherlands Protocol, supra note 313, art. 7, S. TREATY Doc. NO.
108-25 at 11 (adding a new art. 26, para. 2(c)(i) to the treaty). An exchange of
diplomatic notes at the time the protocol was signed provided additional guidance
regarding this determination:
In making the determination..., it is understood that the determination is
based on an assessment of the decision making activities of all of the
executive officers and senior management employees who are members of
the Executive Board or the Board of Directors of the company, as the case
may be, unless such persons merely provide formal approval of decisions
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company has no substantial presence under this test if, inter alia, "the
company's primary place of management and control is not in the
State of which it is a resident."3"7 Thus, for example, a corporation
incorporated in the United States whose shares are regularly traded
on the New York Stock Exchange could not invoke the U.S.-
Netherlands treaty to lower Netherlands taxation if the company's
primary place of management and control is not in the United States.
Under this protocol, publicly traded corporations invoking the
U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty will have to satisfy a fact-based inquiry
into their place of management and control in order to obtain treaty
benefits. According to the Treasury Department's Technical
Explanation of the protocol, this inquiry is intended to focus on the
actual day-to-day management activities of the corporation (and its
subsidiaries), rather than an easily manipulable focus on the place
where the board of directors meets.3 18 Despite this fact-based inquiry,
no publicly traded corporations objected to the provision, either on
administrability or other grounds. Indeed, the representative of a
significant trade group representing major publicly traded
corporations advocated "full support" of the protocol at the Senate
.that are in fact made by others.
Understanding Regarding the Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands
and the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income para. XXVI(a),
attached to Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Between Boudewijn van Eenennaam,
Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and A. Elizabeth Jones, for the
United States Secretary of State, Mar. 8, 2004, in U.S.-Netherlands Protocol, supra
note 313, S. TREATY Doc. No. 108-25 at 39.
317 U.S.-Netherlands Protocol, supra note 313, art. 7, S. TREATY Doc. No. 108-25
at 18-19 (adding a new art. 26, para. 8(d)(ii) to the treaty).
318 DEP'T OF TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL SIGNED
AT WASHINGTON ON MAR. 8, 2004, AMENDING THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS FOR THE
AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH
RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON DEC. 18, 1992, at 23
[hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATION], available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/
releases/reports/tenetherO4.pdf. According to the Technical Explanation:
This test should be distinguished from the "place of effective management"
test which is used in the OECD Model and by many other countries to
establish residence. In some cases, the place of effective management test
has been interpreted to mean the place where the board of directors meets.
By contrast, the primary place of management and control test looks to
where day-to-day responsibility for the management of the company (and
its subsidiaries) is exercised.
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Foreign Relations Hearing on the document,319 as did the vice-
president of a professional organization representing in-house tax
practitioners for 2800 of the largest companies in North American and
Europe.
3 20
iii. Symbolic Importance
Another possible justification for the place-of-incorporation test
is based on symbolic perceptions. To the extent that members of the
public base their perception of whether a corporation is "American"
on its place of incorporation, it might be important to align the tax
definition with this perception. In particular, if members of the public
believe that the tax definition and its resulting tax consequences give
unfair benefits to certain multinational corporations that are
incorporated abroad, that perception might undermine their own
321
voluntary tax compliance.
As a practical matter, such public disillusionment is unlikely to
arise in this context. If a member of the public did, indeed, view place
of incorporation as the appropriate definition of corporate residence,
319 See William A. Reinsch, President, National Foreign Trade Council,
Testimony on the Ratification of Two Protocols Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 108th Cong., Sept. 24, 2004, at 1, available at http://foreign.senate.gov/
testimony/2004/ReinschTestimonyO4O924.pdf. The trade group was principally
interested in the substantive tax benefits provided by the protocol (e.g., the
elimination of withholding tax on certain cross-border dividend payments and
favorable tax treatment for cross-border pension contributions). See id. at 3.
Nonetheless, if the trade group had been worried about the administrability of the
new substantial presence test, it presumably would have raised its concern.
32' See Judith P. Zelisko, Vice President-Tax, Brunswick Corporation, Oral
Statement on Behalf of Tax Executives Institute, Inc., on the Protocol Between the
United States and the, Netherlands and the Second Protocol Between the United
States and Barbados Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Sept. 24, 2004,
108th Cong., at 5, available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/
ZeliskoTestimony040924.pdf. ("TEI... urges the Committee to approve the new
agreement with the Netherlands.").
321 See generally Kirsch, supra note 16, at 937 & nn. 318-19 (discussing the
importance of the public's perception of tax compliance by others in determining
their own compliance); Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications
of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REv. 79, 122 (2002) (noting, in another
international tax context, "[ijf the taxpaying public perceives cross-border tax
arbitrage as an abuse available to (and used by) a limited pool of taxpayers (those
with capital, as opposed to wage income, who have the potential for cross-border
operations), then public support for and confidence in the tax system may be
undermined"). Moreover, "[t]his confidence risk to the tax system can develop even
where the belief that some taxpayers are benefiting is factually inaccurate... " Id.
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yet the United States adopted some other test for tax purposes (e.g.,
place of management), the individual's expectations would be violated
only in the unlikely scenario that the corporation was incorporated in
the United States but had its management in a foreign country."'
Such a scenario would be the opposite of the pattern presented by
corporate expatriations.
Moreover, it is not clear that the public views place of
incorporation, standing alone, as the proper measure of a
corporation's residence. For example, most Americans probably view
Chrysler to be an "American" company, despite its merger into a
. 323
German parent corporation. Indeed, it is unlikely that the average
individual is aware of the place of incorporation of any particular
corporation, unless that corporation's place of incorporation has been
widely publicized in the context of an inversion or some other
context.
iv. Revenue Needs
A final justification for a place-of-incorporation rule might be that
the United States collects more tax revenue by determining residence
under that test than it would under some other test.32 This is an
321
empirical question that this article cannot accurately answer.
However, at least in the short and medium terms, the factual
assumption underlying this as a justification for retaining a place-of-
322 In such a situation, the individual would view the corporation as a U.S.
corporation, yet the hypothetical management headquarters test would treat the
corporation as foreign.
323 See supra note 289.
324 While most corporations that U.S. individuals perceive to be "American"
companies probably do, indeed, have their place of incorporation in the United
States, this might be a function of the historical overlap between place of
incorporation and other factors upon which corporate residency could be based. Cf.
Graetz, supra note 12, at 321 ("Perhaps there was a time when national identity
exerted sufficient pull that a corporation controlled by U.S. individuals would find
incorporation of the parent entity elsewhere unthinkable, but that time seems to have
passed.").
325 As noted above, this discussion assumes that the United States will retain
residence-based taxation, and therefore significant tax determinations depend on the
residence of the corporation. See supra notes 253-254 and accompanying text.
326 See Fleming et al., supra note 32, at 326 (observing that, in the context of
considering a residence test based on the residence of a corporation's shareholders,
"it seems quite possible that most corporations that are incorporated or managed in
the United States are substantially owned by U.S. residents. This is, unfortunately, an
empirical question for which we do not have the definitive answer ... ").
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incorporation rule might not be correct.
The United States collects a significant amount of tax revenue
from corporations that have substantial worldwide operations and
that are incorporated under the law of a U.S. state.3 7 It is reasonable
to assume that a large portion of these corporations currently have
their management headquarters in the United States.3 s If the United
States were to change its test for corporate residence from place of
incorporation to a more fact-specific test, such as the place of primary
management and control,"9 it is unlikely that, in the short or medium
term, a significant number of corporations would change their
management headquarters to a country outside the United States.
Such a change, particularly if it avoided an overly formalistic
determination of management and control,33 would involve more
substantive considerations than the mere change in place of
incorporation. After all, key management personnel might object to
being uprooted from their long-established homes in the United
States. While it is possible that in the long term a corporation might
change its management headquarters - for example, by hiring more
foreign executives in the future - even in the long term this test is
less manipulable than the place-of-incorporation test.
31
327 U.S. domestic corporations that claimed a foreign tax credit in 1999 "reported
foreign-source taxable income of $165.7 billion, which represented approximately 42.9
percent of the $385.8 billion in 'worldwide taxable income'. . . reported by these
companies." Brian Raub, Corporate Foreign Tax Credit, 1999, IRS STATISTICS OF
INCOME BULLETIN, Fall 2003, at 205. Although the worldwide taxable income was
subject to a 35.2% effective tax rate before credits, these corporations claimed foreign
tax credits equal to 28.2% of their worldwide taxable income. Id. at 213 fig. F.
32S Given the current tax implications arising from the place-of-incorporation
rule, it seems unlikely that a foreign-headquartered corporation would have selected
the United States as its place of incorporation.
329 See supra notes 313-320 and accompanying text.
330 In some jurisdictions that focus on the place of management to determine
corporate residence, that inquiry has evolved into an easily manipulable "formal test
by focusing on easily controlled events like the place at which the board of directors
meets, rather than the situs of day-to-day management decisions." AULT ET AL.,
supra note 243, at 371 (emphasis added). However, more recent formulations, such as
that envisioned by the U.S.-Netherlands Protocol, supra note 313, look beyond these
formalistic approaches. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
331 See supra note 312 and accompanying text. The long-term effect of the place-
of-incorporation test is demonstrated by testimony of Robert Perlman, a Vice
President of Intel Corporation, before a Senate Finance Committee hearing. Mr.
Perlman testified that "if Intel were to be founded today, I would strongly advise that
the parent company be incorporate[d] outside the United States." Unofficial
Transcript of Finance Hearing on International Tax Laws, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar.
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Thus, given the significant number of U.S.-incorporated entities
that have their management headquarters in the United States, a shift
from a place-of-incorporation test to management headquarters test is
unlikely by itself to result in any significant additional revenue loss, at
least in the short term.
c. Summary
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, the normative justifications
for a place-of-incorporation rule are somewhat tenuous. The
strongest justification is the rule's administrative simplicity. More
substantive theories - in particular, a benefits theory analysis -
provide only limited support for determining a corporation's tax
residence solely based on place of incorporation, particularly in light
of the significant tax consequences that flow from a determination of
U.S. residence. Similarly, theories of legal personhood provide only
limited support for the rule, particularly when federalism concerns are
taken into consideration.
C. Implications for Expatriating Corporations
The preceding subpart considered the possible justifications for a
place-of-incorporation test of corporate residence. This subpart
extends that analysis of the place-of-incorporation justifications to the
corporate expatriation phenomenon. In particular, it considers the
extent to which the new AJCA inversion provision, which applies a
domestic taint to an expatriated corporation, can be defended in light
of the (tenuous) normative justifications for the place-of-
incorporation rule. It also considers whether any other policies might
support a special domestic taint for expatriated corporations. This
subpart concludes that the special domestic taint of the new provision
cannot be reconciled with the existing place-of-incorporation rule, and
that the provision implicitly supports an abandonment of the place-of-
incorporation rule as the general test.
1. Fundamental Inconsistencies in New Tax Provision
Subpart B, above, concluded that administrative simplicity
16, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 1999 TNT 50-54). See also NY
STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 30 ("U.S. taxation of foreign income
generally can be avoided where a U.S. business that will have predominant (but
dispersed) U.S. ownership is incorporated de novo as a subsidiary of a foreign
corporation.") (footnote omitted).
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provides the strongest argument in favor of a place-of-incorporation
rule for corporate residence, and that benefits theory and legal
personhood considerations provide lesser support. It is important to
consider the extent, if any, to which these justifications for the general
definition of corporate residence can be reconciled with the AJCA
provision that treats the corporate parent as a domestic corporation
even after a reincorporation outside the United States. As the
following discussion demonstrates, the two approaches are not easily
reconciled.
As discussed above, 32  one justification for the place-of-
incorporation rule is its administrative simplicity. The enactment of
the new legislation, which retains the general place-of-incorporation
rule for most corporations but adds a separate test for certain
corporate expatriates,333 retains this administrative simplicity for the
large majority of corporations that do not undertake inversion
transactions. Thus, for most corporations, the new law is not
inconsistent with this normative justification for the general place-of-
incorporation rule. 34
However, administrative simplicity standing alone is a feeble
normative basis upon which to base a definition with such significant
tax consequences. After all, many arbitrary rules might be
administratively simple, yet would not form a sound basis for
imposing tax. Accordingly, it is important to consider the extent to
which the new provision is consistent with the other justifications for a
place-of-incorporation rule.
The benefits theory justification for the place-of-incorporation
test is of particular concern. As discussed above, this theory provides
only limited support for the place-of-incorporation test. However, to
the extent the benefits theory underlies the general place-of-
incorporation test,35 the new AJCA provision is flatly inconsistent
332 See supra notes 308-312 and accompanying text.
333 The details of the legislation are discussed supra notes 235-240 and
accompanying text.
334 It adds some limited subjective complexity to the residency determination for
those corporations that undertake inversions. In particular, it requires a comparison
of the pre- and post-inversion shareholders to determine whether the ownership
continuity test is triggered, and an inquiry regarding the business activities, if any,
conducted in the new country of incorporation. See supra notes 239-240 and
accompanying text.
335 It is reasonable to assume that, even though the actual benefits flowing from
place of incorporation may be limited, a significant number of legislators view the
benefits theory as an important justification for the place-of-incorporation rule.
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with it. In particular, a post-inversion parent incorporated in a foreign
country would receive none of the benefits associated with being
incorporated in a U.S. state, yet that corporation might be treated as a
domestic corporation under the new law in the same way as a
corporation incorporated in a U.S. state and receiving the benefits
associated therewith.
A similar inconsistency exists to the extent the legal personhood
theory is used to justify the place-of-incorporation rule. Following the
inversion, the parent corporation is a legal creation of a foreign
country and derives its existence from that country's laws.
Accordingly, to the (limited) extent a legal personhood theory
justifies treating a U.S.-incorporated corporation as a domestic
corporation, it should follow that the post-inversion corporate parent
should be treated as a foreign corporation. The AJCA legislation
provides otherwise.
2. Other Possible Justifications for Special Expatriation Rule
Despite these inconsistencies between the new tax provision
applicable to expatriated corporations and the policies underlying the
place-of-incorporation rule, the new law might still be defensible if
significant independent policy justifications exist for creating a special
residence test for expatriated corporations. This section briefly
considers this possibility.
a. Neutrality
A separate residency test might be justifiable to the extent it is
necessary to make the act of expatriation tax-neutral.336 Existing law
- in particular, Code section 367 - already attempts to make a
corporate inversion tax-neutral by treating the inversion as a
recognition event for the shareholders and, to a certain extent, the
corporation itself.37 In this way, existing law ensures that neither the
shareholders nor the corporation may escape tax on built-in gain that
arose with respect to the corporate stock or the corporation's assets
during the time the corporation was incorporated in the United States.
This limits the tax benefits that could be obtained by expatriating, but
336 See Abreu, supra note 293, at 1109-20 for an analysis of tax-neutrality in the
context of individuals who surrender citizenship to avoid taxes, concluding that
legislative proposals in the mid-1990s regarding individual expatriation would not
achieve neutrality.
31 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Code section
and the immediate tax consequences to shareholders and the corporations).
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fails to achieve pure neutrality because it does not eliminate the future
tax benefits that will arise under existing law after the inversion is
completed. Moreover, when timing differences are considered,
38existing law is not neutral even with respect to pre-inversion gains.
In contrast, the new AJCA provision achieves tax neutrality for
inversion transactions, at least in the short term, because an inversion
would result in no current or future tax effect on the corporation.
Assuming the provision was triggered, 33 the post-inversion corporate
parent would continue to be treated as a domestic corporation.
However, in the long-term, the new law might not be tax neutral.
Given the possibility of perpetual domestic treatment, persons
organizing new corporations might be more likely to incorporate them
outside the United States. Moreover, even if the provision is tax
neutral, this policy must be weighed against the justifications
underlying the place-of-incorporation rule. For example, tax
neutrality considerations will not necessarily be paramount to the
extent that the place-of-incorporation rule is justified under a benefits
theory and there are even limited benefits associated with
incorporation in the United States. After all, if there is even a limited
338 For example, section 367 would require gain recognition upon an inversion
even though the shareholder had not yet disposed of her stock. I.R.C. § 367. Thus,
the inversion would accelerate gain recognition to earlier than required under the
regular tax rules. This might impose ability-to-pay problems on a taxpayer who has
not yet disposed of her stock. Cf Abreu, supra note 293, at 1112 (mentioning the
potential burden imposed by a proposal to require expatriating citizens to mark-to-
market their assets upon loss of citizenship). Concern over the acceleration of
shareholders' recognized gain has been an important consideration for corporations
contemplating expatriation. See, e.g., COOPER INDUSTRIES, LTD., supra note 263, at 2
(prospectus discussion of tax consequences to shareholders); INGERSOLL-RAND
COMPANY LIMITED, supra note 259, at 3 (same). But see supra note 66 and
accompanying text (noting that the recent fall in stock prices has made this gain
acceleration more palatable to shareholders, particularly when compared to the
expected post-inversion corporate tax benefits).
39 See supra notes 239-240 and accompanying text (discussing ownership
continuity and no substantial business activity tests, which would trigger the domestic
taint).
The incentive to incorporate a new organization outside the United States
existed before enactment of the AJCA tax provision. See supra note 331.
Theoretically, the AJCA provision makes this incentive slightly stronger. Whereas
pre-AJCA law held out the possibility of a U.S.-incorporated entity expatriating in
the future, the new provision generally forecloses this possibility by establishing a
perpetual domestic taint on the corporate parent. However, as a practical matter, it is
doubtful that this change in the law will have much effect on an ex ante decision of
where to incorporate.
[Vol. 24:475
2005] Corporate Expatriation - Symbols and Substance 579
substantive difference between a U.S.-incorporated and a foreign-
incorporated entity, then the equal treatment of the two might not be
justified.
b. Fairness
The new provision that perpetually taints expatriated
corporations might also be justified based on symbolic perceptions of
corporate expatriation. To the extent the public views an inversion as
a mere paper change, allowing the corporation to "get away with"1, / 41
something that individual taxpayers could not easily accomplisn,
public faith in the tax system and voluntary compliance might suffer.
342
The AJCA domestic taint provision prevents such a result by
eliminating any tax benefits from the expatriation.
Even so, a significant element of unfairness still exists. The
provision's special expatriation rule leaves in place the general place-
of-incorporation rule. Accordingly, a corporation originally
incorporated abroad might retain a significant tax advantage over a
corporation originally incorporated in the United States, even if both
companies have similar U.S. management and operations. This
inequity is particularly difficult to justify to the extent that there are
not significant benefits associated with U.S. incorporation.
Moreover, to the extent that the public perceives an expatriating
corporation as achieving an unfair advantage in violation of social
norms,3 43 a legal-based response might not be necessary. Informal
141 While an individual could accomplish an analogous exit from the U.S. tax
system by surrendering his citizenship, such an act would have significant substantive
consequences. See Kirsch, supra note 16, at 874-75 (by renouncing citizenship, a
citizen "would lose his unrestricted right to enter the United States, his ability to
travel using a United States passport, his right to vote in the United States, the
assistance of United States consular services while abroad, and the protection of
United States diplomatic or military intervention abroad") (footnotes omitted); see
also Alice G. Abreu, The Difference Between Expatriates and Mrs. Gregory:
Citizenship Can Matter, 67 TAx NOTES 692, 695 (May 1, 1995) (declaring that the
renunciation of citizcnship "is not just another formalistic act replete with tax
significance but devoid of consequences for any other area of a person's life").
342 See supra note 321 and accompanying text (discussing importance of public's
perception of tax compliance by others); see also NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT,
supra note 3, at 25 ("Even though [the tax benefit] of the inversion may be consistent
with the letter of the law, it may undermine public confidence in the integrity of the
U.S. tax system.").
... As discussed above, the initial Congressional response to expatriation may
have had an information-providing effect in social norm enforcement. See supra
notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
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nonlegal sanctions might be sufficient to deter corporations from
expatriating, as in the Stanley Works example.4
D. New Tax Provision as Harbinger of
Place-of-Incorporation Rule's Demise
If the United States continues to put "flesh into fiction"3 45 by
assigning a residence to a corporation, Congress should ensure that
the chosen method remains justifiable in the increasingly globalized
world in which multinational corporations operate. Subpart B
discussed the tenuous normative support underlying the general
place-of-incorporation rule. Even in the absence of the expatriation
phenomenon, these normative shortcomings indicate a need for
Congress to reconsider the fundamental definitional test underlying
the U.S. residence-based tax system.
Subpart C demonstrated the additional stress that the
expatriation phenomenon has placed on the place-of-incorporation
test.346 In particular, the recent AJCA provision, which attempts to
prevent expatriations by disregarding for tax purposes the change in
place of incorporation, is flatly inconsistent with the benefits theory
and legal personhood theories partially underlying the place-of-
incorporation test.347
This inconsistency shows that Congress should address the
expatriation phenomenon in a broader manner. In particular, it
should begin by focusing on the threshold issue underlying
expatriations: determining what makes a corporation domestic for tax
purposes. In so doing, it should consider the broader implications of
3" See supra notes 162-196 and accompanying text. As noted previously, these
informal nonlegal sanctions are most effective when the corporation relies on retail
sales to the public. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
345 Graetz, supra note 12, at 320. Professor Graetz has argued that "[t]he fragility
and manipulability of the residence of corporations suggests.., that U.S.
international tax policy, to the extent possible, should reduce the tax consequences of
determinations of residence for corporations." Id. at 323. See generally supra notes
253-254 and accompanying text (discussing this article's assumption that the United
States will continue to use a residence-based tax system).
3" See also Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to
International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY L.J. 89, 137 n.117 (noting that "so-called
corporate inversion transactions place ... strain on the place-of-incorporation rule").
347 There are some limited justifications for having a special residency test for
expatriated corporations. See supra notes 336-344 and accompanying text. However,
these policies do not eliminate the significant shortcomings of the place-of-
incorporation test illuminated by the expatriation phenomenon.
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that definition, including the ease of manipulation. Ideally, Congress
would have sufficient confidence in the definition so that it can live
with all of the consequences that flow therefrom.
The response to corporate expatriations demonstrates that
neither legislators nor the public are confident that the place-of-
incorporation rule is the appropriate test for whether a corporation is
domestic. Rather, the expatriation debate rhetoric reflects a
significant gap between the current legal standard for corporate
residence and the public perception of what is an American company.
Indeed, much of the debate assumes that the expatriated company,
despite a change in the paperwork regarding its place of
incorporation, is still in substance an American company.48
In the past, this gap between the place-of-incorporation rule and
public perception was less visible because, as a practical matter, a
corporation's place of incorporation tended to coincide with the place
of its management, the location of its shareholders, the location of its
principal business operations, and other factors that might be
indicative of the "true" residence of a corporation.-49 However, with
the growth of multinational corporate groups, this overlap of factors
has increasingly separated, revealing the shortcomings of relying
exclusively on the place of incorporation to determine tax residence.
This gap is already reflected in certain Code and tax treaty provisions
that determine whether a corporation's place of incorporation reflects
its legitimate residence for purposes of claiming U.S. tax treaty
benefits.
°50
U8 For example, the California legislature, in passing the California Taxpayer
and Shareholder Protection Act, supra note 79, made a legislative finding that "[a]n
expatriate company is a United States based company that has moved in name and on
paper only to a tax haven country and has no substantial business activities in the
country of reincorporation." S.B. 640, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003); see also
Office of Public Affairs, Dep't of Treasury, supra note 84 (statement of then-
Secretary of Treasury Paul O'Neill implicitly assuming that, even after an
expatriation, the corporation will be a "U.S. company headquartered offshore"); 148
CONG. REC. S10,576 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement by Sen. Grassley that
"[i]nverting corporations set up a folder in a foreign filing cabinet or a mail box
overseas and call that their new foreign 'headquarters"'). For additional examples,
see supra notes 251-252 and accompanying text.
39 See supra note 324.
350 See I.R.C. § 884(e) (allowing a foreign corporation to claim a tax treaty
exemption from the branch profits tax only if that corporation is a "qualified
resident" of the foreign country, generally determined by reference to the residence
of the corporation's shareholders); U.S. MODEL TAX CONVENTION, supra note 26, art.
22 (limitation on benefits provision precluding a foreign corporation from claiming
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A recent development in the United States' tax treaty policy
shines particular light on this gap. As discussed supra,"' a new
protocol amending the U.S.-Netherlands income tax treaty recently
entered into force. That protocol adds a requirement that a publicly
traded corporation have its "primary place of management and
control in the State of which it is a [treaty] resident" in order to claim
352treaty benefits. In effect, this requirement represents an
acknowledgement that place of incorporation (and place where
corporate shares are traded) is not, in and of itself, a sufficient
indicator of the "true" residence of a corporation. As summarized by
the Treasury Department's Technical Explanation of the protocol,
this provision (and related provisions) of the protocol "effectively
determine[] whether an entity has a sufficient nexus to [a country] to
be treated as a resident for treaty purposes ....
The gap between place of incorporation and "true" residence of a
corporation is also reflected in numerous non-tax areas that look
beyond the place of incorporation in determining a corporation's
residence."' The new AJCA provision, by placing some reliance on
the identity of the corporation's shareholders and the location of the
corporation's place of business operations, 35 ' reflects a limited attempt
the benefits of the tax treaty unless the corporation meets certain tests based on the
residence of the corporation's shareholders). The large majority of U.S. income tax
treaties currently in force contain a limitation on benefits provision.
351 See supra notes 313-320 and accompanying text.
352 U.S.-Netherlands Protocol, supra note 313, art. 7, S. TREATY Doc. No. 108-25
at 15 (adding a new art. 26, para. 8(d)(ii) to the treaty).
353 TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 318, at 20.
354 For example, in the context of immigration law, a corporation's employees
may be eligible for an E visa to enter the United States if that corporation is a
"national" of a treaty country. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(c) (2004). In determining a
corporation's nationality, the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual explicitly
states that "[t]he country of incorporation is irrelevant to the nationality requirement
for E visa purposes." DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 41.51 n.3.2
(2002). Instead, a corporation's nationality is determined by reference to the
nationality of its shareholders. Id. at n.3.1 (2001) (mentioning that "[iln corporate
structures one looks to the nationality of the owners of the stock"). See generally
Peter A. Le Piane, Note, Stateless Corporations: Challenges the Societas Europaea
Presents for Immigration Laws, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 311, 327-29, 348-
50 (2003) (discussing the nationality of a corporation in the context of E visas and
noting that the Department of State has ignored place of incorporation in this context
for more than fifty years). See Cao, supra note 269, at 445-47 & nn.181-89 (discussing
the shortcomings of a place-of-incorporation rule in the context of international trade
law); Mabry, supra note 269, at 582-84, 587.
355 See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text (discussing the "ownership
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to bridge the gap in the narrow situation of a corporate inversion.
Rather than addressing the shortcomings of the place-of-
incorporation rule in an ad hoc manner through the new AJCA
provision, Congress should consider addressing the rule's
shortcomings in a more general way.356 Given the important tax
consequences that flow from the residency determination, if the
place-of-incorporation rule fails accurately to reflect legislators' and
the public's understanding of what makes a corporation American,
that definition should be revisited across-the-board, not merely when
enterprising corporations seek to turn the rule's shortcomings to their
358
advantage. Possible alternatives include a focus on the residence of
the corporation's shareholders, which would be consistent with
359
existing provisions governing corporate eligibility for tax treaties, or
a focus on the place of the corporation's management and control, as
numerous commentators have advocated.36°  The recent U.S.-
continuity" and "no substantial business activity" tests of the new provision).
356 Some commentators have endorsed a sunsetting form of the Senate-passed
proposal as a temporary stopgap measure, but have argued that a more
comprehensive change should follow. See NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra
note 3, at 3-4.
357 As a commentator observed in a non-expatriation context, "[p]articularly with
regard to juridical entities such as corporations and partnerships, it is far from clear
that the traditional point of beginning, namely place of organization, represents an
appropriate thread on which to hang the full weight of taxing jurisdiction." Andrus,
supra note 244, at 848.
358 Some members of the New York State Bar Tax Section Committee believed
that "it may make sense, as a long-term solution, to change the definition of a
domestic corporation" because of the shortcomings of the place-of-incorporation test.
NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 60; see also Hale E. Sheppard,
Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based Multinational Businesses: Analyzing the Causes for,
Effects of, and Solutions to the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
551, 578-79 (2003) (discussing possibility of replacing place-of-incorporation test with
a management and control test).
359 See supra note 350 and accompanying text. Fleming, Peroni and Shay have
supported this approach. See Fleming et al., supra note 32, at 326. Those
commentators' favored approach is an integration scheme that would ensure the
taxation of shareholders that are themselves U.S. residents. Id. at 318-23. However,
in the absence of such a solution, they advocate an ownership-focused test of
corporate residence because it would further an important "purpose of the U.S. tax
on corporate income[, which] is to serve as an anti-deferral device that preserves the
efficacy of the shareholder-level tax on the worldwide incomes of U.S. shareholders."
Id. at 326 (footnote omitted). In this context, they suggest that the place-of-
incorporation test might be defensible only to the extent that, as an empirical matter,
most U.S.-incorporated corporations are substantially owned by U.S. residents. Id.
360 Professor Avi-Yonah in particular has been a frequent advocate of a
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Netherlands protocol, with its focus on the "primary place of
management and control," is particularly intriguing as a possible test
that might be incorporated into the Code as the general test of
corporate residence, particularly given its focus on day-to-day
management activity, rather than the easily manipulable focus on
361
where the board of directors meets.
A departure from the formal place-of-incorporation test not only
would align the definition more closely with legislative and public
expectations, but would also bring an additional benefit of particular
relevance to this article: it would address Congressional and public
concern over expatriations by eliminating the ability of corporations
to fundamentally alter their U.S. tax profile merely by changing their
• .• 362
place of incorporation. In so doing, it would also eliminate the
unfairness that Stanley Works complained of when its competitors,
management and control test. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Ingenious Kerry Tax
Plan, 103 TAX NOTES 477, 479 (Apr. 26, 2004); Avi-Yonah, supra note 24, at 1796-98.
It is important that a management and control test, if enacted, be implemented in a
way that itself does not create easily manipulated formalities. Professor Avi-Yonah
noted that
[tlhe 'managed and controlled' test has a long history, some of which is not
very distinguished. In particular, many former U.K. colonies have
interpreted it in a mechanical way to focus on where the Board of Directors
meets, which makes the test not less manipulable than the U.S. test.
Boards do not mind meeting twice a year in Bermuda....
.... And yet, if properly defined and interpreted, the managed and
controlled test offers the most promising current definition of corporate
residency - the one most congruent with business realities and therefore
least open to abuse.
Id. at 1797; see also NY STATE BAR INVERSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 49 n.87
("Crafting an appropriate standard may not be so simple; for example, many
'managed and controlled' standards have historically focused on board meetings, a
criterion that the REPO Bill appears to reject (and sensibly so).").
The United Kingdom enacted a combined test that treats a corporation
incorporated in the United Kingdom as a domestic corporation, and also treats a non-
U.K. incorporated entity as a domestic corporation if it is managed and controlled in
the United Kingdom. See Kane, supra note 346, at 91 n.4. Such a test, if enacted in
the United States, would eliminate the tax incentive for most corporations to
undertake inversion transactions, but seems to reflect a "heads I win, tails you lose"
approach at the expense of theoretical consistency.
16' TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 318, at 23; see also supra notes 313-320
and accompanying text (discussing the U.S.-Netherlands protocol).
'62 While a corporation's tax residence might still change under a revised test,
presumably that change would reflect a more substantive change in the corporation's
ownership, management, or other factor underlying a new general residence test.
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Ingersoll-Rand and Cooper Industries, engaged in an inversion
transaction but Stanley Works was prevented from doing so by public
363
and political pressure.
At a minimum, the discussion in this part demonstrates the
important choice that Congress faces if, as this article assumes, a
residence-based tax system is retained. On one hand, Congress can
retain the existing place-of-incorporation definition, with its tenuous
normative underpinnings, and live with the consequences when someS 364
corporations choose to manipulate it through inversion transactions.
Alternatively, it can replace it with a single corporate residence test
with stronger normative support that more accurately reflects the
realities of a globalized world, so that the actions necessary to change
a corporation's tax residence will have some substantive meaning.
The new AJCA provision reflects a difficult-to-defend middle ground.
CONCLUSION
In the past few years, corporate expatriations have attracted
widespread attention. Both the media and Congress have focused on
the image of huge U.S.-based multinational corporations engaging in
seemingly meaningless shuffling of paper to change their status from
domestic to foreign and thereby save millions of dollars in U.S. taxes.
For nearly three years, Congress considered responses to this
phenomenon. Much of Congress's energies during that period
focused on symbolic posturing. Indeed, as discussed in Part III, the
initial expatriation-targeted legislation Congress enacted - an
alternative sanction purporting to ban expatriated companies from
entering into contracts with the Department of Homeland Security -
is prototypical symbolic legislation. That is, it purports to assure the
public that Congress is "doing something" to stop a perceived
problem (corporate expatriations), yet it is enacted in a manner that
does not actually impose instrumental costs on the intended target
363 See STANLEY WORKS, supra note 185, Exhibit 20(i) ("Not only are we
disadvantaged against our foreign competitors, but two of our major U.S.
competitors, Cooper Industries and Ingersoll-Rand Company have a significant
advantage over Stanley Works because they have already reincorporated."). As long
as all three companies retained their relevant profile (e.g., ownership or management)
under a new test, the mere fact that Ingersoll-Rand and Cooper reincorporated would
not alter their U.S. tax profile. This conclusion assumes that Ingersoll-Rand and
Cooper would not be protected by any grandfathering transition rules.
364 Despite the pejorative implications of this alternative, it is not merely
rhetorical. As discussed in Part III, supra, Congress's initial symbolic response
reflected this approach.
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(the politically powerful group of expatriated corporations).
As Part IV demonstrates, however, the initial Congressional
attention had some indirect instrumental effects on the expatriation
trend even in the absence of effective legislation. In particular, by
keeping public attention focused on the phenomenon, Congress
served an information-providing role with respect to the informal
enforcement of social norms. In so doing, it caused some corporations
to reconsider their expatriation plans in fear of possible public
backlash.
Perhaps most importantly, the corporate expatriation trend has
focused attention on U.S. tax policy - in particular, the manner in
which the United States taxes corporations in an international setting.
Like a Rorschach test, legislators have projected their own tax policy
belief systems when interpreting the causes of, and appropriate
responses to, corporate expatriations. Some politicians view
expatriations sympathetically as an understandable response to a
flawed and overreaching U.S. tax system. Accordingly, they advocate
a change in the underlying tax system that would reduce the tax
burden of U.S.-based multinational companies and thereby eliminate
the incentive to expatriate. Others view expatriating corporations as
improperly taking advantage of a loophole in the tax code.
Accordingly, they advocate legislation, as evidenced by the recently-
enacted AJCA provision, that would close this loophole by continuing
to treat a post-expatriation corporation as domestic.
This article argues that both sides in the Congressional debate
misinterpret the expatriation ink-blot, projecting too much of their
own pre-existing notions regarding appropriate tax policy. Rather
than demonstrating the need for a radical overhaul of our
international tax system or the need to selectively target corporations
exploiting perceived loopholes, the expatriation trend primarily
demonstrates the need to reexamine the definition of what is a U.S.
corporation for tax purposes. Given the tenuous normative
underpinnings of the place-of-incorporation rule and its ability to be
manipulated, Congress should focus its attention on this fundamental
building-block of the international tax system. Of course, this tax
policy-grounded inquiry is unlikely to occur unless Congress is able to
move beyond the political allure of symbolic responses to the
phenomenon.
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